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In the past, homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political 
dissident have all been considered to be mental disorders and medically treated on this 
basis. The medical treatment of these conditions seems to be an example in which 
psychiatry has been used as a guise for social control. If the medical treatment of these 
conditions can be safeguarded against, then future misuses of psychiatric treatment 
might also be safeguarded against.  
This thesis considers whether the misuse of medical treatment of these and other 
conditions can be safeguarded against by showing that the following two criteria are 
fulfilled: 
1. Only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders, and 
2. These conditions are not mental disorders in any society.  
The thesis shows that there is a pragmatic (c.f. prescriptive) link between the way the 
concept mental disorder is ordinarily used and medical treatment, and so the first 
criterion is fulfilled. For the second criterion to be true, it needs to be shown that the 
extension of mental disorder is:  
2.1 Static between societies, and 
2.2 Excludes homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a 
political dissident.  
Three potential ways of achieving both 2.1 and 2.2 are considered – basing the 
extension of mental disorder on ordinary language, natural kinds or evaluations. 
Firstly, the way mental disorder is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed 
lay-people in the developed world does exclude homosexuality and the other conditions 
mentioned earlier. However, ordinary language does not make the extension of mental 
disorder static between societies, and so does not fulfil criterion 2.1.  
Secondly, the ordinary use of mental disorder does not pick out a natural kind, so the 
extension of mental disorder cannot be fixed in this sense. If dysfunction (being a 
component of mental disorder) picks out a natural kind, then the extension of mental 
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disorder might be partly static i.e. criterion 2.1 might be fulfilled. However, it is shown 
(using revisionist and conservative naturalism) that if criterion 2.1 is met, then criterion 
2.2 cannot be met and vice versa. This applies whether dysfunction picks out a family 
resemblance natural kind or an essentialist natural kind.   
Thirdly, as disvalue is a necessary component of the ordinary sense of mental disorder 
(as used by health professionals and informed lay-people), there might be Rawlsian 
primary goods concerning the extension of mental disorder. While Graham’s (2013) 
basic psychological capacities might be primary goods, their expansiveness means that 
they are highly unlikely to fix the extension of mental disorder i.e. meet criterion 2.1.  
As none of these approaches fulfil both components of the second criterion, the thesis 
has not shown that the medical treatment of homosexuality, masturbation, being a 
runaway slave and being a political dissident can be safeguarded against by showing, 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1. Mental disorder and medical treatment 
 
Homosexuality is not ordinarily considered to be a mental disorder by health 
professionals and informed lay-people in the developed world.1 As a millennial, who 
grew up in the western world and was raised by a liberal family, it is bizarre to think 
that homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (henceforth, the DSM) until 1974 
(Rubinstein, 1995; Spitzer, 1981). However, homosexuality was considered to be a 
mental disorder in the past and is still considered to be a mental disorder in some parts 
of the world, such as China2, Serbia 3 and Indonesia.4 Other sections of society also 
classify homosexuality as a mental disorder, such as the National Association for 
Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH)5, some fundamentalist Christians and 
orthodox Jews (see Halper & Price, in Earp et al., 2014).6 This thesis considers whether 
those people or societies that consider homosexuality to be a mental disorder are 
wrong. However, the scope of this thesis is not limited to whether homosexuality is a 
mental disorder. While it seems abhorrent to those of us in the developed world to call 
masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political dissident mental disorders, in 
the past all these conditions have been considered to be mental disorders. 7 Hence, this 
                                                          
1 By ‘developed world’, I do not mean the current western world, as there are still some people in the 
West who consider homosexuality to be a mental disorder.  
2 Human Rights Watch (2017), see also BBC (2017).   
3 In 2008, 70% of people living in Serbia considered homosexuality to be a mental disorder (Blagojević, 
2011).  
4 More precisely, the Indonesian Psychiatric Association still considers homosexuality to be a mental 
disorder (Yosephine, 2016).  
5 NARTH argue that homosexuality is a developmental disorder (Nicolosi and Nicolosi, 2012, 12). Joseph 
Nicolosi, who until his death in 2017, was the director of NARTH claimed that there are no gay people 
(teenagers, to be specific). Instead, he claimed that there are only heterosexual people with a homosexual 
problem i.e. a developmental disorder (Nicolosi and Nicolosi, 2012, 173).  
6 On the 6th February 2018, the London cinema Vue cancelled the screening of the film ‘Voices of the 
Silenced’, which supports therapy to make gay people straight. The film was supported by the Core Issues 
Trust; a Christian group who support men and women with homosexual issues who voluntarily seek 
change in sexual preference and expression (BBC, 2018). This has not been used as an example of a group 
of people that consider homosexuality to be a mental disorder because Dr. Mike Davidson, of the Core 
Issues Trust, says that the Trust considers homosexuality to be a ‘normal developmental aberration’ as 
opposed to a disease. However, Dr. Davidson does not explain the difference between diseases (i.e. 
disorders) and aberrations (Moreton, 2012).  Nonetheless, the cancellation of the screening does suggest 
that the medical treatment of homosexuality is looked down upon. 
7 ‘Condition’ is used as a neutral term to pick our states that might potentially be mental disorders.  
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thesis asks whether the extension (i.e. scope8) of mental disorder excludes all those 
conditions we, in the developed world, do not consider to be mental disorders,9 and 
whether this extension can be applied in all societies. 10  This question has two 
components. Firstly, is there an extension of mental disorder that is static between 
societies i.e. an extension of mental disorder that applies in all, even in those societies 
that do not recognise or dispute the extension? (Section two of this chapter explains 
why the thesis asks whether there is a static extension of mental disorder, as opposed to 
whether there is a true extension thereof.) Secondly, does this static extension 
(presuming it exists) exclude all those things we (as health professionals and informed 
lay-people from the present-day West) do not consider to be mental disorders?  If both 
these criteria are true, then those who consider homosexuality (or masturbation, being 
a runaway slave or being a political dissident) a mental disorder are wrong. It is not 
simply the case that these societies use an extension of mental disorder that is different 
to that used in the developed world – their extension would be wrong. I am not the first 
person to consider whether the extension of mental disorder is fixed between societies. 
Brülde puts the problem in the following way:  
Assume that A and B, two physicians (medicine men, or the like) that belong to 
different cultures, disagree on whether a certain person P is ill or not, and that 
they both apply the criteria of their own culture correctly. P is deceitful, 
impulsive, aggressive, reckless, and irresponsible, and A thinks that he suffers 
from a mental disorder (Antisocial Personality Disorder), whereas B thinks he is 
simply a troublesome and disturbing character. In cases like this, is one of the 
parties right while the other is wrong, i.e. do questions of the form “Is P ill or 
not?” have determinate answers? Or can they both be right?” Does it matter if P 
belongs to A’s or B’s culture? (Brülde, 2005, 2).11 
                                                          
8 The extension of a concept is a list of all the members of the kind. For example, the extension of bachelor 
is all the bachelors e.g. Brad Pitt, Tom Cruise and so on. The intension of a concept refers to the meaning 
of a concept. For example, the intension of bachelor is that all bachelors are male, unmarried and adults. 
This example is not intended to suggest that all concepts can be defined essentially i.e. in terms of 
necessary and sufficient elements. 
9 Pragmatic accounts of mental disorder may be able to show that conditions such as homosexuality are 
not mental disorders (see Zachar, 2002; Agich, 1997; Phillips et. al. 2012. This thesis does not consider 
pragmatic accounts of mental disorder due to space and constraints, and the fact that pragmatic accounts are 
unlikely to be able to fix the extension of mental disorder between societies.  
10 When referring to a concept (such as the concept of mental disorder), the term is italicised. When not 
referring to the concept but the thing itself, the term is not italicised. See section two of this chapter.  
11 Nordenfelt also uses this approach – he introduces person C, who exhibits extreme behaviour which 
suggests that C thinks he is in contact with god. A physician determines that C is ill (i.e. disordered), 
whereas a Pentecostal pastor says that C is not ill, but is temporarily out of contact with the world around 
him (Nordenfelt, 1995, 10). Nordenfelt does not use this scenario to ask whether there is a single, correct 
conception of illness) but uses it to show that the physician judges C to be ill while the pastor does not 
because they are considering C from different contexts.  
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Brülde’s scenario can be adapted to be relevant to homosexuality. That is, a health 
professional from one culture might claim that homosexuality is a mental disorder 
while a health professional from the developed world will disagree. Both health 
professionals apply the criteria for mental disorder of their own culture correctly. Is one 
health professional right, and the other wrong? Or is it possible that both health 
professionals are right?  
Why does it matter whether homosexuality falls within the extension of mental 
disorder? This thesis shows that there is a pragmatic link between mental disorder and 
medical treatment such that if a condition is considered to be a mental disorder, then 
medical treatment is appropriate.12 This link does not mean that all and only mental 
disorders should be medically treated. That is, there is no exclusive prescriptive link 
between mental disorder and medical treatment. Instead, the pragmatic link refers to 
the idea that it makes sense to medically treat mental disorders because both medical 
treatment and mental disorders fall within the Asclepian frame.13 Returning to the 
question of why it matters whether homosexuality is a mental disorder, the existence of 
the pragmatic link means that if homosexuality is a mental disorder, then the medical 
treatment of homosexuality is appropriate. (To be clear, this does not mean that medical 
treatment of homosexuality should be provided.) For example, in China, from 2009 to 
2017, there were seventeen cases of forced conversion therapy, including shock 
therapy. 14 While homosexuality was removed from the Chinese Society of Psychiatrist’s 
list of mental disorders in 2001, in practice, homosexuality is still treated on China on 
the basis of being a mental disorder (Human Rights Watch, 2017). As homosexuality is, 
in practice, considered to be a mental disorder in China, this conversion therapy is 
appropriate (c.f. acceptable). The link between mental disorder and medical treatment 
means that in those societies in which homosexuality is considered to be a mental 
disorder, the rhetoric of mental disorder can be used to show that the medical 
                                                          
12 C.f. considered to be appropriate. ‘Considered’ is not required because, as will be shown in section four 
of chapter four, there is a pragmatic link between a condition being considered a mental disorder and 
whether medical treatment is actually appropriate. 
13 The pragmatic link also exists between medical treatment and physical disorders. However, mental 
disorders are the focus of this thesis. 
14 Human Rights Watch (2017). See also BBC (2017). 
Conversion therapy is a generic term to describe medical treatment, such as shock or aversion therapies, 
in which a gay person is treated with the aim of making him or her straight. 
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treatment of homosexuality is appropriate. That is, the medical treatment of 
homosexuality is appropriate on the basis that homosexuality is a mental disorder.  
The rhetoric of disorder cannot be used to show that non-disorders may be medically 
treated – only disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being disorders. If the 
extension of mental disorder is both static and excludes homosexuality, then those 
societies that consider homosexuality to be a mental disorder are wrong. In turn, those 
societies that medically treat homosexuality on the basis that it is a mental disorder 
have incorrectly applied the rhetoric of mental disorder. That is, such a society uses an 
incorrect extension of mental disorder, but the rhetoric (i.e. the pragmatic link) is 
correctly applied. To safeguard against the medical treatment of homosexuality (on the 
basis that is it not a mental disorder), it is insufficient to show that those who consider 
homosexuality to be a mental disorder use an extension of mental disorder that is 
different to that used in the developed world. It must be shown that extensions of 
mental disorder that include homosexuality are wrong. If it can be shown that those who 
claim that homosexuality is a mental disorder’ are wrong, then the medical treatment of 
homosexuality could be safeguarded against. This method does not show that 
homosexuality may never be medically treated. However, if successful, it would show 
that homosexuality may not be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder. For this reason, I do not ask whether this approach will ‘prevent’ the medical 
treatment of homosexuality, but whether it will ‘safeguard’ against such treatment i.e. 
whether it will partially prevent this treatment.  
This line of argument does not only apply to homosexuality, but to all mental conditions. 
That is, if the extension of mental disorder is not dependent on the society in question, 
then it can be shown, for once and for all, whether any condition is a mental disorder. If 
a condition is a mental disorder, then it may be medically treated on the basis of being a 
mental disorder. (This applies to all societies.) On the other hand, if a condition is not a 
mental disorder, then that condition may not be medically treated on the basis of being 
a mental disorder i.e. the rhetoric of mental disorder may not be used to show that 
medical treatment of that condition is appropriate. The condition in question may not 
be treated on the basis of being a mental disorder in any society.  
This argument is important because in past societies, homosexuality, masturbation, 
being a runaway slave and being a political dissident have all been medically treated on 
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the basis of being mental disorders. To most people in the developed world, medically 
treating these conditions (on the basis that they are mental disorders) seems to be an 
abuse of psychiatric power. (To be clear, this does not mean that people should not be 
medically treated if they want to curb their homosexual urges. Instead, it means that the 
medical treatment of these conditions on the basis that they are mental disorders – 
using the rhetoric of mental disorder – seems to be abusive.15) Put bluntly, it seems as if 
these conditions are not mental disorders, but are classified as such to justify medical 
(specifically psychiatric) treatment – it seems as if medicine is being improperly used as 
a façade for social control. For example, diagnosing political dissidents with sluggish 
schizophrenia seems to be a convenient (but deceptive) way of de-legitimising the 
views of political dissidents. This thesis does not endorse anti-psychiatry. I do not agree 
with Szasz’s (1974) proposition that all psychiatric treatment is a guise for social 
control – I do not think that psychiatry is inherently abusive.16 Instead, I think that 
psychiatry has the potential to be used for the purpose of social control, if conditions 
that are not mental disorders are medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders. For example, in 1999, the British Department of Health proposed a new 
mental disorder, dangerous severe personality disorder (DSPD) (Scally, 2016, 184). 
This was largely in response to the conviction of Michael Stone for the murder of a 
mother and child in 1998. Stone was considered to have a personality disorder, but 
psychiatrists considered his personality disorder to be untreatable, and so Stone could 
not be committed under the Mental Health Act 1983 (in England and Wales) (Scally, 
2016, 185; Howells et. al., 2007, 325). Recognition of DSPD also legitimated the 
involuntary treatment of people who were deemed dangerous but had not yet 
committed a crime and did not have another mental disorder. Conceptualising DSPD as 
a mental disorder meant it was seen as a legitimate condition, which in turn meant that 
treatment options were researched. Once potential treatments were found, people with 
DSPD could be committed under mental health legislation. Recognising DSPD as a 
mental disorder also meant that those people who had not committed a crime could be 
involuntarily treated, which provided a degree of safety to the public. This is important 
                                                          
15 Cases might arise in which the person seeking treatment for his or her homosexuality uses the rhetoric 
of mental disorder. In such a case, it is arguable that the medical treatment should be given, but that the 
treatment is not appropriate because homosexuality is not a mental disorder. 
16 Nor do I agree with Szasz (1974) that that unless it can be shown that mental disorders have a physical 
basis, then there is no basis for considering these conditions to be disorders.  
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because people with DSPD who have not committed a crime cannot be imprisoned. It is 
a fundamental principle of law that someone who has not committed a crime cannot be 
imprisoned, and “having a disposition or propensity to break the law is not a crime” 
(Szasz, 2003, 228-229).17  
Many people saw DSPD as a political invention that used medicine as a guise to protect 
the public (Gunn, 2000; see also Szasz, 2003; Buchannan, 2001; Farnham, 2001; White, 
2002). Based on this and other related problems, the diagnosis of DSPD no longer exists 
(Scally, 2016, 194). For another example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it was 
considered whether the diagnostic standards for schizophrenia should be extended to 
include a pre-psychotic stage, called Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (Gosden, 1999). 
Such a diagnosis could easily be used for the purpose of social control, in a similar way 
to which sluggish schizophrenia was used for the purpose of social control.18 In 2012, it 
was decided that Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome would not be included in the DSM-5 
(Yung et. al., 2012). This was not due to concerns about psychiatry being used for the 
purpose of social control, but because of limited and inconclusive evidence (Yung et. al., 
2012, 1131). 
To return to using the argument outlined above, if it can be shown that the extension of 
mental disorder is static between societies and if masturbation, being a runaway slave 
and being a political dissident do not fall within the extension thereof, then none of 
these conditions may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. This 
would apply in all societies i.e. even in those societies that deem these conditions to be 
mental disorders. In this way, the medical treatment of these conditions could be 
safeguarded against. Psychiatry could not be used for the purpose of social control. 
While these four examples are all historical (excepting homosexuality, which is still 
considered to be a mental disorder in some societies) there might be other examples in 
which psychiatry is still being used as a guise for social control. In other words, there 
are other examples of mental conditions whose status as mental disorders is debated 
                                                          
17 There are some exceptions to this rule. In New Zealand, some sexual or violent offenders might be given 
a sentence of preventive detention (section 87 Sentencing Act 2002) or a public protection order (Public 
Safety (Public Protection Orders) Act 2014). While these people have committed a crime, they have 
served their sentence, and so, in effect, are subject to ongoing imprisonment without having committed a 
crime. Another potential exception is that a person may be remanded in custody while awaiting trial. 
18 See section 3.4 of chapter two. 
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within a western framework. For example, the mainstream view is that Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a mental disorder and ADHD is medically treated 
with, for example, methylphenidate (Ritalin).19 However, a minority of people argue 
that ADHD is not a mental disorder but the consequence of expecting people to succeed 
in the structured environment of the classroom or office (see, for example, Timimi & 
Taylor, 2004; and Conrad & Potter, 2000). If ADHD is not a mental disorder, then the 
rhetoric of mental disorder cannot be used to justify the medical treatment of 
hyperactive people. It could also be argued that treating hyperactive people with Ritalin 
on the basis that ADHD is a mental disorder is an abuse of psychiatric power20 – using 
psychiatry as a guise to justify the treatment of people who are not mentally disordered 
but socially deviant.21 This thesis is agnostic on whether ADHD is a genuine mental 
disorder. Instead, the example is given to demonstrate that if the extension of mental 
disorder is not static, then ADHD might be a mental disorder in the developed world, but 
might not have been a mental disorder in a hunter-gatherer society. This might be 
beneficial as it would allow the extension of mental disorder to be tailored to the society 
in question. However, the downside is that many things that we, in the developed world, 
do not consider to be mental disorders, such as being a runaway slave, might be 
considered to be a mental disorder in other societies. Furthermore, in these other 
societies, those conditions may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders.  In contrast, if the extension of mental disorder were fixed between societies, 
then there would be restrictions on what is a mental disorder. Whether a condition is a 
mental disorder would be static between societies, and in turn, whether that condition 
may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder would also be static 
between societies. Put another way, if there were an extension of mental disorder that 
was static between societies, then it could be determined, for once and for all, whether 
the diagnosis and medical treatment of ADHD is an example of psychiatry being used as 
a guise for social control. 
                                                          
19 ADHD is included in both the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) and the tenth 
version of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10).  
20 See, for example, Norris and Lloyd in Mather, 2012, 19; and Conrad, 2006.  
21 ‘Deviant’ is a loaded term that usually has negative connotations. I do not call hyperactive people 
‘deviant’ in the sense that the behaviour of hyperactive people is to be disvalued. Instead, I use ‘deviant’ to 
denote that those people whose behaviour or way of being are or has been disvalued by society in 
general. For example, hyperactive people are socially deviant in the sense that their hyperactivity is 
disvalued because it disrupts the classroom and work environment. 
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A further example is schizophrenia. The mainstream view is that schizophrenia is a 
mental disorder.  However, there are those who debate whether schizophrenia is a 
mental disorder. As mentioned earlier, Szasz (1974) argues that unless it can be shown 
that mental disorders have a physical basis, there are no such things as mental 
disorders and that all psychiatric treatment is a guise for social control. Hence, Szasz 
would claim that schizophrenia is not a mental disorder, and the medical treatment of 
schizophrenia (on the basis that it is a mental disorder) is a misuse of psychiatry. In 
addition, Bentall (1993) and Boyle (1990) argue that schizophrenia is not a mental 
disorder because it does not meet the standards of scientific validity (Poland, 2007, 
170). As argued with respect to ADHD, it would be beneficial if the extension of mental 
disorder were static, because it could show, for once and for all, whether schizophrenia 
is a mental disorder. It could also show, for once and for all, whether the medical 
treatment of these conditions is appropriate (on the basis that these conditions are 
mental disorders) or whether such treatment amounts to using psychiatry for the 
purpose of social control.  
2. Thesis Argument 
So far, it has been explained that a potential way of safeguarding (in part i.e. on the basis 
that they are not mental disorders) against the medical treatment of conditions such as 
homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political dissident is to 
show that 
1. Only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders, and 
2. These conditions are not mental disorders in any society i.e. that the extension of 
mental disorder is static between societies and excludes these four conditions.  
Regarding the second criterion, it needs to be shown that the extension of mental 
disorder is  
2.1 Static between societies, and 
2.2 Excludes homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a 
political dissident.  
Chapter four shows that the first criterion can be fulfilled as there is a pragmatic link 
between mental disorder and medical treatment, and the rhetoric of mental disorder 
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only applies to mental disorders. In subsequent chapters, the thesis considers three 
ways in which the second criterion (i.e. both parts of the second criterion) might be 
fulfilled.22 The first is basing the extension of mental disorder in ordinary language i.e. as 
it is currently used by health professionals and informed lay-people. The second is if 
mental disorder refers to or, more loosely, picks out a natural kind (either essentialist or 
family resemblance.) Additionally, if a component of mental disorder, such as 
dysfunction, picks out a natural kind, then this might mean that the extension of mental 
disorder is partly fixed between societies. Thirdly, the second criterion might be fulfilled 
if there are moral truths or Rawlsian primary goods concerning the extension of mental 
disorder. It is concluded that none of these approaches fulfil both components of the 
second criterion. Ordinary language, at least in very many places, excludes the four 
conditions (homosexuality etc.) but does not provide a static extension of mental 
disorder. Mental disorder does not pick out a natural kind. Moreover, even if dysfunction 
picks out a natural kind, it will not fulfil both components of the second criterion. If 
revisionist naturalism is accepted, the extension of dysfunction might be static, but 
might not exclude the four conditions. If conservative naturalism is accepted, the four 
conditions might be excluded, but it will not provide a static extension of dysfunction. 
Finally, Rawlsian primary goods might exclude the four conditions, but is highly unlikely 
to provide an extension of mental disorder that is static between societies.  
In short, the thesis has not been able to verify the second criterion. The extension of 
mental disorder is not both fixed between societies and excludes the four conditions. 
This means that the medical treatment of homosexuality (and masturbation, being a 
runaway slave, being a political dissident or, indeed, any other condition) cannot be 
safeguarded against on the basis that they are not mental disorders. More generally, this 
approach cannot safeguard against psychiatry being used as a guise for social control.  
3. Three notes on terminology 
3.1 Concepts, terms and things in themselves 
When referring to a concept (such as the concept mental disorder), the term is italicised. 
When not referring to the concept but the thing itself, the term is not italicised. When 
                                                          
22 These approaches are the main ones that are available. While there may be other approaches, they are 




referring to the word (i.e. the term) MENTAL DISORDER, capital letters are used. 
Throughout this thesis, I refer to the ‘extension of mental disorder’. By this, I mean the 
extension of the concept mental disorder. However, given that mental disorder is 
italicised, to say that I mean the extension of the concept is superfluous. At times, it is 
debatable whether a word should be italicised or capitalised. For example, in the claim 
‘in ordinary language, mental disorder is used to refer to …’, one might have either the 
word (or phrase) MENTAL DISORDER in mind or the concept mental disorder in mind. I 
am predominantly interested in the concept of mental disorder as opposed to linguistic 
issues regarding the term MENTAL DISORDER. Hence, this thesis has a great many more 
italics than capitals.  
3.2 Disorder, disease or illness? 
Secondly, I acknowledge that there is an ongoing debate regarding whether mental 
disorders are members of the set of disorders (that is, whether the concept of disorder 
includes the concept of mental disorder as a sub-concept). I acknowledge but do not pay 
close attention to this debate. Currently, the idea that there are no such things as mental 
disorders has lost favour (Perring, 2010) and so I align myself with the mainstream 
view and presume that the concept mental disorder is a subset of the concept disorder. 
To refer to both physical and mental disorders, I use the term DISORDER. To refer solely 
to mental disorders, I use the term MENTAL DISORDERS. 
There are multiple terms that could have been used instead of MENTAL DISORDER. For 
example, Boorse (1975) and Cooper (2007; 2002) use MENTAL DISEASE and Fulford 
(1989) uses MENTAL ILLNESS.23  I consider these concepts to be roughly synonymous 
and have chosen to use MENTAL DISORDER. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is 
the concept used by Wakefield (1992), and Wakefield’s account of mental disorder 
features prominently in this thesis and in the literature.  Likewise, the DSM and the 
World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD) use MENTAL 
DISORDER. (The ICD uses DISEASE for physical conditions, but MENTAL DISORDER to 
refer to mental health problems.) Again, it makes sense to align my terminology with 
these tomes. Secondly, the concept disease is problematic insofar as in ordinary 
language, disease is usually taken to cover a rather narrow range of conditions such as 
malaria and cancer. In contrast, Boorse uses disease in a much broader way to include 
                                                          
23 Clouser, Culver and Gert (1981) use MALADY to refer to both physical disorders and mental disorders. 
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broken bones, gunshot wounds and suffocation i.e. Boorse uses DISEASE to mean the 
absence of health (Boorse, 1987, 363-364). This broad conceptualisation of disease is 
equivalent to the concept pathological condition (Boorse, 1997, 551). In contrast, the 
way that DISORDER is used in everyday language is broader than the way DISEASE is 
ordinarily used. That is, MENTAL DISORDER is ordinarily used to refer to pathological 
conditions of the mind. Given that a large portion of this thesis focuses on ordinary 
language, MENTAL DISORDER is preferable to MENTAL DISEASE.  
3.3 True extension v. Static Extension 
So far, it has been explained that the thesis considers whether there is an extension of 
mental disorder that is static between societies. There are two ways in which the idea 
that ‘there is an extension of mental disorder that applies in all societies’ could be cashed 
out. Firstly, it could be said that there is a truth concerning the extension of mental 
disorder. Secondly, it could be asked whether the extension of mental disorder is static 
between societies. This thesis has opted to ask whether there is an extension of mental 
disorder that is static between societies (as opposed to whether there is a true extension 
thereof). The advantage of asking whether there is a static extension of mental disorder 
is that it clearly shows what I have in mind – whether the disorder-status of a mental 
condition can be determined for once and for all.  In contrast, asking whether there is an 
extension of mental disorder that is true does not highlight that the thesis is interested 
in the fixedness of the extension of mental disorder. The advantage of asking whether 
there is a true extension of mental disorder is that it allows for some flexibility in the 
extension of mental disorder. This is beneficial because there are some examples in 
which whether a condition is a mental disorder seems to be genuinely dependent to the 
environment in question. For example, it is arguable that dyslexia might be a mental 
disorder in a literate society but not in a pre-literate society.24 Asking whether there is 
                                                          
24 Sickle cell anaemia is an example of which a physical condition may be a physical disorder in one 
environment but not another. Sickle cell anaemia is a genetic blood condition which causes fatigue, heart 
palpitations, shortness of breath, blood clots and the destruction of red blood cells. Sickle cell anaemia 
seems to be a paradigm example of a physical disorder. However, people with sickle cell anaemia have a 
thirty-three percent increase in immunity to a tropical form of malaria, plasmodium falciparum (Ruse, 
1981, 17). It is arguable that sickle cell anaemia is a physical disorder in environments free of malaria, but 
is not a disorder in environments with malaria. See, for example, Engelhardt, 1996, 166 C.f. Boorse who 
claims that sickle cell anaemia is a disease (which I take to be analogous with ‘disorder’) that provides 
immunity to the more serious disease of malaria (Boorse, 1997, 89).  
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an extension of mental disorder that is static between societies does not allow for this 
flexibility.  
Despite this, this thesis does not ask whether there is a true extension of mental 
disorder. This is because, as already explained, this might mean that homosexuality is 
considered to be a mental disorder in homophobic societies, being a political dissident 
is considered to be a mental disorder in dictatorships, and so on.25 That is, allowing for 
flexibility is dangerous insofar as psychiatry could be used as a guise for social control. 
This is not to say that a true extension of mental disorder means that anything goes i.e. 
that a true extension of mental disorder could not put any limits on its scope, or that 
whether a condition is a mental disorder is entirely relative to the culture in question. 
However, this thesis focuses on ways in which it might be shown that conditions such as 
homosexuality are not mental disorders in any society. Hence, while the thesis 
recognises that a degree of flexibility in the extension of mental disorder would be 
beneficial, the thesis still asks whether there is an extension of mental disorder that is 
static between societies. My hope is that this thesis will ask whether there is a fixed 
extension of mental disorder, and a later piece of work will consider whether the fixed 
extension of mental disorder can be tempered to allow that certain conditions (e.g. 
dyslexia might be mental disorders in some societies but not others), while also 
ensuring that it remains that conditions such as homosexuality are not mental disorders 
in any society. 
4. Thesis Structure 
 
This main part of the thesis is comprised of two parts. Part one consists of chapters two, 
three and four. This part focuses on the first of the two criteria outlined above - only 
mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders. 
Chapter two provides a historical basis to the link between mental disorder and medical 
treatment, and also explains my motivation for wanting to safeguard against the 
medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality. Chapter three considers ways in 
                                                          
25 Equally, every disorder is advantageous in a Nazi concentration camp in which medical research is 
being carried out to cure that disorder (Boorse, 1997, 89). That is, a person with the disorder being 
researched will not be gassed or otherwise killed, and so will live for longer than a person without that 
disorder. 
In other words, I do not endorse the ideas health equals adaptation to the environment and that disorder 




which the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality might be safeguarded 
against, and concludes that a potentially promising way of doing so is to claim that a) 
only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being disorders, and b) 
that homosexuality and so on are not mental disorders in any society. Chapter four 
shows that there is a pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical treatment, 
and so the first criterion is fulfilled. 
Part two, which is made up of chapters five through eight, concentrates on the second of 
the two criteria i.e. conditions such as homosexuality are not mental disorders in any 
society. (This includes both parts of the second criterion i.e. whether there is an 
extension of mental disorder that is static between societies and excludes 
homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political dissident.) 
Chapter five considers whether basing the meaning of mental disorder on the way it is 
used in ordinary language can meet both parts of the second criterion. Chapters six and 
seven consider whether natural kinds can meet these objectives. Chapter eight 
considers whether the value-status of a mental state can be fixed using moral truths or 
primary goods, and in turn, whether the second criterion can be fulfilled. 
The conclusion ties together the material discussed throughout the thesis, and 
concludes that the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality cannot be 
safeguarded against by showing that they are not mental disorders in any society. The 
coda offers suggestions for further consideration.  
Part One 
Part one focuses on the first criterion, namely, showing that only mental disorders may 
be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders.  
Chapter Two: Four Historical Case Studies 
The second chapter explains, in more detail, that in some societies – both past and 
present –homosexuality is considered to be a mental disorder. In turn, medical 
treatment was used in an attempt to ‘cure’ a person of homosexuality. It also explains 
that, in some societies of the past, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a 
political dissident have been both considered to be mental disorders and medically 
treated. There are two main points to be taken from the four historical case studies. The 
first is that the extension of mental disorder changes depending on the society in 
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question. Secondly, these conditions were medically treated on the basis of being 
mental disorders. (The link between mental disorder and medical treatment is 
considered in detail in chapter four.) Chapter two also considers conditions whose 
status as a mental disorder is debated within the developed world, such as ADHD.  
Chapter Three: Ways of showing that a condition should not or may not be medically 
treated 
Chapter three considers three ways in which it could be argued that homosexuality, 
along with masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political dissident, should 
not or may not be medically treated. The first way is to show that these conditions 
should not be medically treated, if the treatment does not balance the standard 
bioethical criteria, namely, benefit to the patient, harm minimisation and consent 
(where required). (This section also discusses Fulford’s (2004a) values-based 
medicine.) The second way is to argue that only disorders may (c.f. should) be medically 
treated. The third method is to show that only mental disorders may be medically 
treated on the basis of being mental disorders. On this approach, non-disorders may be 
medically treated, but the rhetoric of disorder cannot be used to justify the medical 
treatment thereof. This thesis utilises the third approach.  
Chapter Four: The link between mental disorder and medical treatment 
Chapter four begins by defining medical treatment as those products and services, both 
effective and ineffective, that are provided by health professionals in their capacity as 
health professionals. It then considers the link between a condition being a mental 
disorder and medical treatment. It shows that while there is no exclusive prescriptive 
link between mental disorder and medical treatment, there is a pragmatic link between 
the two insofar as it is appropriate to medically treat mental disorders i.e. that the 
medical treatment of mental disorders makes sense. This is because both mental 
disorders and medical treatment fall within the Asclepian frame. 
Part Two 
Part two focuses on the second of the two criteria, namely, whether it can be shown that 
conditions such as homosexuality are not mental disorders in any society. 
Chapter Five: Conceptual Analysis and Ordinary Language Philosophy  
This chapter begins the consideration of the meaning of mental disorder and considers 
the way mental disorder is used in ordinary language, specifically the way it is used by 
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health professionals in clinical settings and informed lay-people in serious situations. It 
shows that this sense of mental disorder has three necessary and sufficient components, 
namely, that the condition is mental (as opposed to physical), caused by a dysfunction 
and disvalued. The previous four chapters have presumed that homosexuality is not a 
mental disorder. From this chapter onwards, it is asked whether it is the case that 
homosexuality cannot be a mental disorder in any society. 
Chapter five shows that basing the extension of mental disorder in ordinary language 
means that homosexuality and so on are not mental disorders, at least in the developed 
world. However, ordinary language does not fix the extension of mental disorder 
between societies. Hence basing the extension of mental disorder in ordinary language 
will not fulfil the first component of the second criterion, and hence the second criterion 
cannot be fulfilled i.e. it will not show that conditions such as homosexuality are not 
mental disorders in any society.    
Chapter Six: Do mental disorder or dysfunction pick out natural kinds? 
Chapter six shows that as disvalue is a necessary component of the way mental disorder 
is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people, this sense of mental 
disorder cannot pick out a natural kind (either essentialist or family resemblance). 
Despite this, chapter six shows that dysfunction (being a component of mental disorder) 
might pick out a natural kind. If so, then it is arguable that the extension of dysfunction 
will not change between societies. In turn, part of the extension of mental disorder will 
not change between societies. Hence, the first component of the second criterion might 
be fulfilled. Rather than showing that dysfunction picks out a natural kind, this chapter 
(along with chapter seven) considers the implications of dysfunction being a natural 
kind, specifically whether it will fix the extension of dysfunction.  
Chapter Seven: Natural Kinds continued – Conservative and Revisionist Naturalism 
The chapter first considers Murphy and Woolfolk’s (2000; 2000a) claim that Wakefield 
is a conservative naturalist i.e. that Wakefield thinks natural kinds are constrained by 
ordinary language. I argue that while Wakefield is a black box essentialist, it is unclear 
whether he is a conservative naturalist. This chapter then continues the discussion of 
whether criterion two can be fulfilled i.e. whether the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) can show that conditions such as homosexuality are not mental 
disorders in any society. It is shown that conservative naturalism means that 
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homosexuality cannot fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) at 
least in the developed world, but does not provide a static extension of dysfunction (and 
in turn, mental disorder). Revisionist naturalism does provide a static extension of 
dysfunction, but cannot ensure that homosexuality is not caused by a dysfunction. In 
short, even if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, neither revisionist naturalism nor 
conservative naturalism can fulfil both components of criterion two.   
Chapter Eight: Are the values concerning mental disorders fixed? 
If the value-status of mental states were fixed, the extension of mental disorder would be 
fixed i.e. static between societies. Chapter eight argues that while moral truths could be 
used to show that the value-status of mental states are fixed, Mackie’s (1977) argument 
from queerness means that this is unlikely to be successful. Instead, chapter eight 
argues that Graham’s (2013) basic psychological capacities are Rawlsian primary goods 
concerning mental states. To include all conceptions of the good life, the basic 
psychological capacities need to be expansive. However, this expansiveness means that 
the basic psychological capacities are unlikely to fix the extension of mental disorder 
(criterion 2.1). An additional problem is Graham’s claim that an inability to grasp 
morality might be indicative of a mental disorder.  
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
The aim of the concluding chapter is to tie up any loose ends and to outline my position. 
The thesis concludes that none of the approaches considered (ordinary language, 
conservative naturalism and revisionist naturalism regarding dysfunction, and primary 
goods) can ensure that conditions such as homosexuality are not mental disorders in 
any society. That is, while the first criterion (only mental disorders may be medically 
treated on the basis of being disorders) is true, the second criterion is not. That is, both 
components of the second criterion cannot be simultaneously fulfilled. It is either the 
case that the extension of mental disorder is static between societies or that conditions 
such as homosexuality are excluded from the extension thereof. We cannot both have 
our cake and eat it. Hence, it cannot be said that those who consider conditions such as 
homosexuality to be mental disorders, and medically treat them on this basis, are 
wrong. Two methods that might be more fruitful are considered. Firstly, it is considered 
whether the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality could be 
safeguarded against using the established norms in medical ethics, such as the need (in 
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most cases) for informed consent and that the treatment does not unduly harm the 
patient. Secondly, it is briefly considered whether Fulford’s (2004a) values-based 
medicine (VBM) might safeguard against the medical treatment of these conditions. 




PART ONE – THE LINK BETWEEN MENTAL DISORDERS 
AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 
Chapter Two – Historical Case Studies 
1. Introduction 
This thesis consists of an analysis of a philosophical and ethical issue in the philosophy 
of psychiatry, specifically whether it can be shown that a condition is or is not a mental 
disorder in all societies, and in turn whether it can be shown that that condition may be 
medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. The intension (meaning) and 
extension (scope) of mental disorder has been the subject of intense debate since the 
1970s.  A major reason for this is that homosexuality was removed from the American 
Psychiatric Association’s second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (i.e. the 
DSM-II) in 1974 (Rubinstein, 1995; Spitzer, 1981). In effect, this meant that gay people 
were cured of a mental disorder, not by eradicating homosexuality, but by a 
classificatory change.  
It is not only homosexuality that has changed mental disorder status. This chapter 
explains three further conditions that were once considered to be mental disorders, but 
are no longer considered to be mental disorders in the developed world. These 
conditions26 are masturbation, drapetomania (i.e. being a runaway slave) and sluggish 
schizophrenia (i.e. being a political dissident). The extension of mental disorder matters 
because, as will be established in chapter four, the medical treatment of mental 
disorders is appropriate. If homosexuality (or masturbation, drapetomania or sluggish 
schizophrenia) is a mental disorder, then the medical treatment of that condition is 
appropriate. If homosexuality or any other condition is not a mental disorder then the 
medical treatment of that condition is not appropriate, at least, on the basis that the 
condition in question is a mental disorder. 
To determine whether homosexuality, masturbation, drapetomania and sluggish 
schizophrenia may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders, it needs 
to be determined whether these conditions are mental disorders. In order to determine 
                                                          
26 ‘Condition’ is used as a neutral term to pick our states that might potentially be mental disorders 
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whether these conditions are mental disorders, the meaning of mental disorder requires 
consideration. Section one of this chapter gives a brief rundown of the ways in which 
mental disorder can be conceptualised. This is not an exhaustive analysis of the 
conceptualisation of mental disorder but is, instead, intended to facilitate the discussion 
in the remainder of this chapter.  
The second section of this chapter discusses the four case studies – homosexuality, 
masturbation, drapetomania and sluggish schizophrenia. There are two main reasons 
for discussing these four case studies. Firstly, they introduce the idea that a condition 
can be considered to be a mental disorder in one society, but that same condition is not 
considered to be a mental disorder in some other society. Secondly, the case studies 
introduce the link between mental disorder and medical treatment – considering a 
condition to be a mental disorder means that the medical treatment of that condition is 
appropriate. In contrast, if a condition is not a mental disorder, then medical treatment 
of that condition is not appropriate, at least on the basis that the condition is a mental 
disorder. The link is only introduced here, but is discussed in more detail in chapter 
four. 
As the extension of mental disorder can change between societies, whether the medical 
treatment of that condition is appropriate might also change between societies. It might 
be appropriate, for example, to medically treat homosexuality in some societies but not 
others. Consequently, although most people in the developed world find the medical 
treatment of homosexuality abhorrent, the medical treatment of homosexuality cannot 
be safeguarded against simply by showing that homosexuality is not a mental disorder. 
Instead, it needs to be shown that homosexuality is not a mental disorder in any society. 
The same applies to the other three case studies, and, as will be shown in the final 
section of this chapter, any other condition for which its status as a mental disorder is 
debatable.  
In short, the aim of this chapter is twofold. The first is to provide a historical basis to the 
link between mental disorder and medical treatment. The second is to explain my 




2. The meaning of mental disorder 
It cannot be determined whether a condition is a mental disorder (and whether it may 
be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder) without knowing what 
mental disorder means. The meaning of mental disorder is discussed at length 
throughout this thesis. This section only provides a starting point i.e. a rough and ready 
account of the meaning of mental disorder. Much of what is said in this section is 
considered in more detail in chapter five. One way of determining the meaning of 
mental disorder is to consider the way it is ordinarily used by health professionals in 
clinical settings and informed lay-people in serious situations.27 This sense of mental 
disorder has three necessary and sufficient elements: 
1. Mental disorders must be mental as opposed to physical. 
2. Mental disorders must be disvalued as opposed to valued or value-neutral.  
3. Mental disorders must involve something going wrong (with the mind).28   
Regarding the first condition, mental disorders are conditions of the mind as opposed to 
physical conditions. This applies to both symptoms and causes. The causes of mental 
conditions are mental i.e. in the brain or mind. The symptoms of mental disorders are 
also largely mental (c.f. for example, psychosomatic disorders such as conversion 
disorder). For example, broken arms are not mental disorders because a broken arm 
has a physical cause, and the symptoms are largely physical (perhaps excluding pain 
which is arguably a mental phenomenon). Secondly, valued or value-neutral conditions 
are not mental disorders. For example, being happy or intelligent are not mental 
disorders.29 Likewise, while there is (or was) a debate about whether homosexuality is a 
mental disorder, there is no debate about whether heterosexuality is a mental disorder. 
                                                          
27 There are other ways in which mental disorder can be conceptualised. For example, mental disorder can 
be conceptualised as whatever health professionals treat or an unexpected distress or disability 
(Wakefield, 1992, 377-381). 
28 It could be argued that even if these three conditions are necessary, they are not sufficient. For example, 
forgetting where I put my keys is both mental and disvalued. It is also arguably an example of something 
going wrong with the mind. This would mean, according to my criteria, forgetting where I put my keys 
would be a mental disorder, even though we would not ordinarily call this a mental disorder. However, it 
is doubtful whether forgetting where I have put my keys is indicative of something going wrong with my 
mind, as it seems to be part of ordinary (non-dysfunctional) forgetfulness. Hence, I maintain that the 
three elements are sufficient (as well as necessary) for a condition to be a mental disorder. 
29 C.f. Bentall, 1992 and Harris et. al., 1993.  
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This is because heterosexuality is not disvalued.30  This makes me a normativist 
regarding mental disorder. As Wakefield says, an evaluative component is an “important 
truth” regarding disorders (Wakefield, 1992, 376). In contrast, naturalists regarding 
mental disorder claim that it is a value-free concept. For example, Christopher Boorse 
(1976; 1975) argues that disease (which includes mental diseases) is a value-free 
concept, namely a statistically abnormal mental dysfunction. 31 The problem with value-
free accounts of mental disorder is that they do not reflect the way mental disorder is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people. Strong normativists 
claim that disvalue is both necessary and sufficient for a condition to be a mental 
disorder i.e. that mental disorder is a purely evaluative concept. For example, Sedgwick, 
a strong normativist, says that, “all sickness is essentially deviancy [from] some 
alternative state of affairs which is considered more desirable” (Sedgwick, 1982, 32).32 
A disadvantage of strong normativism is that it fails to recognise that there are 
disvalued mental conditions that we do not ordinarily consider to be mental disorders. 
For example, health professionals and informed lay-people do not ordinarily call the 
grief experienced after the death of a loved one a mental disorder. Another problem 
with strong normativism is that it makes mental disorder “a completely value and 
culture-relative notion with no scientific content whatsoever” (Wakefield, 1992, 376).  
Weak normativism can account for both these problems (of naturalism and strong 
normativism). Weak normativists claim that disvalue is necessary but not sufficient for 
a condition to be a mental disorder. For example, a weak normativist will argue that in 
addition to being disvalued, all mental disorders must involve something going wrong 
with the mind.33 For example, if post-bereavement grief does not involve anything going 
wrong with the mind, then post-bereavement grief is not a mental disorder. As will be 
shown in the remainder of this chapter, whether ‘something has gone wrong with the 
                                                          
30 That is, I do not know of any society in which heterosexuality is disvalued. However, if heterosexuality 
turns out to be disvalued by some society and involve something going wrong with the mind, then it 
would be a mental disorder in that society. See also Bentall (1992) on the classification of happiness 
(being a mental state that is not disvalued) as a mental disorder. 
31 Mental disease can be taken to be roughly analogous to mental disorder. See section x of chapter one. 
While Boorse thinks disease is a value-free concept, he argues that this can be built on to produce the 
hybrid (both descriptive and evaluative) concept disease-plus (Boorse, 2014; 1997, 11-13).  
32  See for example Sedgwick on the snapping of a septuagenarian’s femur and the snapping of an autumn 
leaf from its twig (Sedgwick, 1982, 30) and Wakefield’s response (Wakefield, 1992, 376). 
As per section two of chapter one, Sedgwick’s sickness can be taken to be roughly analogous to disorder. 
33 This incorporates the first element i.e. that all mental disorders must be mental. For the sake of brevity, 
I say that all mental disorders must be disvalued and involve something going wrong with the mind. 
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mind’ is a value-free claim is controversial. If it is value-free, then the meaning of mental 
disorder would be partly descriptive and partly evaluative. Hence, this conceptualisation 
of mental disorder is very similar to that of Jerome Wakefield. Wakefield (1992) claims 
that all mental disorders must be harmful mental evolutionary dysfunctions.34 
Wakefield’s position is weakly normative as he claims that harm is value-laden, while 
mental dysfunction is value-free.  
In short, mental disorder, as ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-
people, means those mental conditions that are disvalued and something going wrong 
with the mind. This weakly normative account of mental disorder accounts for the 
important truths that a) disvalue is a necessary component of the way mental disorder is 
used in ordinary language, and b) not all disvalued conditions are ordinarily called 
mental disorders. Moreover, weak normativism allows for factual, scientific content to 
be relevant to whether a condition is a mental disorder. This brief rundown of the 
meaning of mental disorder is not comprehensive, but is only intended to facilitate the 
discussion in the remainder of this chapter. That is, providing a tentative or working 
definition of mental disorder enables discussion of whether the four cases studies 
(homosexuality, drapetomania, masturbation and sluggish schizophrenia) were 
considered to be mental disorders, and whether these conditions were medically 
treated on the basis of being mental disorders.  
3. Historical case studies 
3.1 Homosexuality 
Homosexuality has been considered acceptable in some times and cultures, and 
unacceptable in other times and cultures. For example, homosexuality was often 
acceptable in ancient Greece and ancient Rome (Sullivan, 2004, 4).35 Societies that 
disvalue homosexuality consider it to be immoral, illegal, sinful, a mental disorder or 
some combinations of these. In nineteenth century Europe, homosexuality began to be 
                                                          
34 More precisely, for a condition to be a mental disorder, the harm needs to be caused by a mental 
dysfunction (Pickering, 1996, 90). 
35 Nussbaum argues that this did not include penetrative sex (Nussbaum, 1999, 268, 307-308, 335). 
Williams claims that ancient Rome did not have a term that translates precisely to homosexuality (the 
same applies for heterosexuality) (Williams, 1999, 304). This raises the interesting question of whether 
ancient Roman’s had the concept homosexuality or something different.  
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thought of, by some36, as a mental disorder, specifically a congenital and/or hereditary 
condition (Beachy, 2010). In the late nineteenth century, Freud argued that 
homosexuality (or ‘inversion’ as he called it) was sometimes caused by incomplete 
psychosexual development i.e. the failure to move on from childhood bisexuality 
(Beachy, 2010).  
 
There are some societies, groups or organisations that still consider homosexuality to 
be a mental disorder.37 For example, many people in China38 and Serbia39  consider 
homosexuality to be a mental disorder. Moreover, some fundamentalist Christians and 
orthodox Jews classify homosexuality as a mental disorder (see Halper & Price, in Earp 
et al., 2014) and NARTH along with the Indonesian Psychiatric Association still 
considers homosexuality to be a mental disorder (Yosephine, 2016).40 The previous 
section explained that for a condition to fall within the extension of mental disorder (as 
ordinarily used by health professionals in clinical settings and informed lay-people in 
serious situations), it must involve something going wrong with the mind and be 
disvalued. There is very little information regarding the reasons these societies classify 
homosexuality as a mental disorder.  This thesis takes it for granted that the intension 
of mental disorder (c.f. the extension thereof) has not changed over time and culture. 
That is, the thesis presumes that societies that consider homosexuality to be a mental 
disorder (for example, nineteenth century Europe, modern-day China, Serbia, Indonesia 
and in societies of fundamentalist Christians and orthodox Jews) have the same concept 
of mental disorder as currently used in the developed world – a disvalued condition in 
which something has gone wrong with the mind. This means that for homosexuality to 
be a mental disorder in these societies, homosexuality must be both disvalued and 
considered to involve to something going wrong in the mind.  
 
                                                          
36 For example, Karl Heinrich Ulrich, Jean Martin Charcot and Havelock Ellis (Beachy, 2010). 
37 It is debateable whether an organisation like the Indonesian Psychiatric Association and NARTH are 
societies. Rather than saying ‘societies, groups or organisations’ each time I need to refer to these bodies, 
I use ‘society’ as a shorthand. 
38 Human Rights Watch, 2017. See also BBC, 2017. 
39 In 2008, 70% of people living in Serbia considered homosexuality to be a mental disorder (Blagojević, 
2011).  
40 Given that the majority of Indonesians are Muslim, it is plausible that there is a connection between 
religion and the Indonesian Psychiatric Association’s classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder.  
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In 1952, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) published the first edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the DSM). The DSM included 
homosexuality as a mental disorder as a type of paraphilia (i.e. disordered sexual 
behaviour) (APA, 1952). However, in the western world by the 1960s and 1970s, the 
debate about whether homosexuality was a mental disorder intensified. Gay activists 
(including gay psychiatrists) began lobbying for the removal of homosexuality from the 
DSM. They picketed outside meetings of the APA and sometimes even disrupted them. 
In 1974, a referendum was held in which 58% of APA members voted in favour of 
removing homosexuality from the DSM. As Gary Greenberg said, “this may have been 
the first time in history that a mental disorder was eradicated at the ballot box” 
(Greenberg, 2010, 236). Greenberg did not mean that there were no longer gay people 
as a result of the referendum, but that homosexuality was no longer classified as a 
mental disorder. (Although homosexuality was removed from the DSM-II, the DSM-III 
replaced homosexuality with ego-dystonic sexuality disorder (Rubinstein, 1995; Spitzer, 
1981). Ego-dystonic sexuality disorder occurs in cases in which a person has a sexual 
orientation at odds with one’s idealised self-image that causes anxiety. This was 
removed in the revised version of the DSM-III i.e. the DSM-III-TR.41)  
 
Presuming that all mental disorders are disvalued conditions in which something has 
gone wrong with the mind, there are two possible reasons why homosexuality was 
removed from the DSM. 42  The first is that people judged that homosexuality was not to 
be disvalued i.e. it was realised that the only disvaluable or harmful outcome of being 
gay occurred due to social oppression. As mentioned above, this might be independent 
of scientific evidence, but it might be influenced if it were found that homosexuality 
does not involve something going wrong with the mind. In addition, while 
homosexuality is not disvalued by most people in the developed world, it might be that 
homosexuality stopped being disvalued when it was removed from the DSM. The second 
potential reason why homosexuality was removed from the DSM is that scientific 
evidence had changed such that homosexuality was no longer considered to involve 
                                                          
41 Moser argues that it is possible that it could be included in the DSM-5’s category of paraphilia if a gay 
person were considered to be hypersexual on the basis that they could not control their homosexual 
urges (Moser, 2011, 228). 
42 It might have been decided that homosexuality is not a mental but a physical condition. This is highly 
unlikely and will not be discussed further. 
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something going wrong with the mind. This might have occurred independently of 
values, but as mentioned above, it might have been that the scientific evidence (that 
homosexuality is not a mental disorder) is influenced by values.  
 
The dominant view is that homosexuality was removed from the DSM because it was no 
longer disvalued. As Bayer famously says, people voted to remove homosexuality from 
the DSM not based on new scientific knowledge, but due to “the ideological temper of 
the times” (Bayer, 1981, 4). Equally, Spitzer argued that the intractability of the debate 
over whether homosexuality is a mental disorder was concerned with values, not facts 
(Spitzer, 1981, 210). Both Bayer and Spitzer were aware of both factual and value 
judgments regarding disorder attributions, but concluded that evaluative concerns 
played the main role (Greenberg, 1997, 259).43 One minority view, as espoused by 
Kitzinger, is that homosexuality was considered to be a mental disorder in the past 
because people “were blinded by religious prejudice and trapped by the social 
conventions of their time: their research lacked present-day sophistication and 
objectivity” (Kitzinger, 1987, 8). Kitzinger goes on to say that nowadays “in our sexually 
liberated age, with the benefit of scientific rigour and clear vision, objective up-to date 
research demonstrates that lesbians and gay men are just as normal, just as healthy … 
as are heterosexual people” (Kitzinger, 1987, 8). That is, Kitzinger thinks that 
homosexuality does not involve something going wrong with the mind and that 
homosexuality is disvalued, but that the two components are independent of each other.  
 
In short, conceptualising mental disorder as a ‘disvalued condition in which something 
has gone wrong with the mind’ means homosexuality might be a mental disorder in one 
society but not another.  Whether it is a mental disorder in a certain society depends on 
both its value-status and science (i.e. whether it is considered to be caused by 
something going wrong with the mind). The science and value-status might not be 
independent, which makes it difficult to make a definitive claim concerning the reason 
why homosexuality was removed from the DSM.  
 
                                                          
43 This view has been extended by some such that homosexuality was removed from the DSM because it 
was no longer disvalued which led to the claim that homosexuality does not involve something going 
wrong with the mind. See, for example, Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 288-289 on this debate applied to 
the issue of whether the female orgasm (or lack thereof) is a disorder c.f. Wakefield, 2000a, 265-266. 
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In those societies in which homosexuality is considered to be a mental disorder, 
homosexuality is medically treated.44 For example, during the nineteenth century, 
medical treatment of homosexuality included transplanting the testicles of a straight 
man to a gay man (King & Bartlett, 1999, 107). During the twentieth century, some gay 
people took part in Freudian psychoanalysis. Others were prescribed oestrogen to 
reduce their libido and/or given Electro-Convulsive Therapy (ECT) (Smith, Bartlett & 
King, 2004). Aversion therapy and covert sensitisation were also used. Aversion therapy 
consisted of pairing homoerotic stimuli with electric shocks or nausea-inducing drugs 
(King & Bartlett, 1999; Haldeman, 1991, 1994, 2002). Regarding covert sensitisation, 
Malesky and George (1973), for example asked gay men to imagine that 
You are at the beach with a special person … You lie down behind a 
sand dune and start to embrace and undress each other. You can see 
his penis hard and stiff. He starts rubbing it back and forth. But as you 
get closer you notice a strange odor and you see small white worms 
like lice, crawling in the hair around his penis! You're touching them 
with your mouth! It's disgusting and it's making you sick . . . they're 
crawling into your mouth . . . big chunks of vomit come into your mouth 
(Malesky & George in King & Bartlett, 1999, 109-110).  
While the medical treatment of homosexuality occurred to both gay men and gay 
women, the treatment of gay women is not well documented. King and Bartlett parallel 
this with the facts that female homosexuality was often not criminalised and women 
were rarely arrested for being gay (King & Bartlett, 1999, 109).45  
 
There is very little written about the medical treatment that current homophobic 
societies give to gay people. However, the Human Rights Watch group found that gay 
Chinese people are medicated, given covert sensitisation therapy (injected with nausea-
inducing medication while watching gay pornography) and given ECT. Regarding ECT, 
Li Zhen explained that  
                                                          
44 Chapter four will argue that medical treatment is appropriate for mental disorders. Hence, in societies 
in which homosexuality is consider to be a mental disorder, the medical treatment of homosexuality is 
appropriate. The exact nature of the link between mental disorder and medical treatment is not at issue 
here. 
45 Likewise, when homosexual acts were criminalised in Victorian England, Queen Victoria refused to 
believe that lesbian acts were physically possible and so any reference to lesbianism was removed from 
the Sexual Offences Act before it was given the Royal Assent (Martin, 1994, 428). C.f. Hoffman who 
considers whether this may be a myth insofar as Queen Victoria did not have anything to do with Acts of 
Parliament (Hoffman, 2013, 2-3).  
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The doctor asked me to lie down and relax. He started to play very 
gentle and slow music, at a very low volume. He asked me to think 
about my intimate moments with my boyfriend. He asked me to relax 
and start imagining having sex with my boyfriend… then all of a 
sudden, I felt a very short but strong pain on my left forearm, as if my 
arm was stabbed by something very sharp. I jumped off the couch I was 
lying on and started yelling at the doctor and asked him what the hell 
that was. He told me it was electroshock treatment… I don’t feel the 
pain anymore. But I remembered I was so scared and did not know 
what could have happened to me. I don’t want it to continue doing that. 
I asked him to stop the session. The psychiatrist said that would be it 
for that session, but I would need to be ready for more sessions of 
electroshock for this to work (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
As will be discussed in chapter three, one way of showing that homosexuality should 
not be medically treated is to show that the medical treatment is not consensual, does 
not benefit the patient, does not minimise harm or some combination of these. Only 
some of the medical treatment of homosexuality was compelled by the state. Some 
people agreed to be treated.  Although consent was given, the freedom of this consent is 
debatable.46 Some people, including Alan Turing, consented to conversion therapy to 
avoid going to prison (Hodges, 2012, 471-476). It is likely that others consented to 
conversion therapy on the basis that society was homophobic, and they would do better 
as a straight person. Presumably, some gay people would have themselves been 
homophobic and considered themselves to be disordered and so consented to 
treatment on this basis. Others would have consented to therapy to please their family 
members. For example, Xu Zhen, a twenty-one year old, Chinese lesbian consented to 
conversion therapy in 2014, after being pressured by her parents. When Xu Zhen told 
her parents she was gay, she said,  
My mom started… screaming about unfortunate things happening to 
our family, how she could ever survive it… My dad kneeled down in 
front of me, crying, begging me to go [to the conversion therapy]. My 
dad said he did not know how to continue living in this world and 
facing other family members if people found out I was gay. He was 
begging me to go so that he could live… I mean, at that point, what else 
could I do? I didn't really have any other options. (Human Rights 
Watch, 2017).  
There is little evidence that conversion therapy was effective (Haldemann, 1991) or is 
effective (Earp et. al., 2014, 7; Human Rights Watch, 2017). While psychoanalysis was 
                                                          
46 Persuading people to consent to medical treatment for a mental disorder still occurs (Sørgaard, 2007).  
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often reported as being effective, the studies that made such claims were often 
“haphazard and biased” (King & Bartlett, 1999, 109).  Moreover, these therapies were 
often harmful. People who experienced conversion therapy sometimes attempted or 
committed suicide or became depressed (sometimes psychotically so). Others lost the 
ability to orgasm during sex, heterosexual or homosexual. Sometimes death occurred 
via dehydration caused by the nausea-inducing drugs and others died from inhaling 
vomit (Haldeman, 1991; 1994; 2002; King and Bartlett, 1999, 110; Hicks in Earp et. al., 
2014, 7). While harm clearly occurred, it might well have been thought that the benefit 
produced by the treatment outweighed the harm, at least from an aggregate perspective 
i.e. when not looking at the individual cases. Moreover, if it was believed that being gay 
was a mental disorder, then health professionals might be obliged to take steps to cure a 
person of their ailment, at least insofar as the benefit of the treatment outweighed the 
harm caused by being gay (see Hare, 1962, 11 and section 3.3 of this chapter).  
 
Since the removal of homosexuality from the DSM, there has been a sea-change in the 
literature regarding the medical treatment of homosexuality. When homosexuality was 
included within the DSM (i.e. when it was considered to be a mental disorder), the 
literature almost exclusively focused on how to make gay people straight. Nowadays, 
the literature is much more likely to consider affirmative therapeutic approaches which 
help a gay person accept his or her sexuality (Zucker, 2003, 399; Davison, 2001, 696). 
That homosexuality is not considered to be a mental disorder in the developed world, is 
a way of signaling that the medical treatment of homosexuality is dubious or fishy i.e. 
that the medical treatment of homosexuality might be inappropriate.47  
 
The purpose of this section is to introduce two ideas. Firstly, conceptualising mental 
disorder as a ‘disvalued condition in which something has gone wrong with the mind’ 
means homosexuality might be a mental disorder in one society but not another.  
Secondly, in those societies in which homosexuality is considered to be a mental 
disorder, the medical treatment is considered appropriate. Equally, in societies that do 
                                                          
47 See also Nicolosi who argues that removing homosexuality from the DSM had the undesirable 
(according to him) consequence of discouraging research and treatment of homosexuality (Nicolosi, 
2012, 13).   
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not consider homosexuality to be a mental disorder (including the developed world), 
the medical treatment of homosexuality might be inappropriate. 
 
3.2 Drapetomania (and dysaesthesia Aethiopica)  
In 1851 (prior to the civil war in the United States of America), Samuel Cartwright 
claimed to have discovered the mental disorders of drapetomania and dysaesthesia 
Aethiopica. Drapetomania was symptomised by black slaves running away from their 
masters and/or by slaves who saw themselves as being on an equal level with his (or 
her) master. The main symptom of dysaesthesia Aethiopica was being an indolent slave. 
Cartwright says 
When left to himself, the negro indulges in his natural disposition to 
idleness and sloth, and does not take exercise enough to expand his 
lungs and to vitalize his blood, but dozes out a miserable existence in 
the midst of filth and uncleanliness, being too indolent and having too 
little energy of mind to provide for himself proper food and 
comfortable lodging and clothing… When aroused from his sloth by the 
stimulus of hunger, he takes anything he can lay his hands on, and 
tramples on the rights, as well as on the property of others, with 
perfect indifference as to consequences. When driven to labor by the 
compulsive power of the white man, he performs the task assigned him 
in a headlong, careless manner, treading down with his feet, or cutting 
with his hoe the plants he is put to cultivate—breaking the tools he 
works with, and spoiling everything he touches that can be injured by 
careless handling (Cartwright, 1851/2004, 36).  
Cartwright argued that God intended black people to be “submissive knee-benders” 
(Cartwright, 1851/2004, 35). If a white man treats black people as his equals then he 
“abuses the power given to him by God” (Cartwright 1851/2004, 35). He says that 
physicians in the northern states of the USA 
ignorantly attribute the symptoms to the debasing influence of slavery 
on the mind, without considering that those who have never been in 
slavery, or their fathers before them, are the most afflicted, and the 
latest from the slave-holding South, the least. The disease is the natural 
offspring of negro liberty—the liberty to be idle, to wallow in filth, and 
to indulge in improper food and drinks (Cartwright, 1851/2004, 36).   
Cartwright said if a slave ran away or became sulky for no good reason, then the slave 
had fallen “into the negro consumption” i.e. they had the mental disorder of 
drapetomania or dysaesthesia Aethiopica (Cartwright, 1851/2004, 35). Note that, 
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regarding reasons, Cartwright thought that so long as the master had provided for the 
slave’s physical wants, then this was not sufficient justification for a slave to run away 
or sulk – such a slave might be diagnosed with drapetomania or dysaesthesia 
Aethiopica.  
 
As shown in section one of this chapter, a condition is a mental disorder if it is both 
disvalued and involves something going wrong with the mind. Let us presume that this 
intension of mental disorder also applied during Cartwright’s time. This means that 
Cartwright and his cronies must have disvalued drapetomania and thought it involved 
something going wrong with the mind.48 Drapetomania is no longer considered to be a 
mental disorder. As discussed in the section on homosexuality, there are two potential 
reasons for this. The first is that drapetomania is no longer a mental disorder because 
being a runaway slave is no longer disvalued (and disvalue is necessary for a condition 
to be a mental disorder). This might or might not be independent of scientific evidence. 
Secondly, it might be that science has shown that drapetomania does not involve 
anything going wrong with the mind. This might have occurred independently of values, 
but such a scientific finding might also be influenced by values. That is, that racism is no 
longer acceptable might influence the conclusion that nothing has gone wrong in the 
minds of runaway slaves. (It might also be that drapetomania is not a mental disorder 
because it is neither disvalued nor considered to involve something going wrong with 
the mind.)  
 
Conceptualising mental disorder as a ‘disvalued condition in which something has gone 
wrong with the mind’ means that conditions such as homosexuality and drapetomania 
can be considered mental disorders by some societies but not others. Whether 
drapetomania is a mental disorder in a certain society depends on both its value-status 
and science, and these two might not be independent of each other.  
 
                                                          
48 It could be argued that Cartwright does not think that drapetomania involves something going wrong 
with the mind considering that Cartwright says that drapetomania is “the natural offspring of negro 
liberty” and “when left to himself, the negro indulges in his natural disposition to idleness and sloth” 
(Cartwright, 1851/2004, 36, my emphasis). However, this would presume that natural mental 
dispositions cannot be mental disorders which is spurious.  
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In addition to claiming that drapetomania is a mental disorder, Cartwright also claims 
that because it is a mental disorder, a runaway slave should be treated in such a way 
that they return to slavery. Cartwright claims that if a slave runs away (or attempts to), 
becomes indolent or sees him or herself as an equal to his or her white master, then 
both for the sake of humanity and the slave’s own good, the slave “should be punished 
until they fall into that submissive state which it was intended for them to occupy” 
(Cartwright, 1851/2004, 35). He sees this as being a good outcome for the slave—
considering the slave to be mentally disordered is preferable to saying that the slave is 
being a “rascal” (Cartwright, 1851/2004, 37) or that the slave is being intentionally 
mischievous (Cartwright, 1851/2004, 36).  
 
The treatment that Cartwright suggested for drapetomania is to stimulate the liver, 
kidneys and skin to activity. The best way of doing so is to  
to anoint [the skin of a drapetomaniac] all over with oil, and to slap the 
oil in with a broad leather strap; then to put the patient to some hard 
kind of work in the open air and sunshine, that will compel him to 
expand his lungs (Cartwright, 1851/2004, 37).   
Readers from the developed world might well see this technique as punishment. 
Cartwright also thinks of this as a form of punishment. However, Cartwright also thinks 
of such punishment as therapeutic i.e. as a form of medical treatment based on “sound 
physiological principles” (Cartwright, 1851/2004, 35, 37). Whether the whipping of 
slaves and being given hard work is a medical treatment will be discussed in section 2.1 
of chapter four. The point for now is that Cartwright considered it to be medical 
treatment. Chapter four shows that the medical treatment of mental disorders is 
appropriate. As Cartwright considered drapetomania to be a mental disorder, the 
medical treatment of drapetomania was appropriate. While it is odd to think of 
whipping runaway slaves as appropriate medical treatment, this does not mean that it 
was acceptable or effective.  As drapetomania is not considered to be a mental disorder 
in the developed world, the medical treatment of drapetomania is not appropriate – or 




As mentioned earlier, one way of showing that runaway slaves should not be medically 
treated (i.e. whipped) is to show that the treatment is ineffective, harmful or not 
consented to. Cartwright claimed that the treatment was remarkably effective. He said: 
The effect of this or a like course of treatment is often like enchantment 
… the negro seems to be awakened to a new existence, and to look 
grateful and thankful to the white man whose compulsory power, by 
making him inhale vital air, has restored his sensation and dispelled 
the mist that clouded his intellect … [He is] a good negro that can hoe 
or plough, and handle things with as much care as his other fellow-
servants (Cartwright, 1851/2004, 37).   
Even if the course of treatment were effective – even if the runaway slave did become a 
‘good negro’ by Cartwright’s standards – it is arguable that being a good slave is not a 
desirable end. This would mean that the medical treatment did not benefit the slave. By 
analogy, even if conversion therapy for gay people were effective, it is arguable that 
making a gay person straight might not benefit the patient (i.e. the person who was 
previously gay). While there is no evidence, it is highly likely that the whipping and so 
on of runaway slaves was harmful – it might have led to physical harms such as welts 
and infections; as well as mental afflictions such as depression or uncontrollable anger. 
Of course, Cartwright would claim that the harms caused by the course of treatment 
were outweighed by what he saw as the benefits thereof – that the runaway became a 
good slave. On the other hand, those of us in the developed world will argue that being a 
good slave confers no benefit to the slave, and so the harm caused by whipping the slave 
is cannot be outweighed by the benefit.  Finally, while there is no information regarding 
whether runaway slaves consented to being whipped and so on, it is very unlikely that 
the slaves would have consented.  
 
To summarise, Samuel Cartwright claimed that being a runaway slave, an indolent slave 
or a slave who saw him or herself as equal to his or her white master was a mental 
disorder. The whipping of runaway slaves (and putting them to hard work) appears to 
readers from the developed world to be a straightforward case of corporal punishment, 
not medical treatment. However, I have argued that Cartwright thought of punishing the 
runaway slaves as medical treatment – he said it was based on sound physiological 
principles. This section highlights that in societies that consider drapetomania to be a 
mental disorder, drapetomania was medically treated i.e. it was appropriate to 
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medically treat drapetomania. Nowadays, we do not classify drapetomania as a mental 
disorder. Hence, we do not think the medical treatment of drapetomania is appropriate.  
 
3.3 Masturbation 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, masturbation was thought to cause a wide 
range of physical disorders such as blindness, epilepsy, acne and rickets (Engelhardt, 
1974). In addition, Tissot, an eighteenth century Swiss physician, argued that losing 
semen was equivalent to losing blood and so semen should not be lost unnecessarily i.e. 
ejaculation should only occur in aid of procreation. Tissot also claimed that when a man 
ejaculates in the recumbent position (which according to Tissot is typical in 
masturbation) more semen is lost, which makes masturbation riskier to one’s health 
than ejaculation during intercourse (Engelhardt, 1974, 235). Tissot’s analysis only 
applies to men, yet masturbation was considered a mental disorder for both men and 
women. In women, masturbation was thought to led to yellowish vaginal discharge, 
reddened and congested labia majora and elongation of the labia minora (Engelhardt, 
1974, 236).  
In addition to the claim that masturbation caused physical disorders, masturbation was 
also thought to cause mental disorders i.e. ‘general mental decay’ (Graham in Whorton, 
2001, 67; see also Hare, 1962). In 1834, Graham, a Presbyterian minister, gave a lecture 
to young men in which he warned that ongoing masturbation leads to ‘general mental 
decay’ to the point at which  
the wretched transgressor sinks into a miserable fatuity, and finally 
becomes a confirmed and degraded idiot, whose deeply sunken and 
vacant glassy eye, and livid, shrivelled countenance, and ulcerous, 
toothless gums, and fetid breath, and feeble broken voice, and 
emaciated and dwarfish and crooked body, and almost hairless head—
covered, perhaps, with suppurating blisters and running sores—
denote a premature old age—a blighted body—and a ruined soul! 
(Graham in Whorton, 2001, 67). 
It is plausible that Graham was influenced by the prudish moral values roughly around 
the Victorian era49—Graham thought that all pleasurable sensations were satanic 
temptation in disguise so that it was not only those who masturbated that suffered the 
                                                          
49 It is not the case that as soon as Victoria came to the throne prudishness often referred to as ‘Victorian’ 
emerged. Instead, Victorian prudishness began to emerge before she become Queen. 
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ill-effects of stimulation; those who ate meat, drank whisky or chewed tobacco were 
also damaging their body (Whorton, 2001, 67).  
Another reason that the idea that masturbation caused insanity gained favour was that 
in the increasing number of mental asylums, many patients were observed 
masturbating—the classic ‘correlation equals causation’ fallacy was made (Whorton, 
2001, 66; Hare 1962, 11-12). In addition, Hare has pointed out that the idea that 
madness was caused by evil spirits had fallen out of favour, and so people were on the 
lookout for the ‘real’ cause of insanity (Hare, 1962, 11).  
Masturbation (i.e. the inability to refrain from masturbating) is also considered to be a 
mental disorder in itself (Engelhardt, 1974). While Engelhardt does not explain why 
masturbation was considered to be a mental disorder, this is likely because 
masturbation was thought to lead to physical disorders and general mental decay. By 
analogy, it might be that anorexia is currently classified as a mental disorder because it 
leads to physical disorders and death.50 As with homosexuality and drapetomania, I 
work on the presumption that the intension of mental disorder was the same during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as it is now. If correct, this means that those in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries must have thought that the inability to refrain from 
masturbating (being a mental disorder) was caused by something going wrong with the 
mind, and also that masturbation was disvalued.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea that masturbation caused insanity 
and was itself a mental disorder had fallen out of favour (Engelhardt, 1974; Hare, 1962, 
12-13). 51  If my claim that ‘mental disorders are disvalued conditions of the mind in 
which something has gone wrong’ is correct, then either masturbation was no longer 
disvalued and/or it was no longer thought to involve something going wrong with the 
mind. Hare gives four reasons for the downfall of the notion of masturbation as a mental 
disorder (Hare, 1962, 12-15). The first is the acknowledgement of the role of the 
causation/correlation fallacy; the second that masturbation was found to be very 
common and the proportion of insane people was much smaller than the proportion of 
those who masturbated. As Doctor J. W. Robertson pointed out, if masturbation caused 
                                                          
50 On this approach, over-eating might also be classed as a mental disorder if it leads to physical 
disorders. Alternately, masturbation might have been seen as a ‘compulsive’ mental disorder akin to an 
obsessive compulsive disorder.  
51 C.f. for example, D.H. Lawrence (Cowan, 1995 and Stoehr, 1975, 111).  
35 
 
insanity, then the capacity of state asylums would need to increase tenfold. Whorton 
adds that, as some psychiatrists presumably masturbate, some of the potential inmates 
would be psychiatrists (Whorton, 2001, 68).  Hare’s third reason is that it is hard to 
know whether a patient has masturbated or not—those who admitted to it were 
believed, those that denied it were not. Physicians became wary of this rule of thumb, 
and so began to question whether masturbation caused insanity. Hare’s final reason is 
that the physiological processes fell into question—why is masturbation more 
damaging than intercourse?  
Hare’s final reason suggests that ‘masturbation as mental disorder’ fell out of favour, in 
part, because masturbation was no longer thought to involve something going wrong 
with the mind.52 Of course, as explained in section 3.1.1 of this chapter, descriptive and 
evaluative claims might not be independent of each other. Hence, it might be that the 
physiological processes were questioned because the value-status of masturbation was 
beginning to change. Alternately, it might be that the value-status of masturbation 
changed after the physiological processes were questioned.  Despite this, none of the 
reasons given by Hare directly refer to the idea that masturbation was no longer 
thought of as a mental disorder because masturbation was no longer disvalued.53 
Perhaps this is because, in the 1960s, when Hare was writing, masturbation was still 
largely disvalued.  In any case, Engelhardt hints at the change in value-status in his 1974 
article. He suggests that masturbation was considered to be a mental illness because of 
“particular cultural norms … which had no essential basis in biology” (Engelhardt, 1974, 
243). That is, there were some people who considered the damaging effects of 
masturbation to be the consequence of living in a society that condemned masturbation 
i.e. that guilt caused the downfall associated with masturbation. If guilt, not 
masturbation, caused that downfall, then there might be no reason to disvalue 
masturbation.  
                                                          
52 Boorse claims all diseases or mental disorders must be statistical abnormal dysfunctions (Boorse, 
1975).  Hare’s second reason why ‘masturbation as mental disorder’ fell out of favour (i.e. that 
masturbation is very common) suggests that masturbation cannot be a statistically abnormal dysfunction 
i.e. that it does not involve something going wrong with the mind.  
53 Hare claims that the masturbatory hypothesis was an inevitable outcome of the very new science of 
psychiatry (Hare, 1962, 19). Less charitably, the masturbatory hypothesis may be the outcome of the 
infiltration of prudish values into medicine and psychiatry.   
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In summary, masturbation is a mental disorder in societies that both disvalue 
masturbation and consider it to involve something going wrong in the mind. (These two 
criteria might not be independent of each other.) Nowadays, masturbation is not 
considered to be a mental disorder which means that at least one of these criterion is 
not fulfilled. The take home message from this section is that masturbation might be a 
mental disorder in one society but not another.   
The medical treatment of masturbation began in the nineteenth century. Prior to this, 
there were very few, if any, medical treatments available to treat masturbation.54 
Moreover, in the eighteenth century, it was thought that explaining the ill-effects of 
masturbation should be sufficient to stop a person from masturbating and if they did 
not, then they only had themselves to blame for the ensuing insanity (Hare, 1962, 10). 
By the nineteenth century, treatment included applying camphor or cantharides (an 
aphrodisiac!) to the genitals (Hare, 1962, 10). In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, mechanical devices to make masturbation difficult were being used, as was the 
burning of genitals, vasectomies, circumcision, clitoridectomies and even castration55 
(Engelhardt, 1974; Hare 1962). As late as the 1880s, an American doctor was urging 
parents to try to catch their children masturbating and then to circumcise or perform a 
clitoridectomy on the child without the benefit of an anaesthetic (Whorton, 2001, 67).  
While some people (or their parents) might have consented to this treatment, it is likely 
that this is not always the case. It is also likely that some of the medical treatments were 
effective. For example, if a man’s penis were castrated (i.e. cut off), this would effectively 
stop him from masturbating. Even so, it is a separate question whether such a castration 
treatment benefited the patient. To readers from the developed world, it seems clear 
that such treatments could not have benefitted the patient – that the treatments are 
cruel or harmful seems to be without question. However, Hare points out that someone 
who believed in the masturbatory hypothesis (i.e. that masturbation could cause 
insanity and a plethora of physical ailments) was obliged to take such steps to prevent 
                                                          
54 That is, it is highly likely that homosexuality was not medically treated because there was no effective 
medical treatment i.e. it is highly unlikely that homosexuality was not medically treated because medical 
treatment thereof was considered inappropriate. 
55 While Engelhardt uses the term CASTRATION, it does not appear that men’s penises were cut off. 
Instead, Haynes (the surgeon cited by Engelhardt) removed a duct from the penis.  
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masturbation, at least insofar as the harm it caused was outweighed by the benefit 
(Hare, 1962, 11). 
To summarise, masturbation is medically treated in many societies in which it is 
thought to cause mental or physical disorders, or is thought of as a mental disorder in 
itself. In the developed world, masturbation is not considered to be a mental disorder, 
and so the appropriateness of the medical treatment of homosexuality is questionable.  
3.4 Sluggish schizophrenia 
During the 1960s and 1970s in Soviet Russia, some political dissidents were considered 
to have subclinical56 manifestations of schizophrenia.  These manifestations included 
having reformist delusions, or put bluntly, opposing the government (Smulevich, 
1989; Fulford et al., 1993). I work on the presumption that Soviet Russians had the 
same intension of mental disorder as currently used – mental disorders are disvalued 
conditions in which something has gone wrong with the mind. This means that Soviet 
Russians must have both disvalued being a political dissident and thought that it 
involved something going wrong with the mind. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, western psychiatrists might have considered these 
patients to have subclinical manifestations of schizophrenia, whereas Soviet 
psychiatrists deemed these manifestations to be a diagnosis in itself, namely, sluggish 
schizophrenia (Fulford et al., 1993). The rationale for the Soviet position was, given that 
the Soviet Russian’s had the best political system in the world, there could be no logical 
reason for opposing the regime, and thus the dissidents must be mad. That is, it was 
thought that to disagree with the Soviet political regime was evidence that the dissident 
must have a mental dysfunction. This suggests, as mentioned in the previous sections, 
that there is an interplay between facts and values. That is, the idea that being a political 
dissident involved something going wrong with the mind is influenced by the value-
status of being a political dissident i.e. that being a political dissident is disvalued. (It is 
possible that the claim that being a political dissident involves something going wrong 
                                                          
56 That is, these manifestations were insufficient to give a diagnosis of schizophrenia, but were clinical 
manifestations in the sense that they were sufficient to give a diagnosis of sluggish schizophrenia. By 
analogy, the manifestations may have been clinical in the sense that they would have been sufficient to 
diagnose the now abandoned condition of Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (see section one of chapter 
one) but not schizophrenia itself. 
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with the mind influenced the value-status of being a political dissident. However, this is 
highly unlikely.)  
The situation (that to disagree with the Soviet political regime was evidence that the 
dissident must have a mental dysfunction) was not as overt as I have portrayed. 
Complex and reasonable arguments were formed to show that the political dissidents 
had genuine signs of schizophrenia. Moreover, as Bonnie points out, whether a 
dissident57 had a genuine mental illness was particularly contestable in cases in which 
“culturally embedded features of psychopathology are taken into account” (Bonnie, 
2002, 136). Even so, it is well accepted that the mental disorder of sluggish 
schizophrenia was invented to serve the needs of the Soviet government. After 
reviewing the literature, Merskey and Shafran conclude that the diagnosis of sluggish 
schizophrenia might be “genuine” (Merskey & Shafran, 1986, 247) but that  
under the influence of an unscrupulous regime the observations put 
forward could serve as a ready means to label as psychotically ill many 
energetic and capable citizens who were in disagreement with 
authority … They allow for psychiatric disposal, without much other 
justification, of anyone whose social activism is unacceptable to the 
psychiatrist who believes in the officially approved system (Merskey & 
Shafran, 1986, 254).  
Wilkinson claims that sluggish schizophrenia was a diagnosis hardly seen outside of the 
Eastern bloc (Wilkinson, 1986, 641; see also Merskey & Shafran, 1986). However, 
Fulford et al. argue that at the time, both the Eastern bloc and USA had broad criteria for 
schizophrenia and following Wing, claim that sluggish schizophrenia is similar to the 
western construct of latent schizophrenia. Moreover, Fulford et. al. point out that 
although some Russian patients examined by western doctors were not suffering from 
schizophrenia, they had other mental disorders such as manic or depressive psychosis 
or neurotic depression (Fulford et al., 1993, 804). (Fulford et al. (1993) do not disagree 
that psychiatry was used for political purposes in the USSR but argue that this was 
allowed both by bad science and an unwillingness to acknowledge the values within 
psychiatry.)  
In the developed world, a person cannot be diagnosed with sluggish schizophrenia 
solely on the basis that he or she is a political dissident. In addition, in the developed 
                                                          
57 Bonnie refers to both political and religious dissidents of the USSR.  
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world, a person cannot be diagnosed with latent schizophrenia (the western equivalent 
of sluggish schizophrenia) solely on the basis that he or she is a political dissident. In the 
developed world, being a political dissident is insufficient to show that somebody has a 
mental disorder. This is supported by the DSM’s definition of mental disorder in which 
deviant behaviour (including political deviance) is not a mental disorder unless it is a 
symptom of a dysfunction in the individual.58 Moreover, in New Zealand, a person is not 
subject to compulsory assessment or treatment under the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 based solely on his or her political beliefs. Based 
on my claim that all mental disorders are disvalued conditions in which something has 
gone wrong with the mind, this means that in the developed world being a political 
dissident is not disvalued and/or is not evidence of something going wrong in the 
mind.59 
To summarise so far, in Soviet Russia, some political dissidents were classed as being 
mentally disordered (specifically, they were said to have sluggish schizophrenia). In the 
developed world, we do not think people should be diagnosed with sluggish or latent 
schizophrenia solely on the basis that they are political dissidents. Being a political 
dissident might be a mental disorder in one society but not another. Whether being a 
political dissident is a mental disorder depends on its value-status and science (i.e. 
whether it is considered to be caused by something going wrong with the mind) and 
these two might not be independent of each other. 
Sluggish schizophrenics (i.e. those political dissidents diagnosed with sluggish 
schizophrenia) were given psychotropic medication, shock treatment and confined to 
long-term institutionalisation (Adler & Gluzman, 1993; Jargin, 2011, 
117). Institutionalisation effectively meant that those who opposed the government 
could not disseminate their political views, which in turn meant that the public would 
not be influenced by these minority views.  Adler and Gluzman (1993) also document 
the atrocious conditions of the institutions—over-crowding, lack of personal hygiene 
and food, physical constraints and monotony, physical punishment (sometimes causing 
                                                          
58 This definition was first used in the DSM-III and is still used in the DSM-5.  
59  Moreover, the two may not be independent of each other – that being a political dissident is not 
disvalued may influence the finding that it does not involve something going wrong with the mind, or that 
being a political dissident does not involve something going wrong with the mind influences the value-
status of being a political dissident.  
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death), isolation and the open-ended term of institutionalisation. Pharmacological 
treatment included giving patients Sulfazin (which caused intense muscular pain), 
Atropine (which can cause toxic psychosis), insulin coma therapy (which sometimes led 
to permanent brain damage) and neuroleptics. This medical treatment was justified on 
the basis that being a political dissident was considered to be a mental disorder (Adler 
& Gluzman, 1993; Jargin, 2011, 117). As will be argued in chapter four of this thesis, the 
medical treatment of mental disorders is appropriate which means that in Soviet Russia, 
the medical treatment of political dissidents (on the basis that they had sluggish 
schizophrenia) was appropriate.  
It is highly unlikely that the political dissidents consented to any of this treatment. That 
is, it is highly unlikely that the political dissidents agreed that they had the mental 
disorder sluggish schizophrenia, and so consented to the medical treatment on this 
basis. This treatment did more harm than good, even once the political dissidents were 
released from the institution. Adler and Gluzman cite evidence that many dissidents 
experienced insomnia, depression, isolation and drinking to oblivion (although others 
have expressed themselves in a more positive way such as through art and music). 
Moreover, Adler and Gluzman point out that the long-term effects are likely to be much 
more severe than this but go unreported since people who have been subject to 
brutality might not come forward with their stories (Adler & Gluzman, 1993, 714).60 On 
the other hand, from the Soviet perspective, if the treatment cured or ameliorated the 
so-called mental disorder of sluggish schizophrenia, then it would have been considered 
to have done more good than harm.  
In summary, some political dissidents within the USSR were considered to be mentally 
ill solely on the basis of their political beliefs. These people were subject to long-term, 
open-ended institutionalisation and harmful, inhumane pharmacological treatment. 
This treatment was justified on the basis that sluggish schizophrenia was a mental 
disorder. Nowadays, we do not think being a political dissident is sufficient to diagnose 
someone as being mentally disordered. Hence, the appropriateness of medically 
                                                          
60 Adler and Gluzman (1993) interviewed twenty-two people who were committed to psychiatric 
institutions solely because they held unofficial political views (as ratified by the World Psychiatric 
Association, American Psychiatric Association and other experts). 
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treating a person solely on the basis that he or she has minority political beliefs is 
extremely questionable.  
4. Conclusion and analysis of the four case studies 
The previous sections considered four case studies, namely, homosexuality, 
drapetomania, masturbation and sluggish schizophrenia. I have worked on the 
presumption that the intension of mental disorder is the same across all the societies 
considered. For homosexuality, drapetomania, masturbation or sluggish schizophrenia 
to be mental disorders in the relevant society, they must be disvalued conditions in 
which something has gone wrong with the mind. While these conditions have all been 
considered to be mental disorders in different societies, they are no longer considered 
to be mental disorders in the vast majority of the developed world.61 This means that 
the conditions are no longer a) disvalued and/or b) considered to involve something 
going wrong with the mind. Section three also explained that the evaluative claim and 
descriptive claim (i.e. whether something has gone wrong with the mind) might both 
influence each other, and for this reason, it can be difficult to pinpoint why a condition is 
or is not considered to be a mental disorder.  
There are two main points to be taken from the four historical case studies. The first is 
that whether a condition is considered to be a mental disorder changes depending on 
the society in question. That is, even if the intension of mental disorder does not change 
between societies, whether a condition is disvalued can change between cultures. 
Equally, whether a condition is considered to involve something going wrong with the 
mind can change between cultures. In turn, the disorder-status of a condition might also 
change over cultures. In more technical terms, the case studies show that even if the 
intension of mental disorder is the same for all societies, then extension of mental 
disorder might change. For example, homosexuality can fall within the extension of 
mental disorder for one society, but not fall within the extension thereof for another 
society.  
The second point highlighted by the four case studies is that in societies in which these 
conditions were considered to be mental disorders, the conditions were medically 
                                                          
61 While schizophrenia is still considered by many to be a mental disorder, it cannot be diagnosed solely 
on the basis of being a political dissident. 
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treated. Chapter four will show that these conditions were medically treated on the 
basis of being mental disorders i.e. that the medical treatment of these conditions was 
appropriate because the conditions were considered to be mental disorders. In this 
chapter, all I wanted to show was that it appears to be the case that by classifying a 
condition as a mental disorder, the medical treatment of that condition is appropriate. 
This is a descriptive claim. I am describing what seems to be the case, rather than saying 
this ought to be the case.  
In short, the case studies show that even if the intension of mental disorder can be 
applied to all societies in question, the extension of mental disorder can change from 
society to society. In turn, because the extension of mental disorder is relative to the 
society in question, whether a condition can be medically treated on the basis of being a 
mental disorder is relative to the society in question. 
Looked at from the perspective of the developed world, it seems abhorrent that 
homosexuality, drapetomania, masturbation and sluggish schizophrenia could be 
considered to be mental disorders. In addition, that these conditions were medically 
treated seems even more repugnant. It seems that these are examples in which medical 
treatment is used for the purpose of social control. From the point of view of the 
developed world, it would be beneficial if it could be shown that these conditions are 
not mental disorders in any society, as this would mean that people with these 
conditions could not be medically treated on the basis of being mentally disordered in 
any society. For example, if the extension of mental disorder did not change relative to 
the society in question, then it could be determined, for once and for all, whether 
homosexuality is a mental disorder and whether it may be medically treated on the 
basis of being a mental disorder. Equally, if the extension of mental disorder did not 
change relative to the society in question, it could be determined, for once and for all, 
whether drapetomania, masturbation and being a political dissident are mental 
disorders, and whether they may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders. For this reason, this thesis considers whether it is possible for the extension 
of mental disorder to be static between societies.  
I am not the first person to consider whether the extension of mental disorder is static 
between societies. Brülde asks whether there is “a single correct way to draw the line 
between the pathological and the non-pathological” or whether there are multiple ways 
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of drawing that line that are equally correct (Brülde, 2005, 2).62 However, Brülde (2010) 
concludes that there are multiple correct ways of drawing the line.  
It might be pointed out that since we do not currently consider homosexuality (and the 
other conditions explored in the case studies) to be a mental disorder, there is no need 
to ascertain whether the extension of mental disorder is static between societies – all 
that matters is that we now have the correct extension. There are two problems with 
this line of argument. Firstly, it does not prevent the extension of mental disorder from 
changing in such a way that it includes homosexuality and so on.63 This would mean 
that homosexuality and so on may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders, and this is the very thing that many people, including myself, want to 
safeguard against. Secondly, there exist conditions for which it is a matter of debate 
whether they fall within the extension of mental disorder. For example, while Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is currently considered to be a mental disorder 
and is included within the DSM-5, there are academics who argue that ADHD is not a 
mental disorder (Singh, 2008; 2002; Timimi and Taylor, 2004; Conrad and Potter, 
2000). They claim that ADHD is not a scientifically valid diagnosis but is instead a 
cultural construct.  
I work on the basis that all mental disorders must be disvalued conditions in which 
something has gone wrong with the mind. Hence, those who claim that ADHD is not a 
mental disorder must either show that ADHD is not to be disvalued and/or that ADHD 
does not involve something going wrong with the mind. Mather is of the opinion that 
ADHD is not always to be disvalued – that hyperactivity can be a positive trait (Mather, 
2012, 19). Mather quotes Hartmann’s (2003) argument that Thomas Edison had ADHD-
like symptoms but Edison was able to use this in a beneficial way. Others claim that it is 
not clear that ADHD involves something going wrong with the mind. Timimi (2003) says 
that none of the thirty neuroimaging studies published (as at 2003) have shown that the 
brains of those diagnosed with ADHD are clinically abnormal64, and that it cannot be 
determined whether the differences in the brains of those with ADHD are caused by 
                                                          
62 Nordenfelt says that the most crucial question regarding the health-concepts (e.g. health, disease and 
disorder) is whether there is only one concept of health and one concept of disease (Nordenfelt, 1995, 6; 
see also Nordenfelt, 1997, 16-17). However, Nordenfelt focuses on the intension of mental disorder rather 
than the extension thereof.  
63 That is, even if the intension of mental disorder remains the same, the extension may change in this way. 
64 ‘Clinically abnormal’ is the phrase used by Timimi.  
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(rather than being the cause of) different thinking styles or taking medication such as 
Ritalin. She also points out that co-morbidity is extremely high which makes doubtful 
the claim that ADHD is a distinct mental disorder.65 Finally, Timimi claims that while 
methylphenidate (Ritalin) is widely used to treat those with ADHD, it has similar effects 
on those without ADHD. Ritalin has also generated huge profits for the pharmaceutical 
industry which might have tempted ‘big pharma’ to conceptualise ADHD as a mental 
disorder i.e. to conceptualise ADHD is involving something going wrong with the mind.  
Many of those who claim that ADHD is not a mental disorder also claim that medically 
treating those diagnosed with ADHD is a form of social control (Norris and Lloyd in 
Mather, 2012, 19). Conrad, a stalwart of those who think ADHD is not a mental disorder, 
agrees with Lennard that “psychoactive drugs, especially those legally prescribed, tend 
to restrain individuals from behavior and experience that are not complementary to the 
requirements of the dominant value system” (Lennard in Conrad, 2006, 73). Put into my 
terminology, if ADHD is not a mental disorder, then it may not be medically treated on 
the basis of being a mental disorder – medically treating those with ADHD would not be 
appropriate. Considering ADHD to be a mental disorder and medically treating it on this 
basis would be akin to medically treating homosexuality (or masturbation, being a 
runaway slave or being a political dissident) on the basis that it is a mental disorder. 
That is, the treatment of ADHD might be seen as an unjustified form of social control; of 
medicine being used as a guise for constraining the behaviour of non-conforming 
people.  
As shown by the four historical case studies, as the intension of mental disorder is ‘a 
disvalued condition of the mind in which something has gone wrong’, the extension of 
mental disorder might change between societies. ADHD might be a mental disorder in 
the developed world, but might not have been a mental disorder in a hunter-gatherer 
society (Mather, 2012, 19). This might be beneficial insofar as it allows the extension of 
mental disorder to be tailored to the society in question. On the flipside, the 
disadvantage of this approach is that considering someone to be mentally disordered 
                                                          
65 Similarly, even though schizophrenia is currently considered to be a mental disorder and is included 
within the DSM-5, Bentall (1993) and Boyle (1990) argue that schizophrenia is not a mental disorder. 
They argue that the concept schizophrenia does not meet the standards of scientific validity (Poland, 
2007, 170) and instead see schizophrenia as “a complex, dynamic, multi-level, interactive, and 
normatively constituted domain of phenomena” (Poland, 2006, 108).  
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could be used as a form of social control. Almost any disvalued mental state could can be 
considered to be a mental disorder, and medically treated (sometimes without consent) 
on this basis. Moreover, the judgment regarding whether ‘something has gone wrong 
with the mind’ might well be influenced by values. For example, homophobic people 
(those who maintain that homosexuality is to be disvalued) might be inclined to find 
that homosexuality does involve something going wrong with the mind, whereas queer-
friendly people, like myself, might be inclined to the conclusion that homosexuality does 
not involve anything going wrong. This means that even though to be a mental disorder 
a condition must involve something going wrong with the mind, this might be 
insufficient to safeguard against mental disorder being used for the purpose of social 
control.  
In contrast, if the extension of mental disorder were fixed between societies, then we 
could not consider (almost) anything we wanted to be a mental disorder. That is, there 
would be a truth about what is or is not a mental disorder. In turn, psychiatric medicine 
could not be used as a guise for social control. There would be a truth concerning 
whether a condition is a mental disorder, and in turn there would be a truth about 
whether that condition may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder. It could be determined whether ADHD is a mental disorder. If ADHD is not a 
mental disorder, then it may not be treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. 
Those who medically treated ADHD on the basis of being a mental disorder would be 
using medicine for the purpose of social control. On the other hand, if ADHD is a mental 
disorder, then it may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. Those 
who claim that prescribing medications such as Ritalin is a form of social control would 
be wrong.66  
Looking at the big picture, if a) mental disorders may be medically treated (on the basis 
of being mental disorders), and b) the extension of mental disorder is relative to the 
                                                          
66 Both schizophrenia and ADHD are examples of conditions that are considered to be mental disorders in 
the developed world. There are also examples of conditions that are not currently considered to be 
mental disorders, but there is argument that they should be. For example, as mentioned in section 3.2, the 
grief that occurs once a loved-one has died is not normally classified as a mental disorder.  (There is a 
clause in the DSM’s account of major depressive disorder that excludes depression caused by recent 
bereavement.) However, Engel, Bowlby and Hofer all claim that post-bereavement grief may be a mental 
disorder (Engel, Bowlby and Hofer in Kopelman, 1994 c.f. Kopelman, 1994 and Wakefield, 2012a). To use 
my terminology, if post-bereavement grief is both disvalued and caused by something going wrong with 
the mind, then it would be a mental disorder.  
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society in question, then it follows c) that a condition may be medically treated in 
societies that classify as a mental disorder but that same condition may not be medically 
treated (on the basis of being a mental disorder) in societies that do not classify it as a 
mental disorder. This leaves psychiatry vulnerable to being used for the purpose of 
social control. In contrast, if the extension of mental disorder is static, then it becomes 
much more difficult to use psychiatry as a guise for social control. Instead, it could be 
determined, for once and for all, whether a condition is a mental disorder, and whether 




Chapter Three – Ways of showing that a condition 
should not or may not be medically treated 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter suggested that mental disorders are those disvalued conditions in 
which something has gone wrong with the mind. It also showed that even if the 
intension of mental disorder can be applied to all societies, the extension of mental 
disorder can change from society to society. A condition can be a mental disorder in one 
society but not in another. For example, even though homosexuality and post-
bereavement grief are not considered to be mental disorders in the developed world, 
they might be considered to be mental disorders in other societies. The previous 
chapter also alluded to the idea that there is a link between mental disorder and 
medical treatment. Considering a condition to be a mental disorder signifies that 
medical treatment is appropriate, and excluding a condition from being classified as a 
mental disorder signifies that medical treatment is inappropriate, or at least, that the 
appropriateness of the medical treatment of that condition is in doubt. Given that a) the 
extension of mental disorder is relative to the society in question, and b) there is a link 
between mental disorder and medical treatment, it follows that whether a condition 
may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder is also relative to the 
society in question.  
From the perspective of those of us in the developed world, it is repugnant to think that 
homosexuality (and drapetomania, masturbation and sluggish schizophrenia) were a) 
considered to be mental disorders and b) medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders. There are at least three ways of showing that a condition (such as 
homosexuality, drapetomania, masturbation or sluggish schizophrenia) should not or 
may not be medically treated. The first is to show that these conditions should not be 
medically treated because the standard bioethical criteria for acceptable medical 
treatment, namely, benefit to the patient, harm-minimisation, and consent, are not in 
favour of medical treatment.  (This section also considers whether it can be shown that 
homosexuality and so on should not be medically treated according to Fulford’s (2004a) 
values-based medicine.) The second way of showing that a condition such as 
homosexuality may not be medically treated is to show that the condition in question is 
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not a disorder, and that only disorders may be medically treated. The third way of 
showing that these conditions may not be medically treated is to show that a) the 
condition in question is not a mental disorder and b) only mental disorders may be 
medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders i.e. that the rhetoric of mental 
disorders can only be used to justify the medical treatment of mental disorders. This 
chapter discusses each of these three options in turn. 
Another way in which it could be shown that homosexuality and so on should not be 
medically treated is to show that the medical treatment thereof is contrary to the ethos 
of medicine.67 However, even if there is agreement between societies regarding the 
ethos of medicine, it does not follow that there will be agreement about whether 
homosexuality and so on should be medically treated. This is because there is a diverse 
range of values concerning mental states (Fulford, 1995, 155; 1993, 159).68 Hence, 
whether the treatment of homosexuality falls within the ethos of medicine might be an 
intractable debate. This approach is not considered in more detail for practical reasons. 
Such an approach would require an examination of the ethos of medicine, which could 
not be adequately discussed within the space constraints of this thesis. Instead, the 
thesis focuses on whether the extension of mental disorder can be invoked to safeguard 
against the medical treatment of homosexuality. Furthermore, the thesis largely steers 
clear of the ‘values’ debate (i.e. whether homosexuality etc. are to be disvalued) in order 
to drill down as far as possible on whether there is a static extension of mental disorder.  
Before these three options are discussed, two notes regarding terminology need to be 
made. Firstly, to refer to both physical and mental disorders, I use the term DISORDER. 
To refer solely to mental disorders, I use the term MENTAL DISORDERS. (As explained 
in section 1.1 of chapter one, I consider all mental disorders to be disorders.) As it is the 
case that physical disorders may be medically treated, it is wrong to claim that ‘only 
mental disorders may be medically treated’. Hence, section two of this chapter 
considers the claim ‘only disorders may be medically treated’. Equally, section one 
considers whether disorders may be medically treated. 
                                                          
67 This approach was suggested by the internal examiner.  
68 Note that while Fulford requires examining the values of all involved parties, Fulford does not claim that 
VBM will always come to a consensus (Fulford, 2004, 64; see the coda of chapter nine).  
See also Wakefield, 1992, 386; 1993, 162; 2014, 675. 
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The second terminological note relates to the difference between the terms MAY and 
SHOULD. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. To say that some 
condition SHOULD be medically treated is a prescriptive, action-guiding claim. In 
contrast, to say that a condition MAY be medically treated is not a prescriptive claim. 
Instead, it means that medical treatment for that condition is appropriate i.e. that it 
makes sense to medically treat that condition. SHOULD and MAY do not mean the same 
thing - there are cases in which medical treatment can be appropriate but should not be 
given. Nor do SHOULD NOT and MAY NOT mean the same thing. If a condition may not 
be medically treated, then it is inappropriate to treat it. In contrast, to say something 
should not be medically treated means it is immoral to treat it. 
2. Disorders and non-disorders should be medically treated according to the 
standard bioethical criteria/Values-Based Medicine 
One way of showing that that a condition (such as homosexuality, drapetomania, 
masturbation or sluggish schizophrenia) should not be medically treated is to show that 
the established ethical criteria relevant to clinical decision-making are not in favour of 
medical treatment. It is arguable that much of the medical treatment outlined in the four 
historical case studies was harmful, not beneficial and not consented to, which suggests 
that the proposed medical treatment should not have been given.69 That is, the balance 
of the criteria is unfavourable to giving medical treatment.70 These criteria for 
determining whether medical treatment is acceptable apply to both disorders and non-
disorders. For example, these criteria apply, to both chemotherapy for cancer (a 
physical disorder), and to pain relief during labour (which is not a disorder). Whether a 
condition is a disorder (either mental or physical) is irrelevant to whether it should be 
medically treated on this approach. 
                                                          
69 These criteria are very similar to Beauchamp and Childress’ (2009) ‘four principles’ approach. On this 
approach, the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and distributive justice are central to 
determine whether medical treatment should be given. However, as pointed out by the internal examiner, 
Beauchamp and Childress’ principles are broader than the standard ethical criteria. Hence, the thesis does 
not refer directly to Beauchamp and Childress’ work.  
70 Earp et al. claim that the medical treatment of homosexuality might be acceptable so long as the four 
standard bioethical criteria are met. In fact, Earp et al. go a step further and say that so long as the person 
understands the risks involved, the proposed treatment neither needs to be totally effective nor totally 
harmless (Earp et al., 2014, 7). 
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I acknowledge that whether a medical treatment benefits the patient might be difficult 
to determine. For example, is the removal of a healthy limb in someone with Bodily 
Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) beneficial (Müller, 2009)? In addition, there is a 
difference between a medical treatment being effective and it being beneficial. For 
example, providing a lobotomy to a violently psychotic person might be effective insofar 
as the person might become docile. However, it is debatable whether the lobotomy 
benefits the patient. Likewise, conversion therapy for gay people might in the future71 
be effective insofar as it makes gay people straight, and cutting off a man’s penis is 
effective insofar as it prevents him from masturbating. Even so, it is debatable whether 
conversion therapy and castration benefit the patient. Whether a medical treatment 
minimises harm to the patient might also be debatable. Is the removal of a healthy limb 
in a person with BIID harmful? Is making a violent person docile harmful? Is preventing 
a person from masturbation harmful?  
Regarding physical conditions, whether a medical treatment is beneficial or not is often 
much more straightforward. According to Fulford, this is because the values involved in 
mental conditions are much more diverse than those associated with physical 
conditions. For example, nearly everyone agrees that a broken arm is a bad thing to 
have. In turn, nearly everyone agrees that treating a broken arm benefits the patient. In 
contrast, there is less agreement on the values involved in mental conditions. For 
example, extreme sportspeople love the rush of adrenalin that comes from anxiety, 
others hate it (Fulford, 1993, 159). Hence, whether treating anxiety benefits the patient 
is highly debatable, as well as being dependent on the patient in question. Fulford 
argues that the diversity of values in mental illness is not because psychiatry is an 
embryonic branch of medicine. Instead, because mental illness concerns human 
experience, the values involved are, and always will be, more diverse than in physical 
illnesses (Fulford et. al., 2005, 78, 80; see also Thornton, 2014).  
Rather than pinning down which medical treatment is beneficial, and which is harmful, 
this thesis simply points out that if it is determined that a certain medical treatment 
would not benefit the patient and/or does not minimise harm to the patient, then this 
suggests the medical treatment should not be given. (This would need to be balanced 
                                                          
71 See Earp et. al. (2014).  
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alongside the other criteria, such as autonomy.) It is, at the very least, arguable that 
much of the medical treatment outlined in the four historical cases a) was not beneficial, 
b) did not minimise harm, c) was non-consensual or d) some combination of these. If so, 
it suggests that the medical treatment should not have been given.   
A major problem with using these criteria alone to determine whether medical 
treatment should be given is that it is arguable that the medical treatment outlined in 
the four case studies should not have been given even if it were effective, harmless and 
consensual. For example, imagine that a doctor offers a gay patient a medical treatment 
that will make the patient straight. The treatment is in the form of a single pill, which 
has been thoroughly tested and it has been found to have no physical or psychological 
risks or side-effects in either the short or long-term. The pill is totally effective—it cures 
(i.e. makes straight) everybody who takes it. Moreover, the patient does not like being 
gay – he or she thinks that he or she would be benefited by no longer being gay. (In 
addition, the patient maintains that being gay is harmful, and taking the pill minimises 
harm.) The doctor offers this pill to his or her patient, but tells the patient that he or she 
is under no obligation to take it. In fact, the doctor asks the patient to go away and think 
about it, and then let the doctor know when they have decided whether to take the pill. 
In such a scenario, the medical treatment would be effective, harmless and consensual. 
Even so, some people will claim that such medical treatment should not be provided. 
This is because homosexuality should not be medically treated even if the standard 
bioethical criteria are met because there is nothing wrong with being gay in the first 
place. Gupta (2012), for example, claims that having a diverse range of sexual 
preferences is a good thing, or at least not a bad thing.72 
In a nutshell, a consequence of using the standard bioethical criteria related to clinical 
decision-making to show that a condition or way of being should not be medically 
treated is that it does not show that a specific condition, such as homosexuality, should 
not be medically treated. Instead, it says the medical treatment should not be given if, 
on balance, the standard criteria are not in favour of treatment. This approach does not 
rule out the medical treatment of conditions (such as homosexuality, drapetomania, 
masturbation or being a political dissident) lock, stock and barrel.  
                                                          
72 See the coda of chapter nine.  
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Alternately, it might be that disorders and non-disorders should be medically treated if 
the instance of the condition in question passes muster on Fulford’s (2004a) ‘value-
based medicine’ (VBM). This approach differs from using the established ethical criteria 
relevant to clinical decision-making (such as consent, benefit and harm-minimisation) 
to determine whether medical treatment should be given, insofar as it does not take the 
established criteria to be necessary or sufficient for guiding clinical decision-making, 
but claims that the values captured by the criteria only pick out a small proportion of 
the values involved in medicine (see Thornton, in press; 2011). While this approach has 
generated much positive attention, it is problematic for my purposes as VBM cannot 
show whether a type of condition – either a disorder or a non-disorder – should be 
medically treated. This is because VBM looks at the particular situation of the patient 
concerned to make clinical decisions. It cannot make a global claim about whether 
homosexuality and so on should be medically treated. In this respect, VBM is in the 
same position as the ‘standard bioethical criteria’ approach.73 Moreover, VBM, like the 
‘established ethical criteria relevant to clinical decision-making’ approach applies to 
both disorders and non-disorders. That is, a condition – either a disorder or a non-
disorder – should only be medically treated if it passes muster according to VBM. Hence, 
whether a condition such as homosexuality is a mental disorder does not impact on 
whether it ought to be treated according to VBM.  
3. Only disorders may be medically treated74 
One way of showing that a condition may not be medically treated is to show that the 
condition in question is not a disorder and that only disorders may be medically treated. 
The potential advantage of this approach is that it would mean that if homosexuality 
were not a mental disorder, then it could never be medically treated. This would remain 
regardless of whether the proposed treatment was beneficial, minimised harm and was 
consensual (in situations in which consent were required). The main problem with this 
approach is that it would rule out too much. For example, the Victorian editor of The 
Lancet claimed that pain during childbirth is normal (i.e. not a disorder) and so opposed 
                                                          
73 The conclusion of this chapter considers whether the fact that neither the ‘established ethical criteria 
relevant to clinical decision-making approach’ nor VBM totally rules out the medical treatment of a 
condition such as homosexuality is an advantage of disadvantage of these approaches. 
74 I do not claim that ‘only disorders should be medically treated’ but that ‘only disorders may be 
medically treated’. This denotes that medical treatment is appropriate for mental disorders, as opposed to 
claiming that there is an obligation to medically treat all disorders. 
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pain relief for women in labour (Boorse, 1987, 383).75 It is safe to presume that most 
people will maintain that pain relief may be given to women in labour even if childbirth 
is not a disorder. The claim ‘only disorders may be medically treated’ is needlessly 
strong. There are other, less draconian ways, in which we might be able to show that a 
condition such as homosexuality may not be medically treated.76  
4. Only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders 
As discussed above, the problem with claiming ‘only disorders may be medically 
treated’ is that it rules out too much – it means that non-disorders, such as pain during 
childbirth, may not be medically treated. In this section, I discuss the claim that the 
medical treatment of non-disorders is appropriate so long as the rhetoric of disorder 
(either mental disorder or physical disorder) is not used to justify the medical 
treatment. The following chapter suggests that a condition’s being a disorder is 
sufficient to show that medical treatment may be given (c.f. should be given77). In this 
way, the rhetoric of disorder can be used to show that medical treatment may be given 
i.e. that medical treatment is appropriate. The corollary of this idea regarding the 
rhetoric of mental disorder is that if some condition is not a mental disorder, then 
medical treatment cannot be said to be appropriate for that condition on the basis that 
the condition is a mental disorder. For example, if homosexuality is not a mental 
disorder, then we cannot say that it is appropriate to medically treat homosexuality on 
the basis of being a mental disorder – the rhetoric of mental disorder cannot be used to 
justify the medical treatment of a condition that is not a mental disorder. The same 
reasoning can be applied to any other condition that is not a mental disorder. That is, if 
being a runaway slave or hearing voices is not a mental disorder, then the rhetoric of 
mental disorder may not be used to justify the medical treatment of these conditions. In 
                                                          
75 Pain relief is an example of medical treatment. The meaning of medical treatment is considered in 
chapter four. While childbirth is not a disorder, if childbirth goes wrong (as occurs, for example, in an 
obstructed labour), then this may be a disorder. 
76 Section two of the following chapter picks up on the claim that conditions that are not disorders may be 
medically treated. It shows that non-disorders, such as pain during childbirth may be medically treated, 
because both childbirth and providing pain relief fall within the Asclepian frame. 
77 The idea that ‘only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders’ 
does not mean that all mental disorders should be medically treated.  
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general, only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders.  
Section two of this chapter introduced a scenario in which a doctor offers a gay patient a 
medical treatment (in the form of a single pill) that will make the patient straight. Let us 
now add to that scenario: the doctor informs the patient that homosexuality is a mental 
disorder (when it is not) and the patient agrees to take the pill at least in part on the 
understanding that homosexuality is a mental disorder. In this situation, the rhetoric of 
mental disorder is used to support the medical treatment of homosexuality. The 
incorrect extension of mental disorder is being used but the rhetoric of mental disorder 
is correctly applied. There are three ways in which the rhetoric of a condition being a 
mental disorder can be incorrectly applied. Firstly, the correct extension of mental 
disorder might be wrongly applied. Secondly, the incorrect extension of mental disorder 
might be adopted, but the rhetoric (i.e. the pragmatic link) is correctly applied. Thirdly, 
the incorrect extension of mental disorder might be wrongly applied. It is the second 
way that I have in mind – incorrectly considering homosexuality to be a mental disorder 
means that giving medical treatment is incorrectly deemed to be appropriate. Let us 
now change the scenario so that the doctor makes sure that the patient understands 
that homosexuality is not a mental disorder (and it is not), but that the reason the pill is 
being offered is that the doctor knows that the person lives in a very homophobic 
community or that the person themselves is deeply unhappy with their sexuality. In this 
scenario, the rhetoric of mental disorder is not used to justify the medical treatment of 
homosexuality.  
As will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter, some people will argue that the 
pill should not be offered even though the doctor is clear that homosexuality is not a 
disorder. Yet, some people, myself included, maintain that it would be acceptable to 
offer the patient the pill, so long as the doctor is clear that homosexuality is not a 
disorder. The important point for now is to explain the notion of the rhetoric of mental 
disorder i.e. that only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being 
mental disorders. The claim ‘only mental disorders may be medically treated on the 
basis of being mental disorders’ is quite different from the claim ‘only disorders may be 
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medically treated’.78 The latter makes the strong claim that conditions that are not 
disorders (either mental disorders or physical disorders) may never be medically 
treated. The former claim is weaker insofar as conditions that are not mental disorders 
may be medically treated, but that the rhetoric of mental disorder cannot be used to 
justify the medical treatment of these conditions.  
5. Conclusion: Advantages and disadvantages of each approach 
From the perspective of the developed world, it is repugnant to think that 
homosexuality, drapetomania, masturbation and sluggish schizophrenia were medically 
treated on the basis of being mental disorders. This chapter has considered three ways 
in which it might be shown that these four conditions should not or may not be 
medically treated.  
The first was to show that these conditions should not be medically treated if a) the 
standard bioethical criteria (benefit to the patient, harm-minimisation, and consent) are 
not in favour of medical treatment, or b) the treatment does not pass muster according 
to VBM. The main consequence of both these approaches is that they do not totally rule 
out the medical treatment of homosexuality, drapetomania, masturbation and sluggish 
schizophrenia. This is because the standard criteria and VBM do not determine whether 
a type of condition (e.g. homosexuality, schizophrenia) should be medically treated, but 
determines whether a particular medical treatment should be given to a particular 
individual. On both these approaches, whether the condition in question is a disorder is 
irrelevant. A further consequence of these approaches is that neither entirely rules out 
the medical treatment of, for example, homosexuality. Whether this is an advantage or a 
disadvantage of this approach is debatable. It is disadvantageous insofar as it will not 
prevent the medical treatment of homosexuality. It is advantageous insofar as the 
medical treatment of homosexuality in certain circumstances might be acceptable.  
As a queer-friendly person, I think that society, including health professionals, ought to 
actively try to change the stigmatising views regarding homosexuality. One way of doing 
so is to discourage gay people from having conversion therapy. Yet, I do not think that 
                                                          
78 The claim ‘only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders’ is 
also different from the claim that conditions such as homosexuality have been intentionally 
misrepresented as mental disorders in order to justify medical treatment i.e. disease-mongering. Disease-
mongering is the process of intentionally creating a disorder to generate a market and a profit.  
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health professionals should entirely denounce conversion therapy. This is because it 
will take many decades to change a society’s attitude towards homosexuality. In the 
meantime, denying conversion therapy means that gay people continue to suffer, 
whereas providing conversion therapy may reduce the torment experienced in 
homophobic societies. As Murray eloquently points out, regarding non-therapeutic 
cosmetic surgery,  
if an intervention can alleviate suffering—even if that suffering comes 
about only because of oppressive and unjust social norms—why 
should not clinicians do what helps their patients?79 (Murray in Earp 
et. al, 2014, 9).80 
The second way of showing that a condition such as homosexuality may not be 
medically treated is to show that these conditions are not disorders, and that only 
disorders may be medically treated. A consequence of this approach is that it would 
mean that if a condition (such as homosexuality) is not a mental disorder, then that 
condition may never be medically treated. As mentioned directly above, it is debatable 
whether this would be advantageous or not.  In addition, a clear disadvantage of this 
approach is it rules out too many medical treatments, such as providing pain relief to 
women in labour.  
The third way of showing that a condition such as homosexuality may not be medically 
treated is to show that these conditions are not disorders, and only mental disorders 
may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders i.e. that the rhetoric of 
mental disorders can only be used to justify the medical treatment of mental disorders. 
The notion of the ‘rhetoric of mental disorder’ is based on the claim (discussed in detail 
in the following chapter) that there is a link between mental disorders and medical 
                                                          
79 While Murray’s question is rhetorical a potential answer is given in section two of chapter nine. There it 
is pointed out that attitudes towards homosexuality will never change if health professionals continue to 
give conversion therapy. 
80 See also Haldeman in Earp et. al, 2014, 9 on conversion therapy. 
Professor Omer Bonne’s position is that even though being gay is not a mental disorder, gay people in 
homophobic societies suffer terribly due to the conflict with society which causes them to become 
depressed. Professor Bonne says he would allow conversion therapy to be given to such people, even 
though he would not have in his early years as a psychiatrist (Bonne in Earp et. al., 2014, 8). It is, at least, 
arguable that in such a situation, Professor Bonn is treating a mental disorder – not homosexuality but 
depression. Here, mental disorder has not dropped out of the picture – the rhetoric of mental disorder, 
namely depression, is used to justify medical treatment, namely conversion therapy. The counter-
argument is that such a person does not have a mental disorder (Major Depressive Disorder), but is 
instead in a mismatched environment (see section two of chapter seven on the ‘smoke detector’ 
argument). If so, the conversion therapy is not treating a medical disorder, and so it would not be the case 
that Professor Bonn is justifying conversion therapy using the rhetoric of mental disorder.  
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treatment. This link means mental disorders may be medically treated i.e. that mental 
disorders are the sorts of conditions for which medical treatment is appropriate. There 
are three main advantages of this approach. Firstly, it recognises and utilises the link 
between mental disorder and medical treatment. In contrast, the first approach 
(disorders and non-disorders should be medically treated if the standard bioethical 
criteria are in favour of medical treatment, or if the condition should be medically 
treated according to VBM) does not utilise this link, and so ends up in the arguably 
precarious position that a non-disorder such as homosexuality should be medically 
treated. Secondly, the third approach can maintain that mental disorders may be 
medically treated while still allowing that either the standard bioethical criteria or VBM 
determine whether a condition should be medically treated. The third advantage of this 
approach (only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders) is that it does not make the draconian claim that only disorders may be 
medically treated. In contrast, the second approach (only disorders may be medically 
treated) does have this heavy-handed outcome. A potential disadvantage of the third 
approach is that like the first option, it does not entirely rule out the medical treatment 
of non-disorders. Non-disorders may be medically treated if the rhetoric of disorder is 
not used to justify the medical treatment, and non-disorders should be medically 
treated so long as either the standard bioethical criteria or VBM are in favour of medical 
treatment. However, that this would occur is not clearly a disadvantage of this 
approach. I tend to agree with Murray and Earp et. al. (2014) that it might be acceptable 
to medically treat homosexuality in very homophobic societies (or if the patient himself 
or herself is homophobic). Nevertheless, that a condition is not a mental disorder 
suggests that we need to be especially cautious in maintaining that it would not be 
necessarily wrong to medically treat that condition.  
This third approach (only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of 
being mental disorders) could be applied to masturbation. If an individual wants 
medical treatment to curb his or her masturbation, then it might be morally acceptable 
to treat masturbation, but not on the basis of being a mental disorder. (For this to be 
successful, it must be shown that masturbation is not a mental disorder.) It is debatable 
whether this third approach should also be applied to being a runaway slave and being 
a political dissident. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to say that neither of these 
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conditions should ever be medically treated. On the other hand, if the medical treatment 
of these conditions is beneficial, minimises harm and is consensual, then it might be that 
these conditions should be medically treated. The sting of this claim is removed once it 
is realised that runaway slaves and political dissidents are unlikely to consent to the 
medical treatment of these conditions, which means it is unlikely that an instance of 
either of these conditions should be medically treated. Moreover, if neither of these 
conditions are mental disorders, then they cannot be compulsorily treated under the 
New Zealand Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. This act 
states that having a mental disorder is a necessary but insufficient requirement of 
compulsory treatment. 
The third approach also fits well with the conclusion of the previous chapter. That is, if 
the extension of mental disorder did not change relative to the society in question, then 
it could be determined, for once and for all, a) whether a condition is a mental disorder, 
and b) whether that condition may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder. Adopting the third approach means that two topics need to be considered. The 
first is whether there is a link between mental disorder and medical treatment. If there 
is no link between the two, then it does not make sense to say that ‘only mental 
disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders’. The link 
between mental disorder and medical treatment has been alluded to in this chapter as 
well as the previous chapter. These two chapters have presumed that if a condition is a 
mental disorder, then it is the sort of condition that may be medically treated. That a 
link between mental disorder and medical treatment exists is discussed in the following 
chapter. There it is shown that while there is no exclusive prescriptive link between 
mental disorder and medical treatment, there is a pragmatic link between the two.  
The second theme requiring discussion is the extension of mental disorder. To 
determine whether a condition may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder, it must be determined whether that condition is a mental disorder. Moreover, 
to safeguard against a condition being medically treated in all societies, that condition 
must not fall within the extension of mental disorder in any society. The extension of 




Chapter Four – Link between disorder and medical 
treatment 
1. Introduction 
The question at stake in this thesis is whether there is some way of showing, for once 
and for all, that homosexuality is not a mental disorder.  The main thrust of the 
argument about this has yet to come. Before this will be done, the significance of the 
question needs to be further established. The question is significant because, despite the 
contemporary confidence in much of the world that homosexuality is not a mental 
disorder, in some societies, homosexuality has been considered (and in some others is 
considered) a mental disorder and medically treated on this basis.  But what is the 
relationship between medical treatment and whether a condition is a disorder? The 
previous chapter considered three ways in which it might be shown that conditions 
such as homosexuality, drapetomania, masturbation and sluggish schizophrenia should 
not or may not be medically treated.  It concluded that the most fitting approach is to 
show that homosexuality and so on may not be medically treated because a) they are 
not mental disorders and b) only mental disorders may be medically treated on the 
basis of being mental disorders. Adopting this approach means that two topics need to 
be considered. The first is whether there is a link between mental disorder and medical 
treatment. The previous two chapters have alluded to such a link, and this chapter 
establishes its existence. It shows that there is no exclusive prescriptive link between 
the two. This is because it is not the case that all disorders should be medically treated 
and nor is it the case that only disorders may be medically treated. Despite this, this 
chapter shows that there is a pragmatic link i.e. that mental disorders are the sorts of 
conditions for which medical treatment is appropriate. The second topic requiring 
discussion is the extension of mental disorder. This is considered in chapters five 
through eight. 
This chapter begins by determining what counts as medical treatment. I take medical 
treatments to be those products and services, both effective and ineffective, that are 
provided by health professionals in their capacity as health professionals i.e. medical 
treatments that fall within the Asclepian frame. Sections three and four then show that 
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while there is no exclusive prescriptive link between medical treatment and mental 
disorder, there is a pragmatic link between the two.   
Before the link between disorder and medical treatment is discussed, two 
terminological points need to be made. Firstly, this chapter mainly uses the concept 
disorder rather than mental disorder.81 This is because (as discussed in the introduction 
to the previous chapter) it is wrong to claim that ‘only mental disorders may be 
medically treated’ – physical disorders may also be medically treated. Secondly, to refer 
to the issue of whether there is a prescriptive link between disorder and medical 
treatment, I ask whether disorders should (i.e. must) be medically treated. To refer to 
the pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment, I claim that it is 
appropriate to medically treat disorders i.e. that the condition may be medically 
treated.82  
2. What is medical treatment? 
There are multiple ways in which medical treatment could be defined. The first is to 
claim that something is medical treatment only when it is used to treat a disorder (but 
not any treatment of disorder). That is, that the treatment is aimed at a disorder is a 
necessary but insufficient condition of medical treatment. The second is to define 
medical treatment as any treatment of a disorder and only treatment of a disorder. On 
this view, that the treatment is directed at a disorder is both necessary and sufficient for 
the treatment in question to be medical treatment. The third is to claim that medical 
treatments are those products and services that are provided by health professionals. 
This thesis adopts the third approach because it is a better fit with the way medical 
treatment is used in ordinary language. 83 
The first approach (in which medical treatment is defined as ‘only treatment of 
disorders’) is similar to that taken by Peter Kramer (1993). He claims that Prozac is a 
medical treatment in cases in which it treats Major Depressive Disorder, but it is not a 
medical treatment in cases in which it is used as cosmetic psychopharmacology. That is, 
                                                          
81 This is despite the fact that section four of the previous chapter (only mental disorders may be 
medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders) was worded entirely using mental disorder.  
82 See the introduction of chapter three.  
83 Hansen J also adopted the third approach in New Health New Zealand v. South Taranaki District Council 
[2014] NZHC 395 at paras 80-83. 
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Prozac is not a medical treatment in cases in which it is used to treat low mood that 
does not meet the criteria for Major Depressive Disorder.  On Kramer’s approach, to 
determine whether Prozac is a medical treatment (i.e. whether an instance of 
prescribing Prozac is a medical treatment), it needs to be determined whether it is 
being used to treat a disorder or a non-disorder. This means that a) the diagnostic 
criteria of Major Depressive Disorder need to be established, and b) it also needs to be 
established that Major Depressive Disorder is a disorder. Using Kramer’s approach as 
an example is slightly confusing as Kramer is interested in whether an instance of 
prescribing Prozac counts as a medical treatment. In contrast, I am interested in 
whether some treatment, such as prescribing Prozac in general, counts as a medical 
treatment. Even so, the first problem with defining medical treatment in terms of ‘only 
treatments of disorders’ is that it requires that the extension of disorder is already 
settled. (Another problem is that is requires that the diagnostic criteria of each disorder 
have been established. However, this is not the focus of this thesis.)  
The second problem with the first approach is that it does not fit with ordinary 
language. In everyday language, we consider the treatment provided by health 
professionals for non-disorders to be medical treatment. For example, even though 
fertility is not ordinarily considered to be a disorder, we ordinarily think of the 
contraceptive pill and intra-uterine devices (IUDs) as medical treatments. Likewise, 
having small breasts is not ordinarily considered to be a disorder. As mentioned in 
section two of chapter two, this is because having small breasts is not related to 
something ‘going wrong’. Yet, in ordinary language, we think of breast augmentation as 
a medical treatment.84 Moreover, if medical treatment were defined as ‘only treatment 
of a disorder’, it follows that if homosexuality were not a disorder, ‘homosexuality 
should not or may not be medically treated’ would be a nonsensical claim. It would be 
impossible to medically treat homosexuality if homosexuality were not a disorder. Once 
again, this is a far cry from the way medical treatment is used in ordinary language.  
The second option claims that medical treatment is any and only treatment of a 
disorder. The second approach is problematic for the reasons outlined above – it 
requires disorder to be defined, it does not fit with ordinary language, and it might lead 
                                                          
84 Kraupl-Taylor (1976), Kendell (1986), Reznek (1987, 94, 97) and Cooper (2002) define disorder, at 
least in part, as whatever medical professionals treat. To be clear, they do not define medical treatment as 
any treatment of disorder, but partly define disorder as anything that is medically treated. 
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to non-sensical claims. In addition, we do not ordinarily consider everything done by 
health professionals to be medical treatment. For example, we would not ordinarily 
count a health professional praying for his or her patient to be medical treatment. In 
short, there are two reasons I do not define medical treatment in terms of ‘only 
treatments of disorders’ or ‘any treatment of only disorders’ – they both require the 
scope of disorder to be pre-determined and do not fit with ordinary language.  
The third approach is to define medical treatment as those products and services that 
are provided by health professionals. This approach does not require the extension of 
disorder to be pre-determined because whether a condition is a disorder is irrelevant to 
whether the treatment is medical treatment. The third approach is also a better fit with 
ordinary language as, for example, it considers prescribing contraceptives and 
performing breast augmentations to be medical treatments. In order to be consistent 
with ordinary language, both effective and ineffective interventions might be medical 
treatment. If this were not the case, then this would not fit with ordinary language. For 
example, historical cases of ineffective interventions, from bloodletting to mercury-
based interventions, would not be classed as medical treatments.  
As mentioned above, we do not ordinarily consider everything done by health 
professionals, such as praying for a patient, to be medical treatment. For this reason, I 
define medical treatment as the products and services provided by health professionals 
in their capacity as health professionals. What does it mean to say that something is 
provided by health professionals in their capacity as health professionals? A good way 
of thinking about this is to ask whether the treatment falls within the ‘Asclepian frame’ 
(see Brody; 1993).  Asclepius is the Roman god of medicine, and the rod of Asclepius is 
the snake-entwined staff which is still used to symbolise medicine. To say that a 
treatment falls within the Asclepian frame means that the treatment is something that is 
learnt in medical school (or nursing school, physiotherapy school and so on) or in the 
professional development or practice of health professionals. For example, praying for a 
patient does not fall within the frame because it is not something learnt via medical 
school, professional development or professional practice. Using the Asclepian frame as 
a guide to determine whether a health professional is working within his or her capacity 
as a health professional means therapeutic intention is not sufficient for a treatment to 
count as a medical treatment. The health professional also needs to be exercising the 
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skill and judgment of a clinician and acting in a way that other members of the 
profession deem acceptable. I admit that the borders of the Asclepian frame will be 
fuzzy. For example, does providing relationship advice, even in one’s capacity as a 
health professional, fall within the Asclepian frame? However, the presence of 
borderline cases does not prevent the Asclepian frame providing a rough notion of what 
counts as medical treatment. 
In summary, the main problems with defining medical treatment in terms of ‘any and 
only treatments of disorders’ are that it requires the scope of disorder to be already 
determined and it is does not fit with ordinary language. In contrast, defining medical 
treatment as those products and services that are provided by health professionals (in 
their capacity as health professionals) does not require disorder to be pre-defined. 
Moreover, this approach is a better fit with ordinary language as it can include products 
such as contraceptives and services such as performing breast augmentations as 
medical treatments. 
2.1 Medical treatment and the four historical case studies 
In chapter two, it was presumed that the treatment given in homosexuality, 
drapetomania, masturbation and sluggish schizophrenia amounts to medical treatment. 
This section shows that at least some of the treatment of these conditions counts as 
medical treatment.   
Defining medical treatment in this way means that conversion therapies (such as shock 
treatment and pairing homoerotic stimuli with a nausea-inducing medication) might be 
medical treatments regardless of whether homosexuality is a disorder. Equally, the 
medical treatments of people with sluggish schizophrenia (institutionalisation and 
medication), masturbation (e.g. castration), and drapetomania (being whipped) might 
be medical treatments regardless of the disorder-status of these conditions. Moreover, 
these treatments might be medical treatments even if they were (or are) ineffective. 
Instead, to determine whether these treatments are medical, it needs to be established 
whether they are (or were) the sorts of things done by health professionals in their 




Prior to the 1970s, conversion therapy was likely to have been taught in medical school 
and so on, and so would have fallen under the Asclepian frame. There might be pockets 
of the current world in which conversion therapy is still taught in medical school i.e. fall 
under the Asclepian frame. In all these societies, conversion therapy would count as 
medical treatment. In Soviet Russia, the institutionalisation and medication of those 
with sluggish schizophrenia would have been the sort of thing learnt in medical school 
and so on, and so they would have fallen within the Asclepian frame and so counted as 
medical treatment.85 It is likely that at least some of the treatments for masturbation, 
such as castration and passing needles through the genitals into the bladder fell within 
the Asclepian frame – they were the sorts of things learnt about in medical school and 
professional practice. On the other hand, some devices to curb masturbation might not 
have been fitted by a health professional in their capacity as a health professional. 
Instead, they might have been fitted by a religious leader, a family member or the 
person themselves. Such devices do not fall within the Asclepian frame and so they do 
not count as medical treatments, according to the definition I use.  
Finally, Cartwright said the treatment was based on “sound physiological principles” 
(Cartwright, 1851/2004, 37). This suggests that whipping runaway slaves might have 
fitted within the Asclepian frame, at the time when these treatments were being 
administered.86 In addition to being whipped, Cartwright recommended that runaway 
slaves be given “some kind of hard work in the open air and sunshine” (Cartwright, 
1851/2004, 37). As this is not a product or service provided by a health professional in 
his or her capacity as a health professional, this does not fall within the Asclepian frame 
and so is not a medical treatment. While the recommendation might be medical 
treatment, the ‘hard work’ itself is not a medical treatment. By analogy, while we do not 
ordinarily think of healthy eating and exercising as medical treatment, advice given by a 
                                                          
85 Imagine that a Soviet psychiatrist advised a political dissident to change their political views (to align 
with that of the government). It is debatable whether this would fit within the Asclepian frame. On the 
one hand, political views are not the sort of thing taught in medical school and so would not fit within the 
Asclepian frame. On the other hand, as explained in chapter two, Soviet Russians thought that there could 
be no logical reason for opposing the Soviet regime, and so the political dissidents must be mentally 
disordered. This suggests that ‘disordered’ political views might have been the sort of thing taught in 
Soviet medical schools, and so dissident political views would fall within the Asclepian frame. If correct, 
this might mean that the treatment of those with dissident political views also fell within the Asclepian 
frame. 
86 While it is odd to think of whipping people as medical treatment, considering it to be medical treatment 
does not mean that it was acceptable or effective.  
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health professional regarding diet and exercise is medical treatment (Harris, 1983, 
211).87 Equally, if the slave-owners carried out the whipping (as opposed to a health 
professional), then this would not be classed as medical treatment. 
The main point to take from this section is that, on the definition defended here, some of 
the things done to gay people, runaway slaves, people who masturbated, and those with 
dissident political views, were medical treatments. This does not entail that the 
conditions treated are or were disorders. Instead, it is intended to reinforce the claim 
that there is a link between considering a condition to be a disorder and the 
appropriateness of medical treatment. This link is discussed in detail in the remainder 
of this chapter.  
3. There is no exclusive prescriptive link between mental disorder and medical 
treatment 
This thesis concerns the claim that it is wrong to use medical treatment to attempt to 
cure homosexuality. This section, along with the following section, proposes that there 
is a link between considering something to be a mental disorder and the 
appropriateness of the medical treatment of that condition. In the following section, I 
show that it is pragmatic in nature.  This pragmatic link is weaker than a prescriptive 
link.  A prescriptive link means that if a condition is a disorder, medical treatment 
should be offered – offering medical treatment becomes a duty.  If this were the case, if 
homosexuality were a disorder, health professionals would be obliged to medically treat 
it. Moreover, if there were a prescriptive link, there would be a very strong reason to 
consider whether it can be demonstrated, for once and for all, that conditions such as 
homosexuality are not disorders. However, this section shows that there is no exclusive 
prescriptive link between those conditions that are considered to be disorders and 
medical treatment. This is because it is not the case that all instances of disorder and 
only instances of disorder should be medically treated.  
                                                          
87 Being in the fresh air sounds similar to the ‘Green Prescription’ programme in New Zealand in which 
health professionals give written advice to a patient to be physically active, as part of the patient’s health 
management. The doctor’s advice counts as medical treatment, but being physically active is not medical 
treatment.  
Historically, doctors advised their patients to go to a sanatorium in a place with clear air. This is a medical 
treatment. In contrast, if a doctor advised their patient to move to a warmer climate (but not live in a 
sanatorium), then this is not medical treatment. More precisely, the doctor’s advice counts as medical 
treatment, but moving to a warmer climate is not medical treatment.  
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It is clear that not all instances of disorder should be medically treated. For example, if 
the treatment is clearly harmful, then it should not be given. Instead, disorders should 
only be medically treated if, for example, the standard bioethical criteria (benefit to 
patient, harm-minimisation and consent) or Fulford’s (2004a) values-based medicine is 
in favour of medical treatment.  Hence, there is no prescriptive link between disorder 
and medical treatment.88 We can now turn to the second reason why there is no 
exclusive prescriptive link between disorder and medical treatment, namely, that it is 
not the case that only disorders may be medically treated. For example, we think 
doctors might prescribe contraceptives and pain relief during childbirth even though 
we do not class fertility or childbirth as disorders. This is both a descriptive and 
prescriptive claim. Doctors do prescribe contraceptives and pain relief and they should 
prescribe them in certain circumstances. While there might be some people who 
dispute the prescriptive claim, this is not the focus of this thesis.  
In short, the presence of a disorder is neither necessary nor sufficient to show that 
medical treatment should be given. Hence, while it is the case that some disorders 
should be medically treated; it is also true that some non-disorders should be medically 
treated. Even though there is a prescriptive link between some disorders and medically 
treatment, this link is not exclusive.  
                                                          
88 Germund Hesslow argues that there is no prescriptive link between disorder (or, in his words, disease) 
and medical treatment (Hesslow, 1993, 7-8). He argues that there are some diseases that are not 
associated with any discomfort or danger to the patient, such as small fibromas, and such diseases should 
not be medically treated. In addition, Hesslow argues that there is no prescriptive link between disease 
and a) whether a condition should be covered by medical insurance (see also Brülde, 2010, 21) or b) 
whether a person should be held responsible for criminal actions (Hesslow, 1993, 8-10). (While Hesslow 
considers small fibromas to be diseases, it is debatable whether they would be classified as disorders 
according to Wakefield’s (1992) harmful dysfunction analysis. This is because small fibromas might not 
be harmful.)  
While I agree with Hesslow that there is no prescriptive link between disorder (or disease) and medical 
treatment, I have a different justification than Hesslow. Hesslow says there is no prescriptive link because 
not all diseases are associated with discomfort or danger. In contrast, I claim that there is no prescriptive 
link because mental disorders should only be medically treated if the standard bioethical criteria (benefit 
to patient, harm-minimisation and consent) or Fulford’s (2004a) values-based medicine is in favour of 
medical treatment. Hesslow’s claim that conditions that do not cause discomfort or danger, such as a 
small fibroma, should not be medically treated could be interpreted in the following way: a small fibroma 
does not cause distress or discomfort, therefore medically treating the small fibroma would not benefit 
the patient. In this sense, Hesslow’s account could be interpreted to align with my claim that disorders 
should be medically treated if the standard bioethical criteria are in favour of medical treatment. 
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4. There is a pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment 
The previous section established that the presence of a disorder is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to make the claim that medical treatment should be given. Despite this, 
there is something important in the claim that the nature of disorders is such that they 
should be medically treated. This is endorsed by many others. For example, Caplan says 
“choosing to call a set of phenomena a disease involves a commitment to medical 
intervention” (Caplan in Hesslow, 1993, 6-7) and Albert et al. claim that there is an 
“implicit mandate to eliminate” disorders and symptoms of disorders (Albert et al. in 
Nordby, 2006, 170). Bolton says, “it has long been apparent that there is a close 
connection between making a diagnosis of illness or disorder and warranting clinical 
attention and treatment” (Bolton, 2008, 190).  Moreover, both Reznek (1987, 94, 97) 
and Cooper (2002) define disease, in part, in terms of suitability for medical treatment. 
That is, suitability for medical treatment is a necessary, though insufficient, element 
required for a condition to be a disease. 
As Wakefield’s (1992) ‘harmful dysfunction analysis’ is discussed in detail in chapters 
six and seven, special consideration needs to be given to how Wakefield perceives the 
relationship between mental disorder and medical treatment. Wakefield does not think 
there is an exclusive prescriptive connection between disorder-status (i.e. whether a 
condition is a disorder or not) and medical treatment (Wakefield, 2010, 278; 1999, 
374). He says, “Some disorders should not be treated, and some nondisorders should be 
treated” (Wakefield, 2010, 278).89 Regarding the medical treatment of non-disorders, he 
says that prescribing contraception and performing cosmetic surgery fall within the 
ambit of medicine (Wakefield, 2014, 653, 678) and that normal grief and pain during 
childbirth should be medically treated in certain situations (Wakefield, 2010, 278). 
Secondly, he says that there might be reason not to medically treat a disorder. For 
example, Spitzer and Endicott (1978) claim that masturbation stopped being medically 
treated when it was no longer thought of as a disorder. Wakefield says that this 
confuses two issues – disorder-status and the ‘call to action’ i.e. the moral acceptability 
of medical treatment (Wakefield, 1993, 162). Wakefield also says that disorder is not a 
                                                          
89 C.f. Wakefield’s claim that “anyone diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder needs intervention into the 
internal workings of their mental mechanisms, whether through psychotherapy or drug treatment” 
(Wakefield, 2005, 93).  
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call to treatment because it will have absurd implications when reversed – that if society 
did not feel obliged to treat that disorder, it would no longer be a disorder (Wakefield, 
1993, 162).  
This is not to say that Wakefield thinks that disorder-status is entirely irrelevant to the 
moral acceptability of medical treatment. Instead, he thinks that disorders are negative 
conditions that justify social concern (Wakefield, 1992, 376), that disorder-status has 
“implications for treatment decisions” (Wakefield, 2010, 7) and that the disorder-status 
of a condition is “relevant to, but not identical to, such practical questions as whether or 
how a condition should be treated” (Wakefield, 2010, 178). This fits with Wakefield’s 
claim that in order to maintain credibility, mental health professionals must 
simultaneously respect the distinction between disorder and non-disorder while 
“vigorously exploring” justifiable treatment for non-disorders (Wakefield, 2013, 828).  
Wakefield says that the appropriateness of medical treatment is based, in part, on 
factual considerations i.e. whether the condition is caused by an evolutionary 
dysfunction. He says that one reason that some people are against using growth 
hormones to treat non-disordered short children is that such shortness is not caused by 
an evolutionary dysfunction (Wakefield, 2000, 42). Wakefield also compares 
rambunctious non-disordered children with children with ADHD. He says without the 
factual component (i.e. dysfunction), we cannot understand why rambunctious children 
without ADHD are not equal candidates for drug treatment (Wakefield, 2000, 42).  This 
shows that Wakefield thinks there is some relationship between disorder-status and 
medical treatment.  
Furthermore, Wakefield says that it is problematic to medically treat non-disordered 
people, but it is “even more problematic to label and treat normal people as disordered 
when they are not so” (Wakefield, 2005, 93). For example, it would be problematic to 
say that homosexuality is a mental disorder, and medically treating gay people on the 
basis that homosexuality is a disorder, if homosexuality is not a disorder. While 
Wakefield does not explicitly claim that the harmful dysfunction analysis can safeguard 
against the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality, it is reasonable to 
claim that this is a consequence that Wakefield has in mind. Finally, Wakefield says 
there are costs to more everyday misclassifications of non-disorders as disorders 
insofar as this might convince the patient to have medical treatment, rather than 
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changing the environment or adopting a ‘watchful waiting’ approach (Wakefield, 2010, 
278). 
In summary, Wakefield thinks that there is no exclusive prescriptive link between 
disorder-status and medical treatment. However, he thinks that disorder-status is 
relevant to, though not determinate of, whether a condition should be medically treated.  
Earlier it was mentioned that many authors90 claim there is a link between mental 
disorder and medical treatment. I do not interpret any of these authors as claiming that 
there is an exclusive prescriptive link between whether a condition is a disorder and 
medical treatment. I interpret these authors as referring to the idea that disorders are 
the sorts of conditions for which medical treatment is appropriate – even though it is 
not the case that every instance of disorder should be medically treated, medical 
treatment is still appropriate for all instances of disorders. To say that the medical 
treatment of disorders is appropriate is not a prescriptive claim, but a pragmatic claim. 
A pragmatic claim is not descriptive—it does not simply describe that people generally 
seek medical treatment to cure or ameliorate disorders. Nor is it a prescriptive claim—it 
does not claim that all instances of disorders should be medically treated. Instead, it lies 
somewhere between the two such that it is action-guiding but not action-determining.  
The pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment occurs in all societies. For 
example, in the developed world, cancer is considered to be a disorder and 
chemotherapy a medical treatment, so there is a pragmatic link between cancer and 
chemotherapy. Equally, if some society considers a condition such as homosexuality to 
be a disorder and a treatment such as conversion therapy a medical treatment, then 
there is a pragmatic link between homosexuality (a disorder, for that society) and 
conversion therapy (a medical treatment, for that society). To claim that a pragmatic 
link between disorder and medical treatment exists in all societies does not mean that 
the extension of disorder (or medical treatment, for that matter) is the same for all 
societies. To determine, for once and for all, whether homosexuality is a mental disorder 
and whether it may be medically treated on this basis, the extension of mental disorder 
needs to be static between societies. However, the extension of disorder does not need 
to be static to show that the pragmatic link exists in all societies.  
                                                          
90 Including Caplan, Albert et al., Bolton, Reznek, Cooper – Wakefield can now be added to this list. 
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It would be beneficial if the extension of medical treatment were fixed between societies 
as this means that it could be determined for once and for all whether conversion 
therapy, for example, were a medical treatment. If it were not a medical treatment, then 
regardless of whether homosexuality were a mental disorder, there would be no 
pragmatic link between homosexuality and conversion therapy – conversion therapy 
would not be appropriate for homosexuality (on the basis that homosexuality is a 
mental disorder and conversion therapy is a medical treatment). However, this is not 
the route that that this thesis takes. It focuses on whether disorder, specifically mental 
disorder, has a static extension as opposed to whether medical treatment has a static 
extension. The extension of medical treatment is a large issue, and is a topic that ought 
to be considered, in full, elsewhere. 
The remainder of this section considers three ways in which the pragmatic link between 
disorder and medical treatment (i.e. the claim that medical treatment is appropriate for 
disorders) could be spelled out. The first way in which it might be shown that there is a 
pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment (i.e. that the medical treatment 
of disorders is appropriate) is that medical treatments are generally designed with 
disorders in mind. For example, anti-depressants (a medical treatment) are designed to 
cure or ameliorate Major Depressive Disorder (a mental disorder). There are two 
problems with explaining the pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment 
using the ‘design match’ approach: it is not the case that all medical treatments are a) 
designed or b) designed to treat disorders. Regarding the first point, some medical 
treatments are accidentally discovered rather than designed, such as marijuana and 
quinine (which is used to treat malaria, but naturally occurs in cinchona trees.) 
Regarding the second point, some medical treatments are designed to treat non-
disorders, such as providing pain relief during childbirth (see sections two and three of 
this chapter). 
The second way in which the notion of ‘appropriateness’ could be articulated is by 
claiming that medical treatment is appropriate for disorders, if medical treatment is the 
effective and most efficient way of curing or ameliorating disorders (or if there is 
potential that in the future medical treatment will be discovered that either cures or 
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ameliorates the condition91). The main problem with this approach is that medical 
treatment is always appropriate for disorders, but it is not the case that medical 
treatment is always the effective and most efficient way of curing or ameliorating 
disorders. For example, keeping active might be the effective and most efficient way of 
curing my sore back.92  
The final way of explaining what is meant by the claim ‘it is appropriate to medically 
treat disorders’ is to say that it makes sense to seek medical treatment for a disorder. 
But why does it make sense to medically treat disorders? The Asclepian Frame can be 
used to say why it makes sense to medically treat disorders. The notion of the Asclepian 
frame was introduced in the section two of this chapter. Section two suggested that a 
treatment is a medical treatment if it falls within the Asclepian frame and that all 
disorders fall within the Asclepian frame. This section takes the notion of the Asclepian 
frame a step further and considers whether the pragmatic link between disorder and 
medical treatment can be conceptualised in terms of the Asclepian frame. That is, it asks 
whether it is appropriate (i.e. makes sense) to medically treat disorders because 
disorders and medical treatment both fall within the Asclepian frame.  
There are two potential problems with conceptualising the pragmatic link between 
disorders and medical treatment in terms of the Asclepian frame. The first is that the 
boundaries of the frame are fuzzy. There are examples of conditions (for example, 
having marital problems93) and treatments (for example, talk therapy) for which it is 
unclear whether they fall within the Asclepian frame. While the borders of the Asclepian 
frame might be fuzzy, this does not prevent the frame from providing a rough notion of 
what counts as a disorder, and what counts as a medical treatment.  
                                                          
91 The phrase ‘potentially medically treatable’ is borrowed from Cooper, who argues that to be a disease, a 
condition must be ‘potentially medically treatable’—there must be “reasonable hope that a medical 
treatment might become available in the future” (Cooper, 2002, 277-278). For Cooper, this is a necessary 
but insufficient requirement for a condition to be a disease. 
92 This problem could be overcome by making the definitional claim that keeping active is a medical 
treatment. However, this would be inconsistent with the way medical treatment is used in ordinary 
language.  
93 Another example is a person who is sad though not clinically depressed. This person is not disordered 
but has a problem of living, to use Szasz’s phrase (Szasz, 1960, 113). It is unclear whether this condition 
falls within the Asclepian frame. This is separate from the case in which it is unclear whether a person is 
disordered or whether they have a problem of living. However, in this case, it is also unclear whether that 
condition falls within the Asclepian frame. 
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The second potential problem is that conceptualising the Asclepian frame as something 
that is learnt about in medical school and professional development means that both 
disorders and non-disorders fall within the frame. In other words, all disorders fall 
within the Asclepian frame and some non-disorders too. This means that a condition’s 
being a disorder is sufficient but not necessary for it to fall within the Asclepian frame. 
Hence, there is always a pragmatic link between disorders and medical treatment and 
there is sometimes a pragmatic link between non-disorders and medical treatment. 
However, this is not a problem because to establish the pragmatic link, it only needs to 
be shown that being a disorder is sufficient for a condition to fall within the Asclepian 
frame. That is, it does not need to be shown that being a disorder is necessary for a 
condition to fall within the Asclepian frame.  
In contrast, conceptualising the pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment 
in terms of a design match is problematic because not all medical treatments are 
designed for disorders i.e. being a disorder is not sufficient to show that the medical 
treatment used to cure or ameliorate that disorder was designed. Equally, a condition’s 
being a disorder is not sufficient to show that medical treatment is an effective and the 
most efficient way of treating that disorder – not all disorders are best treated via 
medical treatment.  
In short, while each of the three alternatives help to clarify the existence of a pragmatic 
link between disorder and medical treatment, the best way of conceptualising the 
pragmatic link is in terms of the Asclepian frame. Using the Asclepian frame means that 
disorder is sufficient for the pragmatic link to exist. All disorders fall within the 
Asclepian frame and so it makes sense to medically treat all disorders – the medical 
treatment of all disorders is appropriate.  
5. Conclusion  
This chapter has considered the link between disorders (including both mental 
disorders and physical disorders) and medical treatment. The chapter began by defining 
medical treatments as those products and services, both effective and ineffective, that 
are provided by health professionals in their capacity as health professionals i.e. those 
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treatments that fall within the Asclepian frame.94 To say that a treatment falls within the 
Asclepian frame means that the treatment is something that is learnt in medical school 
(or nursing school, physiotherapy school and so on) or in the professional development 
or practice of health professionals. This definition of medical treatment allows the 
treatment of both disorders and non-disorders to be considered medical treatment. As 
such, it is a good fit with ordinary language. Moreover, defining medical treatment in 
this way does not require the meaning of disorder to be pre-determined. The chapter 
then showed that there is no exclusive prescriptive link between disorder and medical 
treatment. It is not the case that all those conditions we ordinarily call disorders should 
be medically treated and nor is it the case that only those conditions that we ordinarily 
call disorders may be treated.  
While there is no exclusive prescriptive link between disorder and medical treatment, 
the chapter showed that there is a pragmatic link between disorder and medical 
treatment. The pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment refers to the 
idea that it is appropriate to medically treat disorders, even though it is not the case that 
all instances of disorders should be medically treated. It was determined that the 
pragmatic link is best conceptualised in terms of the Asclepian frame – it is appropriate 
(i.e. makes sense) to medically treat disorders because both disorders and medical 
treatments fit within the Asclepian frame. Crucially, this does not mean that all 
disorders should be medically treated. 
Describing the pragmatic link using the Asclepian frame means that the medical 
treatment of all disorders is appropriate, and the medical treatment of some non-
disorders may be appropriate. That the medical treatment of some non-disorders may 
be appropriate does not jeopardise the existence of a pragmatic link between disorders 
and medical treatment. To establish that the link exists, all that needs to be shown is 
that disorder is sufficient for appropriate medical treatment.  
Why does the existence of a pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment 
matter? This thesis aims to show that only disorders may be medically treated on the 
basis of being disorders. If this is the case, and if a condition such as homosexuality is 
not a disorder, then that condition may not be medically treated on the basis of being a 
                                                          
94 While the borders of the Asclepian frame might be fuzzy, this does not prevent the Asclepian frame 
providing a rough notion of what counts as medical treatment.  
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disorder.95 To use this method to safeguard against the medical treatment of 
homosexuality in all societies, it needs to be shown that homosexuality is not a mental 
disorder in any society. In other words, it must be shown that the extension of mental 
disorder is static across all societies and the static extension excludes homosexuality. If 
a) a pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment exists in all societies and b) 
it can be shown that homosexuality is not a mental disorder for all societies, then 
homosexuality may not be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder in 
any society. The same reasoning applies to any other condition that is not a mental 
disorder. If being a runaway slave or ADHD is not a mental disorder, and there is a 
pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment, then being a runaway slave or 
having ADHD may not be medically treated on the basis of being a disorder. On the 
other hand, if the extension of mental disorder changes from society to society, then we 
cannot determine, for once and for all, whether a condition is a mental disorder. Nor can 
we determine, for once and for all, whether a condition may be medically treated on the 
basis of being a mental disorder. Instead, we would have to accept, for example, that a 
society that considers homosexuality to be a mental disorder may medically treat 
homosexuality on the basis that homosexuality is a mental disorder for that society.   
As explained in section 1.1 of chapter one, a potential way of safeguarding against the 
medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality is to show that 
1. Only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders, and 
2. These conditions are not mental disorders in any society i.e. that the extension of 
mental disorder is static between societies and excludes these four conditions.  
Now that part one (chapters two, three and four) has established the first criterion, the 
remainder of this thesis focuses on the second criterion – whether it can be shown that 
conditions such as homosexuality are not mental disorders in any society. Up until now, 
I have presumed that homosexuality is not a mental disorder. From this point on, I 
                                                          
95 The condition may still be medically treated, but the rhetoric of disorder cannot be used to show that 




question whether homosexuality is a mental disorder. More precisely, I consider 
whether it is the case that homosexuality cannot be a mental disorder in any society.96  
 
  
                                                          
96 Bingham and Banner (2014) start on the basis that whether homosexuality is a mental disorder is, at 
least in part, an empirical question, but a closed empirical question. That is, they think that homosexuality 
is not a mental disorder. In contrast, this thesis starts on the basis that whether homosexuality is a mental 
disorder is a partly empirical question, but an open question. (Thank you to the New Zealand examiner 
for pointing this out.) 
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PART TWO – IS HOMOSEXUALITY A MENTAL DISORDER? 
Chapter Five – Conceptual Analysis and Ordinary 
Language Philosophy 
1. Introduction 
Chapters two and three introduced the argument that one method of safeguarding 
against the medical treatment of conditions that we, in the developed world, do not 
consider to be mental disorders, such as homosexuality, is to show that a) those 
conditions are not mental disorders, and b) only mental disorders may be medically 
treated on the basis of being mental disorders. The previous chapter established that 
there is a pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical treatment. This chapter 
considers the meaning or meanings of mental disorder. Chapters two and three also 
determined that to safeguard against the medical treatment of conditions such as 
homosexuality, the extension of mental disorder must be static across societies. The first 
part of this chapter focuses on the meaning (or meanings) of mental disorder. The 
second part of this chapter focuses on whether the extension of mental disorder is static 
across societies. 
A leading way of determining the meaning of a concept such as mental disorder is to 
carry out conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis is the process by which test cases are 
applied to proposed analyses i.e. meanings. If one and only one proposed analysis 
parallels our intuitions about the meaning of that concept, then that analysis determines 
the meaning of the concept in question. The intuitive meaning of a concept is 
determined by examining the way that concept is used in ordinary language. In ordinary 
language, mental disorder can be used in multiple ways and so can have multiple 
meanings. To avoid this problem, I pin down the specific sense of mental disorder in 
which I am interested, as the way mental disorder is used by health professionals in 
clinical settings and by informed lay-people in serious situations.  
As mentioned in section two of chapter one, at times it is unclear whether a term or a 
concept is being referred to. For example, when one asks how ‘mental disorder’ is used 
in ordinary language, it is unclear whether the term MENTAL DISORDER is being 
referred to, or the concept mental disorder. I am interested in the concept which 
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underlies the ordinary use of the term. Hence, I use mental disorder rather than 
MENTAL DISORDER.  
After outlining the basic tenets of ordinary language philosophy, the chapter then 
considers the advantages and disadvantages of basing the meaning of mental disorder 
on the way the concept is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-
people. As discussed in section three, the advantages are two-fold. Firstly, the meaning 
of mental disorder cannot stray so far from its ordinary use, otherwise the talk is no 
longer about mental disorder (i.e. as it is ordinarily used) but something else i.e. 
something with a new intension and/or extension. Secondly, it maintains the pragmatic 
link between mental disorder and medical treatment.  
Section 4.1 shows that this sense of mental disorder has three necessary and sufficient 
components: to be a mental disorder, the condition must be a) mental, b) disvalued and 
c) be caused by a dysfunction. Section 4.2 outlines that a major disadvantage of basing 
the meaning of mental disorder on ordinary language (specifically, the ordinary 
language of health professionals and informed lay-people) is that the extension of 
mental disorder might change over time and culture. For example, homosexuality cannot 
be a mental disorder in the developed world because homosexuality is not disvalued. 
Yet homosexuality might be a mental disorder in a culture in which it is disvalued (if it 
is also mental and caused by a dysfunction).97 As there is a pragmatic link between 
mental disorder and medical treatment, in societies in which homosexuality is a mental 
disorder, homosexuality may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder.  
On the other hand, if the extension of mental disorder (as used by health professionals 
and informed lay-people) were the same across all societies, then it could be 
determined, for once and for all, whether a condition such as homosexuality is a mental 
disorder and whether it may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder. Section five considers ways in which it might be shown that the extension of 
mental disorder is static over time and culture. One way of doing so is to show that 
mental disorder refers to or, more loosely picks out, a real category – either a 
scientifically real category (a natural kind) or a morally real category. Alternately, if 
                                                          
97 See section two of chapter two. Disvalue is further considered in section 4.1 of this chapter.  
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dysfunction (being a component of the way mental disorder is used in ordinary 
language) is a natural kind, then part of the extension of mental disorder might be static 
between societies. Finally, section four introduces the idea that the extension of mental 
disorder might be fixed if there are Rawlsian primary goods concerning the value-status 
of mental states.  
2. Conceptual Analysis and Ordinary Language Philosophy 
One way of determining the meaning of a concept is to carry out conceptual analysis. 
Conceptual analysis is the process by which test cases are applied to proposed analyses 
i.e. meanings.98 If one and only one proposed analysis parallels our intuitions about the 
meaning of that concept, then that analysis determines the meaning of the concept in 
question (Harman in Nordby, 2006, 172; Lemoine, 2013, 310-311; Brülde, 2010, 27). 
For example, it could be said that bachelor means unmarried male – this is a proposed 
analysis of bachelor. We intuitively think of a person such as Brad Pitt or Tom Cruise as 
a bachelor. Since Brad Pitt and Tom Cruise are unmarried males, they are bachelors, 
according to the proposed analysis. Here, the test case (that we intuitively call Brad Pitt 
or Tom Cruise a bachelor) fits with the proposed analysis of bachelor. At this stage, 
there is no conflict between the test case and the proposed analysis and so the analysis 
is acceptable. However, we do not intuitively think of a five year-old boy as a bachelor, 
yet a five year-old boy fits within the proposed analysis. That is, a five year-old boy is an 
unmarried male. Here, there is a conflict between the test case (that we do not 
intuitively call a five year-old boy a bachelor) and the proposed analysis of bachelor. 
Hence, the proposed analysis is unacceptable. It either needs to be rejected in favour of 
some other analysis, or the analysis needs to be adapted. Regarding adaptation, we 
might revise the proposed analysis so that bachelor means unmarried, adult male. This 
adapted analysis excludes the five year-old boy, but includes Brad Pitt and Tom Cruise, 
and so fits with our intuitions. After considering all proposed analysis of bachelor, if one 
and only one proposed analysis fits our intuitions, then according to conceptual 
analysis, that proposed analysis is the meaning of bachelor.  
                                                          
98 In addition to test cases (i.e. counter-examples), Lemoine says that conceptual analysis must also 
consider counter-arguments. However, he acknowledges that most counter-arguments will involve 
counter-examples (Lemoine, 2013, 313-314).  
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Many philosophers have carried out a conceptual analysis of mental disorder (or related 
concepts such as health, disease or disorder). These include many of the main players in 
the philosophy of medicine, such as Boorse, Wakefield and Nordenfelt (Lemoine, 
2013).99 For example, Wakefield (1992) puts test cases against concepts of disorder 
based on a pure value account, whatever health professionals treat100, statistical 
deviance, biological disadvantage and unexpected distress or disability. After 
concluding that all these approaches conflict with the test cases, he proposes a new 
analysis of disorder, namely, disorders as harmful (evolutionary) dysfunctions. 
Wakefield thinks that conceptualising disorder in this way does not conflict with any 
test cases i.e. it does not conflict with our intuitions. This is not accepted by everyone. 
For example, Murphy and Woolfolk claim that dyslexia might not be caused by an 
evolutionary dysfunction, and so, according to Wakefield’s analysis, it cannot be a 
disorder (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 276). This conflicts with our intuition that 
dyslexia is a disorder (see also section one of chapter seven). Dyslexia is an example of a 
test case that is intuitively a mental disorder but might fall outside Wakefield’s 
proposed analysis. There might also be examples of test cases that are intuitively 
excluded from being mental disorders, but might fall inside Wakefield’s proposed 
analysis. For example, post-bereavement grief might turn out to be caused by an 
evolutionary dysfunction. If post-bereavement grief is also harmful, then post-
bereavement grief would be considered a mental disorder according to Wakefield’s 
proposed analysis. This would remain despite our intuition that post-bereavement grief 
is not a mental disorder. In this case, we would either need to a) reject Wakefield’s 
proposed analysis (i.e. that all disorders are caused by harmful dysfunctions) or b) 
revise Wakefield’s account so that the analysis included dyslexia and excluded post-
bereavement grief, or c) reject our intuitions that dyslexia is a mental disorder and post-
                                                          
99 Worhall and Worhall’s examination of the meaning of disease is a clear example of conceptual analysis 
(Worhall and Worhall, 2001, 39-48).  
100 If disorder were entirely defined in terms of that which health professionals treat, it would follow that 
all conditions that health professionals treat are disorders and therefore, health professionals only treat 
disorders (see also Wakefield, 1992, 377 and Boorse, 1977, 543). For example, since doctors medically 
treat the problem of unwanted fertility using contraceptives, unwanted fertility would be a disorder. This 
does not fit with ordinary language—we do not ordinarily call unwanted fertility a disorder. (Cooper 
claims that an unwanted pregnancy that is the result of the failure of contraceptives might be a disorder 
even though this is contrary to our intuitions (Cooper, 2005, 36).) An additional problem is that to define 
disorder entirely in terms of that which health professionals treat, then all preventative treatments would 
treat a disorder, even though the patient does not yet have that disorder. 
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bereavement grief is not. (These options are discussed again in section two of chapter 
seven.) 
In addition to capturing a common understanding of the meaning of a concept and 
arriving at a definition of a concept, conceptual analysis aims to give a verdict about 
grey cases (Nordby, 2006, 173). 101  For example, it is not intuitively clear whether 
homosexuality is a mental disorder, at least if one looks around at how it is categorised 
across different times and cultures. Some societies intuitively consider homosexuality to 
be a mental disorder, but other societies intuitively exclude it. Many of those who carry 
out the conceptual analysis of mental disorder aim to provide a verdict on grey cases. 
However, whether conceptual analysis can provide such a verdict is a moot point (see, 
for example, Lemoine, 2013). 
What does it mean to say that some condition is intuitively a mental disorder or is 
intuitively not a mental disorder? There are multiple ways in which we can think about 
the intuitive extension of a concept.102 This thesis shall not explore these intricacies. 
Instead, following Wittgenstein I think of the intuitive extension as being the application 
of a term in a natural language, such as English or Māori. Given that my parents called 
our four-legged, barking pet a DOG, as a child I intuitively called (our four-legged, 
barking pet) DOG. Equally, if the people around us call schizophrenia a MENTAL 
DISORDER, then we intuitively call schizophrenia a MENTAL DISORDER. Put another 
way, schizophrenia is ordinarily considered to be a mental disorder, and so 
schizophrenia is intuitively a mental disorder. 103  
To say that intuition about whether a condition is a mental disorder is related to the 
way mental disorder is used in ordinary language does not explain how a reference such 
as MENTAL DISORDER got its meaning in the first place. Kripke (1980) and Putnam’s 
(1975) causal theory of reference is an influential theory regarding how references gain 
meaning. This is not the only theory that concerns how references initially gain 
                                                          
101 There may also be conditions that are intuitively excluded or included as mental disorders (i.e. clear, 
uncontroversial cases), but which the proposed analysis fails to classify at all (Lemoine, 2013, 310).  
102 For a detailed account, see, for example, DePaul et. al., 2008.  
103 Murphy and Woolfolk think of the intuitive extension of a concept in a slightly different way. They 
think of intuition as folk psychology – a set of unscientific theories about the mind (Murphy, 2005, 117). 
For example, a lay-person (a non-scientist) would consider schizophrenia to be a mental disorder, and so 
schizophrenia is intuitively a mental disorder. This difference does not impact on the argument of this 
thesis i.e. whether mental disorder has a static extension.  
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meaning, but I adopt it for two reasons. The first is that it fits well with realist accounts 
of disorder as it concerns natural kinds, and whether mental disorder (or a component 
of mental disorder) is a natural kind is discussed at length in chapters seven and eight. 
Secondly, the causal theory of reference is used by Wakefield in his ‘black box 
essentialism’ (Wakefield, 1997; 2001, 36) which is considered in detail in chapters six 
and seven.  
According to Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975), a reference is initially fixed by an act of 
‘dubbing’ or ‘baptising’ through which a term becomes a rigid designator for that thing. 
For example, someone might have initially pointed to the clear, potable stuff in lakes 
and rivers and referred to that stuff as WATER and so WATER became a rigid 
designator for water. The reference WATER was then lent to others via communicative 
exchanges. In other words, the term WATER was borrowed by others to refer to the 
clear, potable stuff in lakes and rivers. By analogy, according to the causal theory of 
reference, the reference MENTAL DISORDER was initially fixed by an act of dubbing or 
baptising – someone pointing to an instance of a mental disorder and saying, ‘that is a 
mental disorder’. MENTAL DISORDER became a rigid designator for mental disorders 
and was lent to others via communicative exchanges. The causal theory of reference is 
discussed in more detail in section four of chapter six. This is only a brief explanation of 
how references initially gain their meaning. We can now return to ordinary language 
philosophy.  
Ordinary language philosophers argue that the meaning (or meanings) of everyday 
concepts should be determined by examining the way that concept is used in ordinary 
language i.e. the way that concept is used by ordinary people in ordinary situations. 
Ordinary language philosophers do not consider the way reality is – they are not 
concerned with positivistic verifications (see Carnap, 1949). Instead, they are interested 
in the way or ways concepts are used. They claim that considering the way concepts are 
used has more descriptive power than trying to verify reality. In addition, ordinary 
language philosophers are more concerned with the use of a term rather than the way a 
term is defined (Austin in Fulford, 2001, 81; Brülde, 2010, 27). This is because we can 
use concepts without having a strict definition of them. That is, if you know how to use a 
term, then you know its meaning. For example, we can use the concept bald without 
trouble, even though we cannot precisely define when a person is bald – is a person 
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with 50 hairs on his or her head bald (Nordenfelt, 1997, 17-18)? Likewise, ordinary 
language philosophers claim that we can use mental disorder without having a strict 
definition thereof. While ordinary language philosophers are not interested in a strict 
definition of a concept, they are still interested in the meaning of a concept, and they 
claim that the meaning of a concept should be based on the way that concept is used.  
That the meaning of a concept should be based in ordinary language is a key theme of 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) philosophy. In his early work in the Tractatus (1921), 
Wittgenstein was interested in meaning as representation – a representation either of 
something in the world or inside the mind. In his later work, Wittgenstein changed tack. 
He argued that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 
43) and “if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say 
that it was its use” (Wittgenstein, 1960, § 4).104  For example, ordinary language 
philosophers claim that the meaning of water should be based on the way water is 
ordinarily used i.e. water refers to the clear, potable liquid found in lakes and rivers.  
Regarding the meaning of mental disorder, ordinary language theorists claim that the 
meaning thereof should not be based on scientific findings about mental states. Instead, 
ordinary language philosophers think the meaning of mental disorder should be 
determined using a conceptual analysis of the way the concept is used in everyday 
situations. This is not an attack on science – ordinary language philosophers do not 
claim that science is unimportant. Instead, they say that philosophy and science are 
separate disciplines. Science is concerned with uncovering facts, whereas philosophy is 
concerned with conceptual analysis. Nor does it mean that ordinary language 
philosophers think that science is irrelevant to the meaning of mental disorder. Science 
might be indirectly relevant to the meaning thereof, insofar as science might influence 
ordinary language such that the applicable science has become part of ordinary 
language. For example, that water is H2O is a scientific discovery, but it is a scientific 
discovery that has been incorporated into ordinary language. That is, most people know 
that water is H2O and use WATER to mean H2O. As will be shown in the following 
                                                          
104 Wittgenstein also claims that the meanings of terms are based on the way they are used, not vice versa 
(the way a term is used is not based on the meaning of that term). However, in most cases the use of a 
term can be equated with the meaning of that term (Baker and Hacker, 2005a, 119; see also Baker and 
Hacker, 2005, 145-158).  Hence, I use ‘meaning’ and ‘use’ interchangeably. Despite this, I acknowledge 
that precisely what Wittgenstein meant by ‘meaning’ and ‘use’ and the relationship between the two is a 
complex issue that cannot be delved into more deeply within the confines of this thesis. 
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chapter, not everybody agrees that the meaning of water105 should be based on the way 
it is used in ordinary language. Others, such as Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975), argue 
that as water refers to a natural kind, the meaning thereof should be based on scientific 
evidence concerning the necessary and sufficient criteria of all instances of water i.e. the 
real essence of water, namely, H2O. Even so, Kripke and Putnam’s causal theory of 
reference means that ordinary language is still related to the meaning of water as it 
provides a starting point from which the real essence of water can be identified. 
Another key part of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language is that words and concepts 
can be used in multiple ways and so a word or a concept might have multiple 
meanings.106  That is, words are the instruments of language and they have various uses 
depending on the way language is used. For example, whether some activity is a game 
depends on the sense in which game is used – scrabble is a board game, but it is not an 
Olympic game.107 Mental disorder can also be used in different ways within ordinary 
language and so can have multiple meanings. For example, a scientist’s account of 
mental disorder might be quite different from the way a mental health professional, a 
lawyer or an insurance company uses that concept. Even within the law, there are 
different concepts of mental disorder depending on whether it is to be used to exculpate 
a person from criminal responsibility or used to force a person to have medical 
treatment (Woolfolk, 2001). Moreover, mental disorder might sometimes be used to 
express a fact, and at other times it might be used to express a value (see Fulford, 1989, 
7, 60-67 on the multiple ways in which disease is used).108 As Wittgenstein says, the 
functions (i.e. uses) of words are as diverse as the functions of tools found in a toolbox 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, § 11).  
                                                          
105 Given that Kripke is interested in naming (i.e. the way words refer), it is arguable that WATER should 
be used instead of water. As explained in section two of chapter one, this thesis italicises concepts and 
capitalises terms (i.e. words). However, as I am interested in the concept water, I have chosen to italicise 
it rather than capitalise it.  
106 Not everyone accepts Wittgenstein’s claim that ordinary language concepts are open i.e. do not have 
an essence (Nordenfelt, 1997, 17). 
107 Using the idea that ordinary language concepts such as game can be used in multiple ways, 
Wittgenstein develops his family resemblance account. See section 5.1 of chapter six for more on the 
family resemblance account.  
108 Dysfunction can also be used in multiple ways. For example, we sometimes refer to families as 
dysfunctional and sometimes refer to mechanisms as dysfunctional. The sense of dysfunction in which I 
am interested is the way that it is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people to 
mean ‘something gone wrong with the body or mind’. 
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It could be argued that the way (or ways) scientists, mental health professionals, 
lawyers and insurance companies use mental disorder are technical uses rather than 
ordinary uses. For example, most countries have some sort of mental health legislation 
that allows for compulsory medical treatment in certain circumstances. In New Zealand, 
the relevant piece of legislation is the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. The Act stipulates that for a person to be compulsorily treated, 
that person must have an abnormality of the mind that either a) poses a serious danger 
to that person or others, or b) seriously diminishes the person’s capacity to take care of 
himself or herself. In contrast, we do not ordinarily require a person to be a serious 
danger to themselves or others to call that person MENTALLY DISORDERED. We 
ordinarily classify depressed people as having a mental disorder even though that 
depressed person might not be a danger to himself, herself or others. However, the way 
scientists, mental health professionals, lawyers and insurance companies use mental 
disorder are ordinary uses. This aligns with Wittgenstein’s philosophy – to call 
something an Olympic game is a technical use of game, but Wittgenstein still considers 
Olympic games to be games in his family resemblance account. It also aligns with 
Fulford’s claim that ordinary use is not confined to lay use i.e. ordinary use can include 
ordinary medical use (Nordenfelt, 2001, 73). In other words, ordinary language 
philosophy does not make a distinction between ordinary and technical (for example, 
academic, scientific, slang) uses. A technical use of a concept can be ordinary for a 
certain group. For example, for botanists, fruit refers to plants with internal seed-
bearing structures. This use of fruit is ordinary for botanists. Moreover, according to 
ordinary language philosophers, the way botanists ordinarily use fruit is not ‘more true’ 
or more precise than the way lay-people use fruit.109 The way lay-people use fruit is 
perfectly adequate for lay-use.110 Hence, the ways in which lawyers, scientists and so on 
ordinarily use mental disorder are part of ordinary language and so it must be accepted 
that mental disorder can be used in multiple ways in ordinary language.  
I accept the Wittgensteinian claim that mental disorder has multiple meanings. (To be 
clear, I claim that mental disorder has multiple meanings. I am not considering whether 
                                                          
109 Those who oppose ordinary language philosophy argue that ordinary language obstructs a clear view 
on reality and that an ideal language would represent reality more precisely than ordinary language (See 
Parker-Ryan (n.d.).) 
110 See Parker-Ryan (n.d) c.f. Hacking who suggests that Wittgenstein was opposed to using a family 
resemblance account to scientific terms such as SPECIES (Hacking, 1991, 115; 1991a, 150). 
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concepts, in general, have multiple meanings.) That is, I do not claim that the multiple 
senses in which mental disorder is used can be tied together using necessary and 
sufficient criteria. 111  That mental disorder has multiple meanings is problematic for my 
purposes, as to complete a thorough conceptual analysis of mental disorder, I would 
need to consider all these uses. Moreover, as will become clear later in the chapter, it is 
problematic because it means a condition such as homosexuality might be considered to 
be a mental disorder in one sense but not another.  There are two ways in which this 
problem might be dissolved. The first is to claim that there is a general or broad sense of 
mental disorder; the second is to specify the sense of mental disorder in which one is 
interested. Each of these options are now discussed.  
The first option is to claim that there is a general or broad sense of mental disorder i.e. 
that there is something (or some things) that tie all these diverse senses of mental 
disorder together. This option picks up on the idea that even though mental disorder 
might have multiple meanings, it is not an open concept (Nordenfelt, 1997, 17-18). A 
fire-damaged house is not a mental disorder; nor is a broken arm, or happiness112 or 
having no sense of humour. That there might be a general sense of mental disorder does 
not necessarily mean that the general sense of mental disorder has an essence; that it 
can be demarcated using necessary and sufficient criteria. It might be that the general 
sense of mental disorder can be analysed using a non-essentialist approach, such as 
Wittgenstein’s family resemblance account of ordinary language concepts or Rosch’s 
prototype account of classification.113  
Wittgenstein asks us to try to define game. He points out that game is a broad concept. It 
includes, for example, sports, make-believe, board games, logic games (crosswords, 
Sudoku) video games, Olympic games and so on. Wittgenstein says that game cannot be 
defined essentially i.e. in terms of necessary and sufficient elements. Despite this, there 
are similarities between games. For example, board games and team sports are both 
played with multiple people. Many (though not all) games are fun. Sports, board games 
                                                          
111 I do not claim that mental disorder is an essentialist concept (demarcated by necessary and sufficient 
elements) and so only has a single meaning.  
112 C.f. Bentall, 1992 and Harris et. al., 1993. 
113 Rosch argues that concepts are not identified using an essence, but are characterised by the best 
examples i.e. prototypes. For example, a robin is a better example of bird than penguin because robins fly 
and chirp, but penguins do not (Rosch, 1975).  See Sadegh-Zadeh (2008) for the difference between 
prototype and family resemblance theories.  
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and video games are usually competitive, while make-believe games are not. 
Wittgenstein’s idea is that rather than game having an essence, all games share a 
network of overlapping and criss-crossing properties (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 66.) If a 
cluster forms when the properties of games are mapped out, then this cluster could be 
said to provide the general, over-arching meaning of game. By analogy, if a cluster forms 
when the network of overlapping and criss-crossing properties of mental disorder are 
mapped out, then this could be said to be the general meaning of mental disorder. In 
other words, the property cluster will identify the general meaning of mental disorder.  
There are two main problems with using the general sense of mental disorder to avoid 
mental disorder having multiple meanings. Firstly, this is not how Wittgenstein uses the 
family resemblance account of ordinary language. Instead, he uses it to show that 
concepts have multiple meanings. That is, Wittgensteinian’s might deny that concepts 
such as mental disorder can have a general, over-arching sense. The second problem is 
that this general sense of mental disorder might be so vague that it is of limited use. By 
analogy, as run has over six hundred meanings, there is either no general sense of run, 
or if there is, it is next to meaningless (Winchester, 2011). 114  If the property cluster of 
the multiple senses of run is too loose or too complex, then it might not be used. If so, 
then this general sense of run would not form part of ordinary language. Equally, if the 
general sense of mental disorder is too loose or complex, then the general sense thereof 
would not be part of ordinary language, and so would not help to analyse the meaning 
of mental disorder. 
The second way of avoiding the problem that mental disorder can be used in multiple 
senses and so can have multiple meanings is to identify one sense of mental disorder in 
which one is interested. Due to the problems for the first option outlined above, this is 
the approach that I adopt. I am interested in the way health professionals use mental 
disorder in a clinical setting, for example, if a health professional tells me that I have a 
mental disorder such as major depressive disorder or schizophrenia. I am not 
interested in the way mental disorder is used in a flippant, or perhaps metaphorical, 
sense. For example, if my friend rants and raves about someone eating her sandwich, 
                                                          
114 Some of the definitions of run are homonyms rather than polysemes. Even so, RUN has plenty of 
polysemes. (A polyseme is a sense of a word that has contiguous meanings, whereas a homonym is an 
accidental similarity between words, such as the animal bear and the verb bear.) See Winchester, 2011.  
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then I might say she is crazy i.e. that she is acting like a mentally disordered person. This 
is not the sense of mental disorder I am interested in. The way mental disorder is used in 
a clinical setting is distinguished from a purely scientific sense of mental disorder. A 
purely scientific sense of mental disorder might be used by pathologists and perhaps 
neuroscientists. Instead, I am interested in the way health professionals use mental 
disorder in a clinical setting. A pathologist might consider the gourmand lesion to be a 
mental disorder. (The gourmand lesion is a lesion which causes a person to become 
appreciative of fine food (Regard and Landis, 1997).) However, a health professional 
would not consider the gourmand lesion to be a mental disorder. This is likely because, 
as discussed in section 4.1 of this chapter, being appreciative of fine food is not 
disvalued.  Since it is not disvalued, it is not clinically significant. In short, while the 
clinical sense of mental disorder is value-laden, the scientific sense of mental disorder 
might be value-free. This does not mean that science is unrelated to the clinical sense of 
mental disorder. Section 4.1 of this chapter shows that all mental disorders must be 
caused by a dysfunction, dysfunction being a scientific concept. Chapter seven shows 
that if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, then the scientific evidence used to pick out 
this natural kind should not be constrained by ordinary language. 
Lay people can also use this clinical sense of mental disorder i.e. it is not restricted to 
health professionals. I might tell my friends in a serious, non-flippant (non-metaphorical 
sense) that I have a mental disorder. By analogy, scientists use gold to mean the stuff 
with the atomic number 79, but lay-people can also use gold in this way in certain 
situations. For example, if I say ‘Pyrite (fool’s gold) is not gold’, I have in mind the stuff 
with the atomic number 79. That health professionals in clinical settings and informed 
lay-people in serious situations use mental disorder in the same way is an empirical 
claim based on my intuitions. Research would need to be carried out to determine 
whether informed lay-people do use mental disorder in the same way as health 
professionals. In the absence of such research, I rely on my intuition. The claim that 
health professionals and informed lay-people use mental disorder in the same way is not 
a conceptual claim. That is, the main task of this thesis is not to determine what this 
sense of mental disorder (i.e. as used by health professionals and informed lay-people) 
consists of. Instead, the main task of this thesis is to determine if it is possible for this 
sense of mental disorder (i.e. as used by health professionals and informed lay-people) 
to be static over time and culture.  
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The sense of mental disorder that I am interested in (the way it is used by health 
professionals in clinical settings and lay-people in serious situations) is similar to the 
sense of mental disorder in which Wakefield is interested, namely, “an account of 
disorder as it is used in medicine in general, including the mental health professions” 
(Wakefield, 2000a, 254). Murphy and Woolfolk critique Wakefield on the basis that he 
(Wakefield) sometimes slips into providing a conceptual analysis of what “an informed 
member of the public might mean by mental disorder” (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 
272). That is, Murphy and Woolfolk claim that Wakefield wavers between analysing a 
lay sense of mental disorder and the clinical sense thereof. I claim that there is no 
wavering between the two because the way an informed member of the public uses 
mental disorder (i.e. in a serious sense) is the same as the way in which a health 
professional uses mental disorder in a clinical setting.115  
I have specified that the sense of mental disorder that I am interested in is the way that 
concept is used by health professionals and informed members of the public. It could be 
argued that such an approach for determining the meaning of mental disorder is 
circular. In the previous chapter, I argued that there is a pragmatic link between mental 
disorder and medical treatment. It would be meaningless (i.e. tautologous) to claim that 
there is a pragmatic link between ‘the way mental disorder is used by health 
professionals when determining whether medical treatment might be given’ and 
medical treatment. It is akin to saying that there is a pragmatic link between ‘those 
mental disorders that may be medically treated’ and medical treatment. However, this 
circularity is avoided by specifying that while there is a pragmatic link between the 
sense of mental disorder I am interested in (i.e. as mental disorder is used by health 
professionals and informed members of the public) and medical treatment, the 
pragmatic link is not necessary or definitional. It just happens to be the case that there 
is a pragmatic link between this sense of mental disorder and medical treatment. It 
might turn out to be the case that there is an instance of mental disorder that may not 
be medically treated. If so, then I would argue that we should rethink whether there is 
always a pragmatic link between this sense of mental disorder and medical treatment. I 
                                                          
115 As discussed in detail in chapter seven, Murphy and Woolfolk go on to claim that Wakefield thinks that 
the clinical sense of mental disorder should be constrained by folk-theory. 
89 
 
do not argue that the condition in question cannot be a mental disorder because it 
jeopardises the pragmatic link with medical treatment.  
In summary, this chapter considers the meaning of the concept mental disorder. This 
section has begun to carry out a conceptual analysis of mental disorder. Conceptual 
analysis utilises the way a concept is used in ordinary language. Ordinary language 
philosophers, including Wittgenstein, argue that the meaning of everyday concepts, 
such as mental disorder, should be based on the way that concept is used in everyday 
situations. Wittgenstein also argues, that in ordinary language, concepts can be used in 
multiple ways and so might have multiple meanings. I agree that mental disorder might 
have multiple meanings, but have identified the specific sense of mental disorder in 
which I am interested: the way mental disorder is used by health professionals in clinical 
settings (i.e. in their capacity as health professionals) and informed lay-people in a 
serious, non-flippant (non-metaphorical) sense. Although this sense of mental disorder 
can be informed by science, it can be distinguished from a purely scientific sense 
thereof. Hence, the sense of mental disorder that I am interested in is used in both 
ordinary language and scientific domains. It is a hybrid of ordinary language and science 
insofar as it takes both into account. Exactly how this occurs will be examined in 
chapter seven. In the following two sections, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
of basing the meaning of mental disorder on ordinary language. 
3. The advantages of basing the meaning of mental disorder on ordinary language 
There are two related advantages of basing the meaning of mental disorder in ordinary 
language. The first is that it would be used in ordinary conversation i.e. mental disorder 
would be of interest to us. (Nordenfelt, 1995, 8). If the meaning of mental disorder were 
not based in ordinary language whatsoever (i.e. if the way mental disorder was used in 
ordinary language were completely unrelated to the meaning thereof), then mental 
disorder might not be used at all in ordinary settings (Nordenfelt, 1995, 8). If ordinary 
language were irrelevant to the meaning of mental disorder, then mental disorder might 
exclude conditions that we take to be paradigm examples of mental disorders such as 
severe depression. Likewise, mental disorder might include conditions that are clearly 
not mental disorders, such as being a political dissident or very intelligent. If mental 
disorder excluded severe depression and included being very intelligent and a political 
dissident, it is plausible that mental disorder might fall out of the common vernacular. As 
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Murphy puts it, if the way mental disorder is ordinarily used is irrelevant to the meaning 
thereof, then the meaning of mental disorder might stray so far from the way it is used in 
ordinary language that we are no longer talking about mental disorder but something 
else i.e. something with a new intension and/or extension (Murphy, 2015, 7). In 
contrast, the way mental disorder is ordinarily used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people is likely to be of interest to the public and so will not fall out of use.  
Even if mental disorder (the meaning of which is unrelated to ordinary language) did not 
fall out of the common vernacular, if mental disorder bore little or no relation to the way 
it is used in ordinary language, then it might not have the same practical ramifications. 
As explained in chapter four, there is a pragmatic link between the way mental disorder 
is used in ordinary language and medical treatment. This can now be made more 
precise: there is a pragmatic link between medical treatment and the way that mental 
disorder is used by health professionals and informed lay-people – it is appropriate to 
medically treat the conditions that fall within this sense of mental disorder.  This is the 
second advantage of basing the meaning of mental disorder on the way it is ordinarily 
used by health professionals and informed lay-people i.e. the pragmatic link between 
mental disorder and medical treatment is retained. In contrast, if the meaning of mental 
disorder were unrelated to its ordinary use, then this pragmatic link might be lost. For 
example, if mental disorder included being a political dissident or very intelligent, and if 
we do not consider medical treatment to be appropriate for political dissidence or 
intelligence, then the pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical treatment 
might dissolve.116 
In short, the first advantage of basing the meaning of mental disorder on ordinary 
language is that it reflects the way that concept is ordinarily used i.e. it will not stray so 
far that the talk is no longer about mental disorder (i.e. as it is ordinarily used) but 
something else (Murphy, 2015, 7). In turn, it will be of interest to the public and not fall 
out of use. Secondly, basing the meaning of mental disorder on the way it is ordinarily 
used by health professionals and informed lay-people maintains the pragmatic link 
between mental disorder and medical treatment.  
                                                          
116 Alternately, we could make the definitional claim that these conditions are not mental disorders. 
However, as mentioned earlier, I do not claim that the link is definitional.  
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4. The disadvantages of basing the meaning of mental disorder on ordinary 
language 
The main disadvantage of basing the meaning of mental disorder in ordinary language is 
that the extension of ordinary language concepts such as mental disorder might change 
over time and culture. I do not consider whether the meaning – the intension – of 
mental disorder changes over time and culture. The intension of mental disorder might 
change, but this is not part of my argument.117 I will show that the extension of mental 
disorder might change, even if the intension does not. However, as the extension of 
mental disorder is dependent on the intension of mental disorder, the intension of 
mental disorder needs to be ascertained. In particular, the intension of the sense of 
mental disorder in which I am interested – the way it is used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people – must be ascertained. By analogy, if fruit is used in its botanical 
sense (plants with internal seed-bearing structures), then avocados, tomatoes and 
pumpkins are fruit. That is, if the intension of fruit is ‘plant with internal seed-bearing 
structures’, then avocados, tomatoes and pumpkins fall within the extension of fruit. 
However, if fruit is used in its everyday sense to refer to the stuff that we put in a fruit 
salad or the stuff in one’s fruit bowl, then avocado, tomatoes and pumpkins do not fall 
within the extension of fruit.  In other words, if the intension of fruit is something along 
the lines of ‘edible, sweet, fleshy plant that is put in fruit salad and found in fruit bowls’, 
then avocado, tomatoes and pumpkins do not fall within the extension of fruit.   
4.1 How is mental disorder used by health professionals and informed lay-people? 
This section shows that mental disorder (as ordinarily used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people) can be outlined essentially i.e. using necessary and sufficient 
elements. Cooper also claims that mental disorder is an essentialist concept. She says all 
mental disorders are a) bad things to have, b) such that we consider the afflicted person 
to be unlucky, and c) can potentially be medically treated (Cooper, 2005; 2014, 41-42). 
However, it is unclear whether Cooper is interested in the same sense of mental disorder 
in which I am interested. For this reason, I say that I might not be alone in claiming that 
this sense of mental disorder is essentialist, rather than that I am not alone.  
                                                          
117 For example, as the internal examiner suggested, some religious groups may consider mental disorder 
to be something going wrong, not with the mind, but with the soul. Despite this, my focus is the extension 
of mental disorder.   
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I claim that the intension of mental disorder as used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people has three necessary and sufficient elements: 
1. All mental disorders must be mental as opposed to physical. 
2. All mental disorders must be disvalued as opposed to valued or value-neutral.118  
3. All mental disorders must be caused by a dysfunction.  
This is a descriptive claim about the way health professionals and informed lay-people 
use mental disorder. It is not a prescriptive or stipulative claim about the way these 
people should use mental disorder.  
Let’s look at each of the three requirements in more detail. Firstly, ordinarily, mental 
disorders are conditions of the mind as opposed to physical conditions. For example, 
health professionals and informed lay-people do not ordinarily call a broken arm a 
mental disorder. As noted in section two of chapter one, I align myself with the 
mainstream view that the category mental disorder is a sub-category of the category 
disorder. (The category disorder includes the sub-sets mental disorder and physical 
disorder.) This fits with Brülde’s claim that an ordinary language account of mental 
disorder must a) be consistent with the fact that we ordinarily regard the category 
mental disorder as a subset of the category disorder and b) an ordinary language 
account of mental disorder should help to distinguish between mental and physical 
disorders (Brülde, 2010, 27).  
Secondly, valued or value-neutral conditions are not mental disorders. For a health 
professional or an informed lay-person to consider a condition to be a mental disorder, 
that condition must be disvalued. For example, being happy119 or intelligent are not 
normally considered to be mental disorders by health professionals or informed lay-
people. Likewise, showing that a condition such as shyness has a biological basis does 
not show that it is a mental disorder any more than showing that extroversion has a 
biological basis demonstrates that it is a mental disorder (Gorenstein in Zachar, 2000, 
172). 
                                                          
118 More precisely, all mental disorders must be disvalued for moral reasons – aesthetic or epistemic 
disvalue, for example, will not suffice. 
119 C.f. Bentall, 1992 and Harris et. al., 1993. 
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As Wakefield claims, it is an “important truth” regarding the concept disorder (and the 
concept mental disorder), that disvalue (or in his words, ‘harm’) is a necessary 
component (Wakefield, 1992, 376).120 That is, if mental disorder did not have an 
evaluative component, then it would not be an accurate description of the way it is used 
by health professionals and informed lay-people.  
(Wakefield claims that whether a condition is harmful is determined by society, as 
opposed to the affected individual.121 Wakefield says that “in a literate society, a person 
who does not value reading still has a dyslexic disorder if incapable of learning to read 
due to a brain dysfunction; and, in a society valuing reproductive capacity, a sterile 
individual has a disorder even if he or she does not want children” (Wakefield, 2005, 
88). I do not align myself with Wakefield’s view that harm is determined by society. I 
leave it an open question as to whether the condition must be disvalued by the 
individual or society.) 
The theory that mental disorder has no evaluative component (which Murphy calls 
‘simple naturalism’) has “few adherents” (Murphy, 2015, 19; see also Murphy, 2005, 
116). One adherent is Thomas Szasz (1960) who denies the existence of mental 
disorders and is an objectivist about physical and mental disorders. As an objectivist, 
Szasz claims that there is a fact of the matter whether a condition is a disorder. He 
claims that ‘damage to bodily structures’ is both necessary and sufficient to demarcate 
disorders i.e. disvalue is not required to demarcate disorders from non-disorders. It 
might be thought that the disease naturalist, Christopher Boorse, also thinks that mental 
disorder (i.e. mental disease) has no evaluative component. However, I will now show 
that Boorse agrees that disvalue is a necessary component of the way mental disorder is 
used by health professionals and informed lay-people. Boorse (1975) is a naturalist 
regarding disease. That is, he claims that all diseases are statistically abnormal 
dysfunctions and that values are not used to determine whether a condition is a 
statistically abnormal dysfunction.122 For example, if the gourmand lesion were a 
                                                          
120 This reflects Spitzer’s (1981) claim that the intractability of the debate over whether homosexuality is 
a mental disorder is in part a debate about values (Wakefield, 1992, 386; 1993, 162; 2014, 675). 
121 C.f. Edward’s interpretation of Wakefield which, respectfully, is wrong (Edwards, 2009, 83). 
122 Whether dysfunction is value-free is a moot point (see for example Engelhardt, 1976, 263-266, 
Ereshefsky, 2009 and Kingma, 2007). The purported value-freedom of dysfunction is not a debate into 
which I shall enter. Instead, the point is that Boorse maintains that dysfunction is value-free.  
While Wakefield uses an aetiological account of dysfunction, Boorse uses a teleological account thereof – 
a dysfunction occurs if it reduces the likelihood of the goals of survival or reproduction (Boorse, 1977).  
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statistically abnormal dysfunction, then it would be a disease. It would be a disease even 
though having such a lesion is not disvalued. Likewise, on Boorse’s approach, a 
dysfunction must reduce the likelihood of survival or reproduction (Boorse, 1977). 
Boorse admits that if gay people are less likely to reproduce (Cooper, 2005, 18; 2002, 
269), then homosexuality might be a disease on his approach (Boorse, 2014, 691). 
Boorse recognises that most people do not ordinarily classify the gourmand lesion or 
homosexuality as a disease. However, Boorse is interested in the way disease is used by 
pathologists (Boorse, 1997, 45-46, 49-50; see also 2014, 711-713). He would say that 
pathologists ordinarily class the gourmand lesion as a dysfunction, and that if 
homosexuality were a statistically abnormal dysfunction, then pathologists would also 
classify it as a disease. Boorse says that pathologist’s potential classification of 
homosexuality as a disease “need not be disturbing” because disease is a theoretical, as 
opposed to practical, concept (Boorse, 2014, 691). One implication of this is that Boorse 
does not think that there is any relationship between classing some condition as a 
disease and whether that condition merits treatment (Boorse, 1997, 12-13). 
Importantly, Boorse says that the way disease is used by pathologists is different to the 
way in which it is used by clinicians (i.e. the group that I refer to as ‘health professionals 
and informed lay-people’) (Boorse, 1997, 45-46, 49-50; see also 2014, 711-713). 
Although Boorse claims that the way pathologists use disease is value-free, the way 
pathologists use disease is different to the sense of disease in which I am interested. I 
consider mental disorder as used by health professionals and informed lay-people, not 
pathologists.123 Furthermore, Boorse admits that the way clinicians use disease (or as he 
calls it, illness or later, disease-plus) is value-laden (Boorse, 1997, 12-13; see also 2014; 
684-685). The way clinicians use disease (i.e. illness or disease-plus) is an “ineluctably 
normative concept” (Boorse, 1997, 12).124 This means that Boorse would agree with 
myself (and Wakefield and Cooper) that evaluation is a necessary (but insufficient) 
component of the way disease is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed 
lay-people. Finally, Boorse says disease-plus (i.e. the way disease is used by health 
professionals and informed lay-people) is practical (Boorse, 1997, 11) i.e. there is a link 
                                                          
123 I consider mental disorder, as opposed to disease or mental disease. However, I take the way health 
professionals and informed lay-people use mental disease to be roughly synonymous with mental 
disorder.  
124 More precisely, Boorse says that therapeutic abnormality is an “ineluctably normative concept” 
(Boorse, 1997, 12). Therapeutic abnormality is a diagnostic abnormality that merits treatment. A 
diagnostic abnormality is a clinically apparent pathological state (Boorse, 1997, 12).  
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between disease-plus and treatment. In a nutshell, Boorse claims that the way 
pathologists use disease is value-free. Even so, Boorse agrees that disease-plus is value-
laden. I take Boorse’s account of disease-plus to be the same as the way disease is used 
by health professionals and informed lay-people. If correct, this means that Boorse 
thinks that the way disease (including mental disease) is used by health professionals 
and informed lay-people is value-laden.  
The third requirement is that all mental disorders must be caused by a dysfunction. This 
is based on the fact that not all disvalued conditions are considered to be disorders by 
health professionals and informed lay-people. Likewise, not all disvalued mental 
conditions are considered to be mental disorders by health professionals and informed 
lay-people. The best example of this arises in physical disorder – ‘normal’ ugliness is 
disvalued but neither health professionals nor informed lay-people consider it to be a 
disorder. Regarding mental conditions, neither health professionals nor informed lay-
people consider the following conditions to be mental disorders, even though all these 
ways of being are disvalued: having no sense of humour, lousy taste, a propensity for 
destructive relationships, chronic rudeness and fascist ideologies (Murphy, 2015, 14; 
2005, 119). That not all disvalued mental conditions are considered to be mental 
disorders shows that the first two elements (that the condition is mental as opposed to 
physical, and that the condition is disvalued) are insufficient to explain the way mental 
disorder is used by health professionals and informed lay-people. There must be a third 
element.  
As mentioned earlier, Wakefield (1992) says that all mental disorders must be caused 
by an evolutionary dysfunction. Wakefield would claim that normal ugliness is not a 
physical disorder because it is not caused by an evolutionary dysfunction. In contrast, 
ugliness that is caused by elephantiasis is considered to be a disorder because (i.e. on 
the presumption that) elephantiasis is caused by an evolutionary dysfunction.  
Regarding mental disorder, we do not consider post-bereavement grief to be a mental 
disorder. Wakefield says this is because post-bereavement grief is not caused by an 
evolutionary dysfunction (Wakefield, 2012; First and Wakefield, 2013a, 668). Likewise, 
Wakefield would say that having no sense of humour, lousy taste, a propensity for 
destructive relationships, chronic rudeness or fascist ideologies are not mental 
disorders because these conditions are not caused by an evolutionary dysfunction.  
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Wakefield’s claim that all mental disorders must be caused by evolutionary 
dysfunctions is problematic because there might be conditions that health professionals 
and informed lay-people consider mental disorders that are not caused by evolutionary 
dysfunctions. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven. Very briefly, 
Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) argue that dyslexia might not be caused by a dysfunction 
(if the ability to read is not functional in the sense that it is selected by evolution, but a 
spandrel), ADHD might not be caused by a dysfunction (if it is caused by an 
environmental mismatch) and anti-social personality disorder might not be caused by a 
dysfunction (if is caused by ‘bad input’). If Murphy and Woolfolk are right that there are 
conditions that we ordinarily consider mental disorders, but are not caused by 
evolutionary dysfunctions, there are multiple options. We might reject Wakefield’s 
harmful dysfunction analysis, or we might accept Wakefield’s analysis, and argue that 
these conditions (dyslexia, ADHD, anti-social personality disorder) are not mental 
disorders. While either of these options could be taken, I accept the second option. My 
reason for taking the second option is purely pragmatic – it allows me to consider the 
harmful dysfunction analysis in more detail. (More specifically, it allows me to consider 
whether, if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, this will provide an extension of 
dysfunction that is both static over societies and excludes homosexuality.)   
Even though, I accept the harmful dysfunction analysis, there are yet more options. 
These options listed here are considered in detail in chapter seven. Firstly, we might 
maintain that dyslexia and so on are caused by a dysfunction, and keep searching for the 
dysfunction involved (I refer to this as option 2a). Option 2b is to adapt the harmful 
dysfunction analysis, so that rather than claiming that all mental disorders must be 
caused by a dysfunction, all mental disorders must have the right antecedent cause 
(Murphy, 2005; 2015). Thirdly, we could accept the harmful dysfunction analysis, 
including the claim that all mental disorders must be caused by a dysfunction, but claim 
that whether a condition is caused by a dysfunction is constrained by ordinary language 
(option 2c). Finally, we could accept the harmful dysfunction analysis, including the 
claim that all mental disorders must be caused by a dysfunction, but claim that 
dysfunction-status is not constrained by ordinary language (option 2d). Option 2d 
means that the extension of mental disorder might not map exactly on to the way it is 
used in ordinary language (i.e. by health professionals and informed lay-people). For 
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example, dyslexia, ADHD and anti-social personality disorder might not be mental 
disorders, and homosexuality might be a mental disorder.  
I have claimed that the intension of the way health professionals and informed lay-
people ordinarily use mental disorder: all mental disorders are a) mental, b) disvalued 
and c) caused by a dysfunction. My intent in providing this essentialist account of the 
intension of this sense of mental disorder is only to give a rough description of this sense 
of mental disorder to give the reader some idea of what I have in mind. The remainder of 
this section shall explain that a disadvantage of using this intension of mental disorder is 
that the extension thereof might change over time and culture.  
4.2 The extension of mental disorder might change over time and culture 
The intension of mental disorder (as ordinarily used by health professionals and 
informed lay people) is such that all mental disorders are a) mental, b) disvalued and c) 
caused by a dysfunction. Specifying the intension of mental disorder in this way means 
that the extension of mental disorder might change based on whether the condition is a) 
classed as mental or physical, b) disvalued and/or c) considered to be caused by a 
dysfunction. That the extension of mental disorder might change based on values is the 
easiest to understand. The extension of mental disorder will change between societies if 
whether a condition is disvalued changes. For example, homosexuality is not disvalued 
by most people (including health professionals and informed lay-people) in the 
developed world and so it cannot be a mental disorder. However, there are societies – in 
both the past and present – in which homosexuality is disvalued.125 In such societies, 
homosexuality might be a mental disorder. Hence, based on the intension of mental 
disorder outlined above, homosexuality might be a mental disorder in some societies 
but not others.  
The extension of mental disorder (as ordinarily used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people) might also change based on whether the condition is classified as 
physical or mental. It might seem obvious whether a condition is physical or mental. For 
example, a broken arm is clearly a physical condition whereas schizophrenia is clearly a 
mental condition. However, there are grey cases. For example, it is arguable that visual 
problems such as blindness are not physical but mental conditions. Moreover, in many 
                                                          
125 See section 3.1 of chapter two.  
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Asian countries, the symptoms of depression are somatic (Kleinman, 1982). Both these 
examples highlight that it is not always clear whether a condition should be classed as 
mental or physical. If a condition is considered to be mental in one society, but physical 
in another, then that condition might be a mental disorder in the first society but cannot 
be a mental disorder in the second. 
Finally, the extension of mental disorder (as ordinarily used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people) might change based on whether a society considers the condition 
to be caused by a dysfunction (c.f. whether the condition is, in fact, caused by a 
dysfunction i.e. presuming there is a fact of the matter). For example, in the developed 
world, dyslexia is intuitively thought to be caused by a dysfunction, whereas this would 
not be the case in a pre-literate society.126 Moral values might also influence whether a 
condition is considered to be caused by a dysfunction. For example, during Victorian 
times, the female orgasm was considered to be caused by a dysfunction. This aligns with 
the prudish sexual climate of the Victorian era. Nowadays the lack of the female orgasm 
is considered to be caused by a dysfunction (Wakefield, 2000a, 265-266).127 This aligns 
with the more sexually liberated climate of the developed world.  
The extension of the way mental disorder is used in ordinary language (i.e. by health 
professionals and informed lay-people) might change over time and culture based on a) 
differing values, b) whether a condition is classed as mental or physical and c) on 
whether a society considers the condition to be caused by a dysfunction. The changing 
extension of mental disorder is a disadvantage of basing the meaning of mental disorder 
on ordinary language. This is because homosexuality might be a mental disorder in 
some societies, but not others. In societies in which homosexuality is a mental disorder, 
it may be medically treated on this basis. The upshot of this is that the medical 
treatment of homosexuality cannot be safeguarded against using the argument that the 
ordinary extension of mental disorder (as used by health professionals and informed 
lay-people) excludes homosexuality in all societies. The extension of mental disorder 
would only be true “in a local or limited sense, i.e. relative to a certain culture, paradigm, 
                                                          
126 For the sake of clarity, I consider whether dyslexia is caused by a dysfunction i.e. something going 
wrong in the mind. By dysfunctional, I do not mean that a person who struggles to read and write will find 
it difficult to function in everyday life. 
127 While Wakefield uses this example, he says that values do not influence whether a condition is, in fact, 
caused by a dysfunction (Wakefield, 1992, 385).  
99 
 
conceptual scheme, linguistic community, or the like” (Brülde, 2005, 7) and so we could 
not say that societies that consider homosexuality to be a mental disorder are wrong. 
On the other hand, if the extension of mental disorder did not change between societies, 
then it could be determined, for once and for all, whether a condition such as 
homosexuality is a mental disorder. In turn, it could be determined, for once and for all, 
whether a condition such as homosexuality may be medically treated on the basis of 
being a mental disorder. The following section considers ways in which the extension of 
mental disorder might be static over time and cultures.  
(It could also be argued that there is a second disadvantage of basing the meaning of 
mental disorder in ordinary language. This would be based on Wittgenstein’s claim that 
ordinary language concepts such as mental disorder can be used in multiple ways and so 
can have multiple meanings.128 This means that a condition might be a mental disorder 
in one sense but not another. For example, a condition might be a mental disorder 
according to health professionals and informed lay-people but not a mental disorder for 
the purpose receiving medical insurance. I do not consider this to be a disadvantage. At 
least, it is not a disadvantage for the purposes of safeguarding against medical 
treatment for conditions such as homosexuality. This is because the pragmatic link 
between medical treatment and mental disorder is not between medical treatment and 
the way insurance companies use mental disorder.129 Instead, the pragmatic link is 
between mental disorder and the way health professionals and informed lay-people use 
mental disorder.)  
5. Can the extension of mental disorder be fixed over time and culture? 
The previous two chapters have introduced the argument that if we want to safeguard 
against homosexuality from being medically treated on the basis that it is a mental 
disorder, then it needs to be the case that homosexuality is not a mental disorder in any 
society. The previous section established that the main disadvantage of basing the 
meaning of mental disorder in ordinary language (i.e. as it is ordinarily used by health 
professionals and informed lay-people) is that the extension of mental disorder might 
                                                          
128 Wittgenstein, 1953, § 11 
129 Admittedly, there may be an indirect pragmatic link insofar as the way insurance companies use 
mental disorder may be based on the way health professionals use mental disorder. 
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change over time and culture, and so conditions such as homosexuality might be a 
mental disorder is some societies but not others.  
If mental disorder refers to, or more loosely picks out, a real category, then the extension 
of mental disorder might be fixed over time and culture. By real category, I have in mind 
a set (of instances) that exists and is independent from beliefs, conceptual schemes, 
linguistic practices and so on. There are two ways in which mental disorder might pick 
out a real category. Firstly, it could be shown that mental disorder picks out a 
scientifically real category in the same way that water picks out a scientifically real 
category i.e. a natural kind. That is, the concept water (which exists in our minds i.e. as 
the constituents of our thoughts) picks out a natural kind. By examining instances of 
water, it was discovered that all water is H2O. Scientists might also find that mental 
disorder is a real category (i.e. a natural kind) by examining instance of mental disorder. 
Whether mental disorder picks out a natural kind is considered in section two of 
chapters six. Whether a component of mental disorder, namely dysfunction, picks out a 
natural kind is considered in chapter seven.  
It might be that mental disorder does not pick out a natural kind, but that being a 
dysfunction is a natural kind. If there is a matter of fact regarding whether a condition is 
caused by a dysfunction, and if all mental disorders must be caused by a dysfunction (c.f. 
considered to be caused by a dysfunction), then whether a condition is caused by a 
dysfunction will not change between societies. In turn, the extension of mental disorder 
will be partly static. Whether dysfunction refers to or picks out a natural kind is 
discussed in chapters six and seven. Equally, if there is a matter of fact concerning 
whether a condition is mental or physical (c.f. whether a condition is considered to be 
mental or physical), then nor will this part of the extension of mental disorder change 
between cultures. This is not discussed further because, as established in chapter four, 
there is a pragmatic link between medical treatment and both mental disorders and 
physical disorders. Regardless of whether a condition, such as homosexuality, is a 
physical or mental disorder, it may be medically treated. Hence, the medical treatment 
of homosexuality cannot be safeguarded against by showing that homosexuality is a 
physical disorder rather than a mental disorder. The only way to show that 
homosexuality is not a mental disorder (and so may not be medically treated on this 
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basis) is to show either that homosexuality is not disvalued or is not caused by a 
dysfunction. 
It will be beneficial to my project if mental disorder picked out a natural kind. If so, it 
could be determined, for once and for all, whether a condition is a mental disorder. This 
would mean that it could be determined, for once and for all, whether a condition such 
as homosexuality may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. If 
homosexuality, for example, does not fall within the natural kind mental disorder 
(presuming it exists), then it cannot be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder. In this way, the medical treatment of homosexuality would be safeguarded 
against. It will also be beneficial to my project, although not to the same extent, if 
dysfunction (being a necessary but insufficient component of mental disorder) picked 
out a natural kind. If dysfunction did pick out a natural kind, then the extension of 
mental disorder would be static, at least in part, between societies. However, that it will 
be beneficial to my project if mental disorder or dysfunction referred to a real category 
does not mean that either of them are a real category. What I want to be the case is not 
necessarily the case. This is, in effect, Aucouturier and Demazeux’s (2014) critique of 
naturalism regarding mental disorder. They point out that we cannot presume that 
mental disorder is a natural kind. If neither mental disorder nor dysfunction pick out a 
real category, then there might not be an extension of mental disorder that is fixed 
between societies, even in part.  
There are disadvantages to basing the extension of mental disorder on the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it exists).130 The short discussion here only serves to flag these 
problems. It might be that dysfunction is a natural kind, but that homosexuality (or 
other conditions that we do not currently consider to be mental disorders) will be 
included in the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). That is, the way we 
ordinarily demarcate between conditions that are mental disorders and conditions that 
are not mental disorders might not map on to natural kinds. These disadvantages will 
be discussed in detail in the chapters six and seven. 
The second way in which mental disorder might pick out a real category is if mental 
disorder picks out a morally real category. Mental disorder might refer to a morally real 
                                                          
130 ‘Dysfunction’ is not italicised because I am not considering the concept dysfunction, but dysfunction 
(i.e. the set of things that are dysfunctional) itself.  
102 
 
category because disvalue is a necessary component of the ordinary use thereof. If it can 
be shown that it is a moral truth that homosexuality, for example, is not to be disvalued, 
then this applies to all societies. It would be a moral truth that homosexuality cannot be 
a mental disorder in any society. If there are moral truths concerning the value-status of 
all other mental conditions (e.g. happiness, intelligence, dementia, schizophrenia), then 
mental disorder would refer to a morally real category.131  If mental disorder picks out a 
morally real category, then the extension of mental disorder would be static between 
cultures. It will be beneficial to my project if mental disorder picked out a morally real 
category because it could be determined, for once and for all, whether a condition is a 
mental disorder. However, as mentioned above, that it will be beneficial to my project if 
mental disorder referred to a real category does not mean that it is a real category i.e. 
that there are such things as moral truths, or that there are moral truths concerning the 
extension of mental disorder.  
Chapter eight notes the epistemological problem for moral realism (i.e. Mackie’s (1977) 
claim that moral truths are ontologically queer). To avoid this problem, chapter eight 
does not focus on whether there are moral truths concerning mental disorders. Instead, 
it utilises Rawlsian primary goods to ground evaluative claims – it asks whether there 
are any primary goods concerning mental states, and if so, whether these primary goods 
can fix the extension of mental disorder.   
6.  Conclusion 
This chapter began by considering the meaning of mental disorder using conceptual 
analysis and ordinary language. Ordinary language philosophers claim that the meaning 
of a concept such as mental disorder should be based on the way or ways that concept is 
used by everyday people in everyday situations. In ordinary language, mental disorder 
can be used in multiple ways and so might have multiple meanings. The specific sense of 
mental disorder in which I am interested is the way mental disorder in used by health 
professionals in clinical settings and informed lay-people in a serious, non-flippant 
sense.  
                                                          
131 If it is a moral truth that a mental condition, such as dementia, is to be disvalued, and that condition is 
caused by a dysfunction, then that condition is a mental disorder.   
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There are two advantages of basing the meaning of mental disorder in ordinary 
language. The first is that mental disorder will be used and will be of interest to us 
(Nordenfelt, 1995, 8). On the other hand, if the meaning of mental disorder bore no 
relation to ordinary language, then mental disorder might fall out of the common 
vernacular. Alternately, we might still use mental disorder, but the concept might have 
strayed so far that the talk is no longer of mental disorder (as ordinarily used) but 
something else (Murphy, 2015, 7). That is, the intension and extension of mental 
disorder might change so that the talk is no longer about the same thing as it once was. 
The second advantage is that basing the meaning of mental disorder on the way it is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people maintains the 
pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical treatment. In contrast, if the 
meaning of mental disorder were unrelated to its ordinary use, then this pragmatic link 
might be lost. For example, imagine that mental disorder included being gay, a political 
dissident or very intelligent. As we do not consider medical treatment to be appropriate 
for homosexuality, political dissidence and intelligence, then there would be no 
pragmatic link between this extension of mental disorder and medical treatment.   
While there are advantages to basing the meaning of mental disorder on ordinary 
language (specifically the way it is used by health professionals and informed lay-
people), there is a major disadvantage of doing so. The way mental disorder is used by 
health professionals and informed lay-people has three necessary and sufficient 
components: a mental disorder is a condition that is a) mental as opposed to physical, b) 
disvalued and c) caused by a dysfunction. This is a descriptive claim. As values change 
over time and culture, whether a condition is a mental disorder might also change i.e. 
the extension of mental disorder might change. This is problematic because it means 
that mental disorder might not have a static extension. Homosexuality, for example, 
might be a mental disorder in one society but not another. In turn, homosexuality may 
be medically treated in societies in which it falls within the extension of mental disorder. 
We cannot safeguard against the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality 
on the basis that homosexuality is not a mental disorder. 
Section four introduced ways in which the extension of mental disorder might be fixed 
over time and culture. The first is if mental disorder picks out a real category, either a 
natural kind or a morally real category. In addition, if dysfunction (being a component of 
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mental disorder) picks out a natural kind, then the extension of mental disorder might be 
partly static. Finally, the extension of mental disorder might be static if there are 
Rawlsian primary goods concerning the value-status of mental states. The remainder of 
this thesis considers these methods. The following chapter shows that mental disorder 
does not pick out a natural kind and considers whether a component of mental disorder, 
namely dysfunction, picks out a natural kind. Rather than showing that dysfunction picks 
out a natural kind, chapter seven considers the implications of dysfunction picking out a 
natural kind, specifically, whether it can show that a condition such as homosexuality is 
not a mental disorder in any society. Chapter seven shows that while revisionist 
naturalism fixes the extension of the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists), 
homosexuality might be included in the natural kind thereof. While conservative 
naturalism means that homosexuality will not be included in the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it exists) at least in the developed world, it does not fix the 
extension of mental disorder. Chapter eight explains the difficulty in showing that a 
moral claim is true. Chapter eight then considers whether there are Rawlsian primary 
goods concerning the value-status of mental states. It is shown that while there might be 
such primary goods, in order to be neutral between competing conceptions of the good 
life, the primary goods are highly unlikely to fix the extension of mental disorder 






Chapter Six – Natural Kinds 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter suggested that the way mental disorder is ordinarily used by 
health professionals and informed lay-people has three necessary and sufficient 
elements: all mental disorders must be a) mental as opposed to physical, b) disvalued 
and c) caused by a dysfunction. That chapter also established that a major problem with 
basing the meaning of mental disorder on ordinary language (i.e. the way mental 
disorder is used by health professionals and informed lay-people) is that the extension 
of mental disorder might change between societies. Homosexuality, for example, might 
be a mental disorder in one society but not another. This is problematic because it 
means that in societies in which homosexuality is ordinarily considered to be a mental 
disorder, it may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. In 
addition, a shift in values or beliefs in societies that do not currently regard 
homosexuality as a mental disorder might arise, which means that homosexuality 
might, once more, be seen as a mental disorder and medically treated on this basis. To 
safeguard homosexuality from being medically treated on the basis that it is a mental 
disorder, it needs to be shown that a) homosexuality is not a mental disorder and b) 
that this applies to all societies – the extension of mental disorder needs to be static 
across all societies. A potential way of showing that the extension of mental disorder is 
static is to show that mental disorder picks out a real category. There are two ways in 
which it might be shown that mental disorder picks out a real category. The first is to 
show that mental disorder exists in the world i.e. to show that mental disorder picks out 
a natural kind. The second is to show that mental disorder picks out a morally real 
category. This chapter considers whether mental disorder, or a component thereof, picks 
out a natural kind.  The following chapter shows that even if mental disorder, or a 
component thereof, picks out a natural kind, this may not both fix the extension of 
mental disorder and also ensure that conditions such as homosexuality are excluded 
from the extension thereof.  
This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first gives a brief explanation of 
natural kinds and shows that mental disorder (as ordinarily used by health professionals 
and informed lay-people) cannot refer to or, more loosely, pick out a natural kind. This 
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is because natural kinds must not have a necessary evaluative component, and as 
suggested in the previous chapter, disvalue is a necessary (but insufficient) element of 
the way mental disorder is ordinarily used. To be clear, I consider whether mental 
disorder picks out a natural kind. I do not consider whether types of mental disorders, 
such as depression or schizophrenia, pick out natural kinds (c.f. Cooper, 2005). To use 
Cooper’s analogy, I consider whether weed picks out a natural kind as opposed to 
whether types of weeds, such as cooch grass, pick out natural kinds (Cooper, 2005, 46). I 
do not consider whether types of mental disorders are natural kinds because even if 
homosexuality picks out a natural kind, this would not show that homosexuality is a 
mental disorder. In turn, it would not determine whether homosexuality may be 
medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder.  
The second section introduces the idea that a component of mental disorder might refer 
to or pick out a natural kind. This is the approach taken by Jerome Wakefield (1992) 
who argues that all mental disorders are harmful mental dysfunctions, and that 
dysfunction (which includes mental dysfunction) picks out a natural kind. Not everyone 
agrees that all mental disorders must be caused by a dysfunction (see section two of the 
following chapter and section 4.1 of chapter five on spandrels and dyslexia). However, 
the main focus of the second section of this chapter is to explain, rather than critique, 
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis. 
Wakefield uses Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist account of natural kinds and so the 
third section considers this account of natural kinds in detail. According to Kripke and 
Putnam’s approach, if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, then the extension of 
dysfunction is determined using the real essence thereof—those properties that are 
shared by (i.e. necessary and sufficient for) all instances of dysfunction and that are 
linked by natural laws. 
It could be argued that as dysfunction is a complex phenomenon, it cannot refer to or 
pick out a natural kind. Non-essentialist accounts of natural kinds are more inclusive 
(i.e. more kinds are natural kinds) than essentialist natural kinds. This is because there 
are no elements that are necessary to demarcate the kind. Complex phenomena such as 
dysfunction are more likely to be non-essentialist natural kinds than essentialist natural 
kinds. Section four thus considers a non-essentialist approach account of natural kinds, 
namely, the family resemblance approach.  
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Section five briefly considers some of the arguments posed by others in the debate 
which claim that Wakefield’s account of dysfunction is value-laden. The section does not 
conclude whether dysfunction is value-laden, or whether it is a natural kind. This 
enables the following chapter to consider the implications of dysfunction being a 
natural kind i.e. to consider whether the extension of dysfunction would be static 
between societies. If the extension of dysfunction were static, then the extension of 
mental disorder would be partly static between societies. (The following chapter shows 
that even if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, the extension thereof might not be 
static between societies.)  
2. Mental disorder does not refer to a natural kind 
A natural kind is a technical term used by philosophers to refer to the things studied in 
natural science, such as water132, electrons and mice (Cooper, 2005, 45). A natural kind 
is a ‘kind’ insofar as it refers to a group of similar things as opposed to an instance of 
something. For example, the natural kind mice (presuming it is a natural kind) does not 
just refer to that mouse nesting under my house. It refers to the category mice, which 
includes that mouse nesting under my house, the mice in cages in laboratories133 and all 
the other instances of mice in the world. To say the natural kind mice refers to 
something that exists in the world is different from saying that instances of mice exist in 
the world.   
A natural kind is ‘natural’ insofar as the kind exists in the world. That is, natural kinds 
are the naturally existing discrete partitions of nature. Alternately, in slogan form 
‘natural kinds carve nature at its joints’. 134  Traditionally, natural kinds are thought to 
have a real essence —they all share some property or group of properties that is both 
necessary and sufficient to demarcate the kind. For example, all water shares the 
property of being H2O. H2O is the real essence of water, and so water picks out a natural 
kind. Likewise, the real essence of gold is the atomic number 79 – that some stuff has 
                                                          
132 Weisberg (2006) argues that H2O is not a natural kind because H2O has multiple isotopic isomers and 
therefore, the essence of water must be much more nuanced than H2O. 
133 Mice in cages in laboratories may have characteristics that have been created by people (i.e. scientists), 
yet still fall within the natural kind mouse (presuming it exists).  
134 Natural kinds are the naturally existing discrete partitions of nature. A proposed natural kind (i.e. a 
natural kind that is proposed by people, usually scientists or philosophers) is a natural kind if it turns out 
to refer to a discrete partition of things in nature.  It is the proposed natural kind that successfully – or 
otherwise – carves nature at her pre-existing joints (or at least do so if there are any pre-existing joints). 
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the atomic number 79 is both necessary and sufficient to show that that stuff is gold. 
The properties of natural kinds are linked together via natural laws. For example, being 
H2O is linked with other properties of water, such as, that the freezing point is zero 
degrees Celsius at one atm (atmosphere of pressure) and so on. 
As a natural kind is a naturally existing partition of nature, a natural kind must exist in 
the world independently of human experience and categorisation. ‘Weed’ is a category 
that has been created by people to refer to unwanted plants (Cooper, 2005, 45) and the 
category ‘vermin’ has been created by people in virtue of the usefulness of grouping 
disvalued animals together (Murphy, 2015, 5). Both the categories ‘weed’ and ‘vermin’ 
are dependent on human categorisation. Hence, neither weed nor vermin are natural 
kinds. Another way of saying that a natural kind must be independent of human 
experience and categorisation is to say that natural kinds cannot have a necessary 
evaluative component. For the sake of clarity, a natural kind can be valued or disvalued. 
Gold (the stuff with the atomic number 79) is a natural kind that is valued. However, the 
evaluative component is not necessary to the category gold. Something is gold if it has 
the atomic number 79.  This applies regardless of whether gold (the stuff with the 
atomic number 79) is valued nor disvalued. A natural kind must be value-free because 
values are human creations and so any category that can only be picked out by values is 
not independent of humans in the way required to be a natural kind.  
In short, for a category to be a natural kind it must fulfil two conditions. Firstly, the kind 
must refer to or pick out the naturally existing discrete partitions of nature. For a kind 
to be an essentialist natural kind, it must have a real essence (and the real essence must 
pick out the natural kind in the right way). Secondly, a natural kind must exist 
independently of human experience and categorisation.  
To show that mental disorder (as it is ordinarily used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people) does not pick out a natural kind, it needs to be shown that a) 
mental disorder does not exist independently of human experience and categorisation  
because all mental disorders must be disvalued, and/or b) mental disorder does not pick 
out a naturally existing partition of nature for some other reason (i.e. even if it is not the 
case that all mental disorders must be disvalued, mental disorder does not exist in the 
real world) . This section takes the first option – mental disorder does not pick out a 
natural kind because it does not exist independently of humans. As shown in section 4.1 
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of the previous chapter, disvalue is a necessary component of the way mental disorder is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people. Hence, this sense of 
mental disorder cannot refer to or pick out a natural kind. Since this is sufficient to show 
that this sense of mental disorder is not a natural kind, the second option is not 
discussed.  
Wakefield (1992) claims that disvalue (or in his words, ‘harm’) is a necessary 
component of disorder, and hence he says that disorder does not pick out a natural kind. 
In a similar vein, Cooper argues that all mental disorders are “bad things to have” 
(Cooper, 2005, 46; see also Cooper, 2005, 23-28), and so concludes that mental disorder 
does not pick out a natural kind. In addition, Lawrie Reznek (1995; 1987) argues that 
disease (which I consider to be analogous with disorder) does not pick out a natural kind 
because it is value-laden. Moreover, as explained in section 4.1 of the previous chapter, 
Boorse would agree that disvalue is a necessary component of the way disease is used 
by health professionals and informed lay-people (i.e. disease-plus). Hence, Boorse would 
say that the way disease is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-
people (i.e. disease-plus) does not pick out a natural kind. It might be that there are 
other senses of mental disorder, such as that used by pathologists, that are value-free 
and so these might pick out natural kinds. However, the sense of mental disorder that I 
am interested in – the way it is used by health professionals and informed lay-people – 
does not pick out a natural kind.  
Aucouturier and Demazeux (2014) claim that because mental disorder is not a unified 
object of enquiry in either ordinary language or science (i.e. there is no extension of 
mental disorder that is widely agreed upon), we cannot determine whether mental 
disorder picks out a natural kind (c.f. mental disorder does not pick out a natural kind). 
Aucouturier and Demazeux ought to admit that mental disorder has a degree of unity 
insofar as almost everyone agrees that disvalue is a necessary component of the way 
mental disorder is used by health professionals and informed lay-people.135 Hence, this 
sense of mental disorder cannot pick out a natural kind. In short, I disagree with the 
pair’s claim that we cannot determine whether mental disorder picks out a natural kind. 
                                                          
135 C.f. Szasz, 1960.  
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Instead, I claim that the way health professionals and informed lay-people use mental 
disorder does not pick out a natural kind. 
3. Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Analysis 
The previous section showed that the way mental disorder is ordinarily used by health 
professionals and informed lay-people cannot pick out a natural kind because disvalue 
is a necessary component of this sense of mental disorder. This is not the end of the road 
for the argument that natural kinds might provide an extension of mental disorder that 
is static between societies. It might be that a component of the way mental disorder is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people is a natural kind. For 
example, Wakefield (1992) says that all mental disorders are caused by a harmful 
mental dysfunction and that dysfunction is a natural kind.136 If dysfunction picks out a 
natural kind, then whether a condition is caused by a dysfunction might be static 
between societies. If so, then part of the extension of mental disorder would be static 
between societies. 
Alternately, one could argue, a la Boorse, that there is another sense of mental disorder 
(such as the sense used by pathologists) that picks out a natural kind. Boorse (1997) 
says pathologist’s sense of mental disorder is a component of the clinical sense of mental 
disorder i.e. that all disease-plusses (conditions that fall within the clinical sense of 
disease) must be diseases (conditions that fall within the pathologists’ sense of 
disease).137 Added to this, there is a pragmatic link between the clinical sense of mental 
disorder and medical treatment. Hence, on Boorse’s approach, there is an indirect link 
between the pathologists’ sense of mental disorder and medical treatment. This remains 
even though Boorse says the way pathologists use mental disorder is value-free – a 
theoretical rather than a practical concept (Boorse, 1997, 11).  
While either Wakefield’s or Boorse’s approach could be used to consider whether a 
component of the clinical sense of mental disorder (i.e. the way mental disorder is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people) is a natural kind, this 
chapter (and the following chapter) considers Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis. 
                                                          
136 Wakefield implies that dysfunction picks out a natural kind that includes both mental and physical 
dysfunctions. That is, he does not say that mental dysfunction picks out one natural kind and physical 
dysfunction picks out a separate natural kind. 
137 See section 4.1 of chapter five.  
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This is because Wakefield explicitly says that dysfunction is a natural kind, whereas 
Boorse does not say whether his account of disease (as used by pathologists) is a natural 
kind – Boorse’s approach is only amenable to natural kind analysis. This section outlines 
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis.   
Wakefield’s (1992) Harmful Dysfunction Analysis was briefly introduced in section 4.1 
of chapter five – all mental disorders must be caused by harmful mental evolutionary 
dysfunctions.138 Wakefield says that all disorders involve something going wrong, and 
translates this idea into scientific terms: disorders must be caused by evolutionary 
dysfunctions. By extension, Wakefield says that all mental disorders are caused by 
evolutionary mental dysfunctions.  
According to Wakefield, functions are effects that explain their causes (Wakefield, 1992, 
381-383). Cooper gives a clear explanation of Wakefield’s position:  
“The function of eyes is to see, and the fact that vision gives the 
organism a biological advantage resulted, via the workings of natural 
selection, in humans having eyes” (Cooper, 2002, 267).  
In turn, an evolutionary dysfunction is a failure of a mechanism within an organism to 
perform the function for which it was designed (Wakefield, 2007, 152). For example, as 
the function of eyes is to see, if some mechanism related to vision fails, then this is a 
dysfunction. Wakefield says that this (i.e. that some organ or system is not performing 
the function for which it was naturally selected) is the real essence of dysfunction 
(Wakefield, 1999a, 471-472; 2000, 36).  
Section 4.1 of chapter five also established that Wakefield’s interest in the clinical sense 
of mental disorder is roughly analogous to the sense of mental disorder in which I am 
interested, namely, the way mental disorder is used by health professionals in clinical 
settings and informed lay-people in serious situations. The sense of dysfunction in which 
I am interested is the way that it is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed 
lay-people to mean ‘something gone wrong with the body or mind’. In addition, section 
four of chapter four explained that while Wakefield does not think there is an exclusive 
prescriptive connection between disorder-status and medical treatment, he still thinks 
                                                          
138 More precisely, for a condition to be a mental disorder, the harm needs to be caused by a mental 
dysfunction (Pickering, 1996, 90). 
112 
 
that disorder-status is relevant to, though not determinate of, whether a condition 
should be medically treated.  
Wakefield says that all disorders are significantly harmful (Wakefield, 1992, 375). In 
contrast, he says not all dysfunctions are harmful, and therefore not all dysfunctions are 
disorders. Wakefield gives albinism, fused toes and reversal of heart position as 
examples of dysfunctions that are not harmful (i.e. do not cause harm or, more 
precisely, significant harm) (Wakefield, 1992, 375). Regard and Landis’s (1997) 
gourmand lesion (a lesion which causes a person to become appreciative of fine food) is 
another example of a dysfunction that is not harmful. Likewise, there might be a 
function that causes males to be aggressive. If this function were to break down, then it 
would be a dysfunction that is not harmful, at least in the developed world. Nor does 
Wakefield think that all functions are valuable or desirable. For example, the desire to 
eat sweet and fatty food might be functional, but in an obesogenic environment, such a 
function would be harmful as it can lead to premature death. If the desire for sweet and 
fatty food were functional, then it cannot be a disorder despite being disvalued. 
Wakefield acknowledges that dysfunction-status might alert us to hidden processes that 
have negative implications, but the reason that the processes are disvalued has nothing 
to do with dysfunction-status (Wakefield, 1992, 385; see also Wakefield, 2001, 355).139 
Wakefield takes mental disorder to be a hybrid concept – the harm component of mental 
disorder is evaluative, whereas the dysfunction component is descriptive i.e. value-
free.140 Wakefield is a separatist regarding facts and values i.e. he thinks that the two 
can be separated.141 While Wakefield says that mental disorder is not a natural kind, he 
says that dysfunction is a natural kind (Wakefield, 1999a, 471-472). Wakefield adopts 
Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist account of natural kinds, which is discussed in the 
following section. 
                                                          
139 See also section six of this chapter.   
140 As Wakefield thinks that mental disorder has both evaluative and descriptive components, this makes 
him a weak normativist regarding these concepts. In contrast, strong normativists think disvalue is both 
necessary and sufficient for a condition to be a mental disorder (see section two of chapter two).   
141 In contrast, Putnam, a non-separationist, thinks that the fact and value in thick terms is inextricably 
entangled (Putnam, 2002, 38). See also Megone, 2000 and section six of this chapter. 
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4. Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist natural kinds 
Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975; 1973) develop an essentialist account of natural 
kinds in which natural kinds share a set of necessary and sufficient properties. In turn, 
natural kind concepts (i.e. concepts that refer to or pick out natural kinds) can be 
demarcated using a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, namely, the possession of 
properties. Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist account of natural kinds is discussed for 
two reasons. Firstly, it is the account of natural kinds that Wakefield uses. Secondly, 
using Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist account of natural kinds should provide a static 
extension of a concept such as dysfunction, providing it is a natural kind. (However, as 
discussed in the following chapter, the extension of a natural kind concept might drift 
away from ordinary language.)  
Kripke and Putnam say a term is initially fixed by an act of ‘dubbing’ or ‘baptising’ which 
becomes a rigid designator for that thing. There are two ways in which a reference 
might be initially fixed. The first is to use an ostensive definition i.e. a definition that 
points out instances of the extension of the concept. For example, someone might have 
initially pointed to the clear, potable stuff in lakes and rivers and referred to that stuff as 
WATER and so WATER became a rigid designator for water. Secondly, something can be 
dubbed or baptised by describing the instances of the kind. For example, water can be 
described as a clear, potable liquid found in lakes and rivers  (see Alexander & Tobin, 
2016). The reference WATER was then lent to others via communicative exchanges. In 
other words, the term WATER was borrowed by others to refer to the clear, potable 
stuff in lakes and rivers. There is a causal chain from the way we ordinarily use the 
reference WATER that stretches back to the initial dubbing. Those at the end of the 
causal chain (c.f. the beginning i.e. the baptism) do not need to know what properties of 
water the baptiser had in mind to use the concept water because there is a causal chain 
that stretches back to the baptism (see Reimer & Michaelson, 2014, 17-19).142 
Kripke and Putnam’s approach can be compared and contrasted with other accounts of 
reference. For example, Gotlieb Frege and Bertrand Russell both claim that a reference 
                                                          
142 Kripke adds that we must intend to use the reference of a proper name or natural kind in the same 
way in which it was passed down the causal chain. This means that even though ‘Napoleon’ is normally 
associated with the French general, I can use ‘Napoleon’ to refer to my pet cat. What matters is whether I 
intend to use the name according to its rigid designator or not (Reimer & Michaelson, 2014, 17-18). 
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is associated with descriptive content (see Reimer & Michaelson, 2014, 6). To use the 
word, a speaker must have descriptive content in his or her mind. For example, to use 
the term NAPOLEON, the speaker must be able to describe Napoleon – that he was a 
French general during the French revolution. Frege’s theory of meaning is a form of 
semantic internalism. That is, Frege claims that meaning is entirely inside the head i.e. 
references refer to the descriptive content associated with that name in the speaker’s 
mind. In contrast, on Mill’s theory of reference, a speaker does not need to have any 
descriptive content. Instead, the meaning of a term is nothing other than its bearer (see 
Reimer & Michaelson, 2014, 6-7). This makes Mill’s theory of reference a form of 
semantic externalism – meaning is entirely outside the head.  
Kripke and Putnam’s causal theory of reference offers a middle of the range approach 
between purely internal and external theories of reference (Zahavi, 2004, 5). On Kripke 
and Putnam’s causal account, the presence of the causal chain means that there is no 
descriptive content associated with the reference of a proper name or natural kind. That 
is, a speaker does not have to have any descriptive content in his or her mind to use the 
reference. For example, when it was discovered that whales are not fish but mammals, 
we did not claim that there were no whales. Instead, we said that whales are still whales 
(whales is a rigid designator for whales), but that whales are mammals. That the 
descriptive content of whales changed – we no longer class whales as fish, but as 
mammals – shows that the descriptive content of whale does not preserve the use of 
WHALE. Instead, the rigid designator means that whales remain whales even when the 
descriptive content changes (Wolf, n.d.; see also Reimer & Michaelson, 2014, 38-39). 
This makes the causal theory of meaning a form of semantic externalism – a reference 
depends on facts external to the speaker, such as facts concerning the prior use of the 
term. While Putnam thinks that there are external facts, these facts are not independent 
of conceptual choices. He says, “what we say about the world reflects our conceptual 
choices and our interests, but its truth and falsity is not simply determined by our 
conceptual choices and interests” (Putnam in Zahavi, 2004, 4). Hence, on the causal 
theory of reference, meanings are partly inside the head and partly outside the head. 
Meaning is outside the head insofar as it is partly dependent on external factors such as 
the causal chain. Yet meaning is inside the head insofar as we did not stop referring to 
whales as WHALES when we found that whales were not fish but whales. That is, we 
could be wrong about the descriptive content of WHALES, but still successfully refer to 
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the creatures we intend to refer to. Likewise, Putnam claims that we can be ignorant of 
the descriptive properties of WATER (i.e. that water is H2O) and still successfully use 
the reference WATER. In other words, WATER refers to water regardless of whether the 
concept is used before or after Lavoisier found that water is H2O.  
The reference-fixing and reference-borrowing of WATER used the ordinary language 
properties of water – water is the clear, potable stuff in lakes and rivers. In contrast, 
when demarcating the natural kind water, Kripke and Putnam do not think we use these 
ordinary language properties. (Ordinary language properties can also be thought of as 
the nominal essence of a kind (see Reimer & Michaelson, 2014, 17).) Instead, natural 
kinds are demarcated using their real essence.143 The ‘real essence’ is also known as the 
internal structure or microstructure. As the name suggests, the real essence of a natural 
kind is a set of necessary and sufficient properties of that kind (that are linked via 
natural laws.)  For example, the real essence of water is H2O – that some stuff is H2O is 
both necessary and sufficient to show that that stuff is water. The causal chain provides 
an initial reference which can be modified by the real essence. Imagine we found some 
stuff that we ordinarily refer to as WATER (i.e. some of the clear, potable liquid found in 
lakes and rivers), and that upon examining that stuff we found that it is not H2O but 
xyz.144 Putnam and Kripke say we would not call this stuff water because it is not H2O. 
This shows, they think, that natural kinds are not demarcated using their superficial or 
ordinary language properties. Instead, natural kinds are demarcated using their real 
essence. Moreover, if the real essence of water is H2O, then it is so in all possible worlds 
(Kripke, 1980, 48). It follows that if the extension of water is based on the natural kind 
(i.e. the real essence), then the extension of water will be static between societies – 
water always means H2O. 
That natural kinds are demarcated using their real essence could mean that people who 
do not know that the essence of water is H2O cannot successfully use the concept water. 
                                                          
143 This also applies to proper nouns, but this thesis does not concern proper nouns, and so they will not 
be discussed further. 
144 This is a version of Putnam’s (1973; 1975) Twin Earth thought experiment. On Earth, our pre-scientific 
ordinary language-definition of water is along the lines of that potable liquid found in rivers and lakes 
that looks, tastes and behaves like water. Putnam imagines a world that is exactly the same as Earth 
except in one respect –the internal structure (i.e. real essence) of the stuff on Twin Earth that we would 
ordinarily refer to as WATER is not H2O but xyz. The water on Twin Earth is the same as the water on 
Earth in all other respects – it is a clear, potable liquid found in lakes and rivers and so on. However, the 
stuff on Twin Earth is not H2O. Since the internal structure of the stuff on Twin Earth is not H2O, the stuff 
on Twin Earth is not water.  
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To deal with this problem Putnam introduces the idea of the linguistic division of labour 
(Putnam, 1973, 705). The linguistic division of labour means that so long as experts (for 
example, chemists) know that the real essence of water is H2O, then laypeople do not 
need to know the real essence of water to be able to use water. 145 The division of 
linguistic labour is successful because Kripke and Putnam’s account of natural kinds is 
not descriptivist. We do not need to know the descriptive properties (i.e. the real 
essence) of a natural kind to be able to successfully use that term. The previous chapter 
outlined Wittgenstein’s claim that the meaning of words lies in the way in which they 
are used in ordinary language. It might be argued that Wittgenstein would claim that 
basing the meaning of water on the real essence (i.e. the linguistic division of labour) is 
an example of language “on holiday” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §38]. 146   Wittgenstein claims 
that in cases in which we use a term in a way that is not ordinary, language has 
detached itself from ordinary life i.e. it has gone on holiday. However, Wittgenstein says 
that the way a term is used in scientific settings can be part of ordinary language 
(Parker-Ryan, n.d). That is, that chemists use water to mean H2O is ordinary for 
chemists. This suggests that, so long as it is made clear that a scientific discourse is 
intended, the way chemists use water (i.e. as H2O) is not an example of language ‘on 
holiday’. A second way of disputing the claim that basing the meaning of water on 
ordinary language is an example of language ‘on holiday, is to claim that Wittgenstein 
was not considering scientific terms such as WATER or SPECIES (Hacking, 1991, 115; 
1991a, 150). If Hacking is correct, and water does have a real essence, then Wittgenstein 
would not say that basing the meaning of water on the real essence thereof is an 
example of language ‘on holiday’. (In contrast, Wittgenstein would say that language 
was ‘on holiday’, if philosophers assumed that a scientific term, such as SPECIES has a 
real essence, or indeed any essence, on which the meaning of species can be based.) 
Applied to dysfunction, Putnam and Kripke would say that the reference of 
DYSFUNCTION was initially fixed by an act of dubbing or baptising via its superficial 
features (i.e. its nominal essence). In this respect, the intension and extension of 
dysfunction are related to ordinary language. However, Putnam and Kripke would say 
                                                          
145 Atran argues that even experts do not fully grasp the full truth of the internal structure of a natural 
kind (Atran, 1987, 29). 
146 Wittgenstein also uses the metaphor of an idling engine (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 132). This is  
similar to the metaphor of language ‘on holiday’ as they both concern the absence of work.  
Thank you to the internal examiner for pointing me to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘language on holiday’.  
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that if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, then the natural kind is demarcated using 
the internal structure or real essence of dysfunction—those properties that are shared 
by (i.e. necessary and sufficient for) all instances of dysfunction and that are linked by 
natural laws. The natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) is not demarcated using 
its superficial, ordinary language features. If dysfunction picks out a natural kind, the 
rigid designator applies regardless of whether the real essence of dysfunction is known. 
Putnam’s division of linguistic labour means that so long as experts know the real 
essence of dysfunction (presuming it is a natural kind), then laypeople do not need to 
know the real essence to successfully use the concept dysfunction. Laypeople can 
successfully use the concept dysfunction using its ordinary language or superficial 
properties.  
For the purposes of this chapter (and the following chapter), there are three important 
parts of Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist account of natural kinds. The first is that 
natural kinds have a real essence—a property or set of properties (linked by natural 
laws) that are shared by all members of the kind. This means that, according to Kripke 
and Putnam, if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, then it will have a real essence. Not 
everybody agrees that natural kinds must be essentially demarcated. The following 
section considers a non-essentialist account of natural kinds. Even if dysfunction does 
not pick out an essentialist natural kind, as non-essentialist accounts of natural kinds 
are broader (i.e. more inclusive) than essentialist accounts of natural kinds, dysfunction 
might pick out a family resemblance natural kind.  
The second important point is that the real essence of a natural kind is stable across all 
societies – the real essence applies in all possible worlds (Kripke, 1980, 48). This means 
that if dysfunction picks an essentialist natural kind, then the extension will be static 
between societies. If being caused by a dysfunction is a necessary component of the 
ordinary extension of mental disorder, then the extension of mental disorder will be 
partly static between societies. In contrast, as explained in chapter four, a problem with 
basing the extension of mental disorder on the way it is ordinarily used by health 
professionals and informed lay-people is that the extension might change over time and 
culture.  
In other words, the aim of this thesis is to determine whether the medical treatment of 
conditions such as homosexuality can be safeguarded against by claiming that  
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1. Only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders, and 
2. These conditions are not mental disorders in any society.  
For the second criterion to be fulfilled, it must be shown that the extension of mental 
disorder is  
2.1 Static between societies, and 
2.2 Excludes conditions such as homosexuality.  
Hence, the second important point of Kripke and Putnam’s account is that if dysfunction 
picks out an essentialist natural kind, then criterion 2.1 will be, in part, fulfilled.  
If dysfunction picks out an essentialist natural kind, will it also fulfil criterion 2.2? No. 
This is the third important point of Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist account of natural 
kinds. That is, on their account, a natural kind can drift from the way it is used in 
ordinary language. For example, the real essence of the natural kind water is H2O. If 
some stuff has all the ordinary language properties of water (i.e. it is a clear, potable 
liquid found in lakes and rivers) but is not H2O, that stuff would not fall within the 
extension of the natural kind water but would fall within the extension of the ordinary 
use of water. In the same way, the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) might 
have a different extension from the way dysfunction is ordinarily used. 
The following chapter shows that even if dysfunction picks out a natural kind it cannot 
both show that the extension of mental disorder is static between societies and excludes 
conditions such as homosexuality. Conservative naturalism means that while 
homosexuality will be excluded from the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) 
in the developed world, it does not fix the extension of natural kinds between societies – 
homosexuality might fall within the natural kind dysfunction in other societies (and in 
turn, may be a mental disorder and medically treated on this basis). In contrast, 
revisionist naturalism means that the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it is a 
natural kind) will fix the extension of mental disorder between societies, but it cannot 
guarantee that homosexuality will be excluded from the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists).  
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5. Non-essentialist accounts of natural kinds 
Not everyone agrees with Kripke and Putnam’s claim that natural kinds must have a 
real essence i.e. the internal structure of a natural kind must be able to be demarcated in 
terms of necessary and sufficient components.  Non-essentialist accounts of natural 
kinds are more inclusive (i.e. more kinds are natural kinds) because there are no 
elements that are necessary to demarcate the kind. This means that even if dysfunction 
does not have a real essence, dysfunction might still pick out a non-essentialist natural 
kind. Section 5.1 considers a specific account of non-essentialist natural kinds, namely, 
Cooper’s family resemblance account of natural kinds.  
The notion of non-essentialist natural kinds was first used to argue that species are 
natural kinds i.e. a single species, such as lilium or mus musculus, might be a natural 
kind. A species does not have a real essence, and so cannot be an essentialist natural 
kind. Kripke (1980) argues that the morphological features (i.e. the appearance) of a 
species cannot be the essence of a species because the appearance of a species is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to demarcate members of that species from non-members.147 
For example, the essence of tiger cannot be that tigers are four-legged animals with 
yellow and black stripes, as this would mean that albino tigers or three-legged tigers are 
not tigers (Cooper, 2005, 48). 
Moreover, Dupré (1981) argues that evolutionary lineage cannot be the essence of a 
species. Cooper summarises Dupré’s argument into three clear points (Cooper, 2005, 
48-49). Firstly, we cannot distinguish cats and dogs by saying that ‘cats are the offspring 
of cats, while dogs are the offspring of dogs’ because this just moves the problem of 
distinguishing cats and dogs to the ancestor cats and dogs. Secondly, that members of a 
species can successfully breed with each other cannot be the essence of a species. This is 
because some members of a species will be infertile and because species can interbreed 
with some other species. There is no criterion that can successfully account for both 
infertile members and breeding between species and so evolutionary lineage cannot be 
the essence of a species. (Cooper also notes that breeding patterns are useless when it 
                                                          
147 See also Ziff and Fodor in Atran, 1987, 42. Atran, following Sperber, objects that tigers, for example, 
can be essentially defined: three-legged tigers fall within the extension of tiger because we say that ‘the 
tiger was born without one of its legs’ i.e. that, tigers, by nature, have four legs. In contrast, we would not 
say that by nature, tables have four legs (Atran, 1987, 43). 
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comes to asexual species.) Finally, genetic properties cannot be the essence of species 
because there is variation within the genes of a species.  
Species cannot be demarcated using necessary and sufficient components that are a) 
linked by natural law and b) all members of the species share. That is, a species does not 
have a real essence and so cannot be an essentialist natural kind. Despite this, Boyd 
(1999; 1999a), Millikan (1991), Dupré (1981), Griffiths (1999), Robert Wilson (1999) 
and Wilson et al. (2007) all argue that species might be a natural kind. They think that 
Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist account of natural kinds is too restrictive and that 
natural kinds might be demarcated using a non-essentialist approach. This means that 
even if dysfunction does not pick out an essentialist natural kind, it might still pick out a 
non-essentialist natural kind. In contrast, Brülde implicitly rejects the notion of family 
resemblance natural kinds with his claim that as there are multiple ways of drawing the 
line between those conditions that are mental disorders and those conditions that are 
not mental disorders, this shows that mental disorder does not pick out a real category 
(Brülde, 2005, 2).  
Non-essentialist accounts of natural kinds include, for example, family resemblance 
accounts of natural kinds, Boyd’s homeostatic property clusters, Roschian prototype 
approaches. For the sake of clarity, this is not intended to suggest that Boyd’s and 
Rosch’s account utilise family resemblances, but that they are non-essentialist. Boyd’s 
account of homeostatic property clusters is an influential account of non-essentialist 
natural kinds. Murphy, 2005b, 338-341; Weiskopf, 2017; Hassall, 2016, Zachar 
(2002)148 and Kendler et. al., 2011 all consider whether types of mental disorders are 
natural kinds according to Boyd’s approach i.e. homeostatic property clusters. Very 
little has been written on whether mental disorder or mental dysfunction are 
homeostatic property clusters (c.f. D’Amico, 1995). Due to space constraints, I have 
opted to consider Cooper’s (2005) family resemblance account of natural kinds, as 
Cooper herself applies this account to mental disorder (albeit types of mental disorders, 
as opposed to mental disorder itself) whereas Boyd applies his account to species. 
Despite this, dysfunction might pick out a homeostatic property cluster i.e. dysfunction 
would be a non-essentialist natural kind. If so, then there would be a truth about 
                                                          
148 Zachar’s (2002) account concerns practical kinds as opposed to natural kinds. 
121 
 
whether a condition is caused by a dysfunction, and in this way, the extension of 
dysfunction might be static between societies. 
5.1 Cooper’s family resemblance account of natural kinds 
A family resemblance account of natural kinds might be beneficial for my purposes in 
the following way: even if dysfunction does not pick out an essentialist natural kind, it 
might pick out a family resemblance natural kind. This is because family resemblance 
natural kinds are more relaxed than essentialist natural kinds. This section will show 
that if dysfunction does pick out a family resemblance natural kind, then there is a truth 
about whether a condition is caused by a dysfunction. In turn, if dysfunction picks out a 
family resemblance natural kind, then the extension thereof might be static between 
societies. 
While Cooper (2005) is a realist, she argues that Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist 
account of natural kinds is too restrictive and that natural kinds might be demarcated 
using a family resemblance approach. Cooper does not apply her family resemblance 
account of natural kinds to either disorder or mental disorder (or to use Cooper’s terms, 
disease or mental disease), but instead to types of disorders, both mental disorders and 
physical disorders.  For example, she says that tuberculosis and Huntington’s chorea 
might pick out family resemblance natural kinds (Cooper, 2005, 45-46, 72). By analogy, 
she says that weed does not pick out a natural kind, but that certain types of weeds, such 
as daisies and stinging nettles, might pick out natural kinds (Cooper, 2005, 4, 76). That is, 
Cooper argues that the meta-categories of disorder and weed do not pick out natural 
kinds, but that the sub-categories of types of weeds and disorders might pick out natural 
kinds. As shown in section one of this chapter, I agree with Cooper that mental disorder 
does not pick out a natural kind. Whereas Cooper considers whether some types of 
disorders pick out natural kinds, I consider whether dysfunction picks out a family 
resemblance natural kind 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) family resemblance account of concepts was alluded to in chapter 
five. It is now pertinent to consider the family resemblance account in more detail. The 
family resemblance account was first used by Wittgenstein to demarcate concepts such 
as game. Wittgenstein’s idea is that rather than game having an essence, all games share 
a network of overlapping and criss-crossing properties (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 66).  To 
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reiterate, no property or group of properties is necessary.149 On the family resemblance 
approach, if clusters form when properties are mapped out, this cluster might be a 
family i.e. a kind. The network of criss-crossing properties is similar to the way that 
people within a family resemble each other. Although not all family members exactly 
resemble each other, family members will share many similarities. For example, many 
(though not all) people in my family are short and round with curly hair. The people in 
my family do not exactly resemble each other. My family cannot be defined essentially 
i.e. in terms of necessary and sufficient elements. Even so, members of my family share 
many properties and everyone within my family has at least one of these properties. If 
the properties height, weight and hair-type are mapped out on three axes, then these 
properties would cluster, and we could then argue that the individuals who instantiate 
the properties are members of the same family—the Knox family.  
Wittgenstein uses the family resemblance account to analyse the way concepts such as 
game are used in ordinary language. He does not apply the family resemblance 
approach to natural kinds.150 Cooper (2005) argues that natural kinds might not have 
an essence, but might be demarcated using the family resemblance account. Cooper 
considers whether some types of disorders are family resemblance natural kinds. For 
example, while not all instances of schizophrenia exactly resemble each other, if all 
instances of schizophrenia share a network of properties, then schizophrenia might pick 
out a family resemblance natural kind.151 I consider whether all dysfunctions share a 
network of properties, and if so whether dysfunction picks out a family resemblance 
natural kind.   
How might dysfunction (as used by health professionals and informed lay-people) be a 
family resemblance concept? That is, what might the properties of this sense of 
dysfunction be? Note that, at this point, I am not considering whether this sense of 
dysfunction picks out a family resemblance natural kind, but whether it is a family 
resemblance concept. One potential property is that the condition negatively impacts on 
                                                          
149 Some groups of properties may be sufficient. However, no particular group is sufficient - this is a point 
about necessity. 
150 Hacking argues that Wittgenstein was opposed to using a family resemblance account to scientific 
terms (Hacking, 1991, 115; 1991a, 150). 
151 See also Zachar, 2002, 223. Zachar does not argue that types of mental disorder (such as 
schizophrenia) are natural kinds, but practical kinds. Practical kinds lie in between natural kinds and 
artificial kinds.  
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the survival or reproduction of an individual.152 Secondly, it might be that some 
dysfunctions are a failure of a mechanism within an organism to perform the function 
for which it was designed i.e. an evolutionary (aetiological) dysfunction.153 Thirdly, 
some dysfunctions might involve some sort of incapacity. If I am unable to walk up a 
flight of stairs, and I can normally do so (and there is no external impediment), then this 
could be indicative of a dysfunction.154 As will become clear throughout the remainder 
of this section, if these properties are determining properties (if they are linked by 
natural law such that inductive inferences can be made), then this sense of dysfunction 
will a) pick out a family resemblance concept and further b) pick out a family 
resemblance natural kind. If, when mapped out, these properties (negatively impacting 
on survival and reproduction, failure of a mechanism to perform the function for which 
it was designed, an incapacity) form a property cluster (i.e. a network of overlapping 
and criss-crossing properties), then dysfunction might be a family resemblance concept. 
(Neither ‘negative impact on survival or reproduction’, nor ‘caused by an evolutionary 
dysfunction’, nor ‘incapacity’ are likely to be the essence of the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists). Regarding the negative impact on survival and reproduction, for 
example, sickle cell anaemia is arguably a dysfunction that does not reduce survival in 
malarial environments (see section 3.3 of chapter one). Evolutionary dysfunction might 
not be the essence because it is arguable that not all conditions that ordinarily fall 
within dysfunction are caused by an evolutionary dysfunction, such as dyslexia, ADHD 
and anti-social personality disorder (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a; see also section 4.1 
of chapter five and section two of chapter seven). Finally, incapacity cannot be the 
essence of the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) because, for example, early 
stage cancer (i.e. cancer that has not yet caused symptoms) is not incapacitating.)  
Cooper’s account of family resemblance natural kinds is based on Duprè’s (1993, 1981) 
family resemblance account of natural kinds. Both Cooper and Duprè’s accounts of 
natural kinds are promiscuously real. Their accounts are real insofar as they claim that 
the property clusters reflect the real world – the property clusters are not mere 
conventions. Their accounts are promiscuous because “different clusters can … be 
                                                          
152 This is taken from Boorse’s (1997) essentialist account of disease.  
153 This is taken from Wakefield’s essentialist account of dysfunction (Wakefield, 2007, 152). 
154 This is taken from Fulford’s (1989) account of illness. See McKnight (1998) for a clear explanation of 
Fulford’s account.  
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generated by restricting our attention to particular dimensions of the map” (Cooper, 
2005, 49). Duprè uses the category ‘lily’ as an example (Duprè, 1981, 74). Biologically 
speaking, the genus lilium has over one hundred species including garlic and onions. In 
ordinary language, we do not classify onions and garlic as lilies. Additionally, lilium 
excludes many species that we ordinarily class as lilies such as calla lilies. Duprè’s point 
is that common sense and biology furnish us with different ways of categorising lilies, 
and that each is equally legitimate. Duprè does not think that one property cluster is 
privileged over any other—that one cluster is ‘more true’ than another or that there is a 
hierarchical structure of clusters. Duprè’s account of natural kinds is promiscuously real 
insofar as a single concept can pick out multiple family resemblance natural kinds. 
Lilium might pick out different family resemblance natural kinds depending on whether 
we are cooks, cottage gardeners, botanists and so on.155 Duprè’s account is realist 
insofar as he claims that the property clusters reflect the real world – the property 
clusters are not mere conventions.  
(For the sake of clarity, the network of properties is amongst the properties of lilium 
picked out by a group, such as cottage gardeners or botanists. The network of 
properties is not between the natural kind lilium used by different groups, such as 
cottage gardeners and botanists. That is, the family resemblance approach does not pick 
out the meta-meaning of lilium.) 
That a single concept might pick out multiple family resemblance natural kinds is 
potentially problematic for my purposes. This is because the extension of these family 
resemblance natural kinds might differ. For example, lilium might pick out a family 
resemblance natural kind for botanists, and the extension of this kind includes onions 
and garlic but not calla lilies. Lilium might pick out a family resemblance natural kind for 
cottage gardeners, and the extension of this kind might not include onions and garlic, 
yet include calla lilies (see Duprè, 1981, 74). By analogy, if dysfunction picks out multiple 
family resemblance natural kinds depending on our interests, then the extension of 
these natural kinds might differ. Homosexuality might be caused by a dysfunction 
according to one family resemblance natural kind, but not another. In turn, 
                                                          
155 It is unlikely that Duprè thinks that there are multiple ways in which a natural kind can be demarcated. 
For example, it is unlikely that Duprè thinks that lilium refers to or picks out a single family resemblance 
natural kind, but that this natural kind can be demarcated in many ways, depending on that in which we 
are interested.  
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homosexuality may be a mental disorder (and medically treated on this basis) according 
to some accounts of the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction, but not a mental 
disorder according to some other accounts of dysfunction. However, this problem can 
be avoided by specifying the sense of dysfunction in which I am interested, namely, 
dysfunction as used by health professionals and informed lay-people to denote when 
something has ‘gone wrong’ with the body or mind.  
Cooper’s family resemblance account of natural kinds is also promiscuously real. That 
is, she agrees with Duprè that a) there can be multiple family resemblance natural kinds 
associated with a single concept, b) family resemblance natural kinds reflect the real 
world i.e. family resemblance natural kinds are not mere conventions and c) one family 
resemblance natural kind is not privileged over any other. However, Cooper critiques 
Duprè’s account – or, at least, his early account – on the basis that his account of family 
resemblance natural kinds is too broad. That is, she thinks that Duprè’s earlier account 
might incorrectly class accidental or artificial kinds as natural kinds.  
In his earlier work, Duprè says that clusters of common sense properties might form 
natural kinds. In his 1993 book, Duprè claims that properties of family resemblance 
natural kinds must be “economically useful or strikingly noticeable… [or]… of interest 
for further theoretical reasons” (Duprè, 1993, 113). Cooper claims that such properties 
are little better than the properties of accidental kinds (Cooper, 2005, 50). Cooper asks 
us to imagine tins of tomatoes in Mr. Smith’s shop that are three months out of date. As 
the tins are out of date, Mr. Smith stacked those tins in the storeroom and the heavy-
handed cleaner knocked over that stack of out-of-dates tins. Because the tins were 
slightly out of date and dented, a staff member reduced the price to 59p. Cooper says 
that on Duprè’s account of natural kinds, the tins of tomatoes might constitute a family 
resemblance natural kind because there will be a cluster of properties concerning the 
out of date tins of tomatoes being stacked out the back, dented and reduced in price 
(Cooper, 2005, 49-51). On Duprè’s approach, mental disorder might also pick out a 
family resemblance natural kind, when it is not, in fact, a family resemblance natural 
kind. For example, many people with mental disorders might find it difficult to get a job, 
have poor physical health, have minimal support networks and so on. All these 
properties are ‘economically useful’ and ‘of interest for theoretical reasons’. That many 
people with mental illness find it hard to find and keep a job is economically useful, and 
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the poor physical health and minimal support networks are clearly of interest to social 
workers, policy makers and so on. On Duprè’s approach, if these properties form a 
cluster, then mental disorder might pick out a family resemblance natural kind, even 
though these properties only show that mental disorder is an accidental kind.  
In his later work, Duprè says that the properties of family resemblance natural kinds 
must provide a basis for scientific theorising i.e. that the properties must serve an 
investigative or explanatory function (Duprè, 2002; see also Cooper, 2005, 50-51). This 
restriction means that Duprè’s later account of family resemblance natural kinds is less 
promiscuous than his earlier account. If common sense properties do not provide a 
basis for scientific theorising, then property clusters formed by common sense 
properties do not constitute a family resemblance natural kind. That is, Duprè’s later 
account is less promiscuous because there are fewer ways in which a family 
resemblance natural kind might be demarcated. The tins of tomatoes in Mr. Smith’s 
shop do not provide a basis for scientific theorising, so they will not form a natural kind. 
However, the properties of mental disorder listed above (unemployment, poor physical 
health, minimal support networks) might serve an explanatory function, and so these 
properties might form a property cluster and so mental disorder might still pick out a 
family resemblance natural kind.  
Cooper agrees with Duprè’s later account – she agrees that the properties of family 
resemblance natural kinds must provide a basis for scientific reasoning. She refines 
Duprè’s claim so that the properties of family resemblance natural kinds must be linked 
together via natural laws such that inductive inferences can be made.  She refers to such 
properties as ‘determining properties’ (Cooper, 2005, 49-51).156  For example, the 
property that water is H2O is lawfully connected to the properties that water boils when 
it reaches 100 degrees Celsius (at sea level), that it expands when frozen on so on. 
Regarding family resemblance natural kinds, Cooper says, for example, the properties of 
rabbits are lawfully connected insofar as we can infer that anything that looks like a 
                                                          
156 Like others such as Millikan (2000) and Boyd (1999), Cooper thinks determining properties may be 
internal (for example, gene selection) and external (for example, nutrition) (Cooper, 2005, 51-52). 
Cooper admits that, it might not be clear whether a property is a determining property. For example, we 
can make inductive inferences about red things—in standard circumstances, red things appear red to 
normal observers. Yet, as being ‘red’ is not lawfully linked to much else, Cooper says ‘red things’ is a 




rabbit will have other ‘rabbity’ features (Cooper, 2005, 50). The tins of tomatoes in Mr. 
Smith’s shop are not a natural kind on Cooper’s account, as there are no natural laws 
linking the fact that Mr. Smith forgot to check the date, the heavy-handed cleaner 
knocked the tins over and a staff member priced the tomatoes at 59p (Cooper, 2005, 49-
50). That is to say, from the fact that I find a can of tomatoes priced at 59p in Mr. Smith’s 
shop, I cannot infer that it will also have been forgotten when it came to date checking 
time, and subsequently knocked over by a clumsy cleaner. Being out-of-date, dented and 
on sale are not determining properties. Equally, unemployment, poor physical health 
and having minimal support networks are not determining properties of mental 
disorders – they are not linked by natural laws. That is, there is no natural law linking 
unemployment and poor physical health and minimal support networks. Hence, on 
Cooper’s approach, these properties are not determining properties, and so these 
properties cannot show that mental disorder picks out a natural kind.  
In summary, family resemblance accounts of natural kinds are realist accounts, albeit 
promiscuously so. While Cooper’s family resemblance account of natural kinds is 
promiscuously real, it is less promiscuous than Duprè’s account – especially Duprè’s 
earlier account. As Cooper requires the properties of family resemblance natural kinds 
to be determining properties, accidental kinds (i.e. kinds that are not natural kinds) will 
not be classed as natural kinds.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, a family resemblance account of natural 
kinds might be beneficial for my purposes insofar as dysfunction might pick out a family 
resemblance natural kind, even if it does not pick out an essentialist natural kind. That 
is, family resemblance natural kinds provide a more relaxed account of natural kinds 
while also providing a truth about the extension of a natural kind concept (without 
being so relaxed as to include accidental or artificial kinds).  If dysfunction picks out a 
family resemblance natural kind, then there is a truth about whether a condition is 
caused by a dysfunction, and so the extension of mental disorder might be static 
between societies.  
Section eight of the following chapter returns to family resemblance natural kinds. It 
asks whether, if dysfunction picks out a family resemblance natural kind, it will provide 
an extension of dysfunction that is both static between societies (criterion 2.1) and 
excludes conditions such as homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and 
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being a political dissident (criterion 2.2). If it does, then the extension of mental disorder 
will be partly static between societies and so the medical treatment of these conditions 
can be safeguarded against. (Chapter four has already established that only mental 
disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders.) Section 
eight of the following chapter concludes that even if dysfunction picked out a family 
resemblance natural kind, it cannot simultaneously fulfil both components of the second 
criterion.  
6. Is dysfunction value-laden?  
Section one showed that as disvalue is a necessary component of the way mental 
disorder is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people, it cannot be 
a natural kind. This applies to both essentialist and family resemblance accounts of 
natural kinds. By extension, if dysfunction has a necessary value-component, then nor 
can dysfunction pick out a natural kind – neither an essentialist natural kind nor a family 
resemblance natural kind. This section briefly considers the arguments that disvalue is 
a necessary component of dysfunction, but leaves it an open question whether 
dysfunction is value-free. This allows me to consider the implications of dysfunction 
picking out a natural kind (either essentialist or family resemblance), namely whether it 
will provide an extension of dysfunction that is both static between societies and 
excludes conditions such as homosexuality i.e. meets both criteria 2.1 and 2.2.  
The vast majority of criticism of Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis is directed at 
the purported value-freedom of dysfunction. For example, Sadler and Agich argue that in 
his account of dysfunction, Wakefield uses evaluative terms such as ‘beneficial’ and 
‘failure’, and these terms cannot be translated into purely descriptive terms without loss 
of meaning (Sadler and Agich, 1995, 224). Wakefield responds that while he sometimes 
uses evaluative terms, these are not necessary to explain function and dysfunction 
(Wakefield, 1995, 234; see also 1992, 385 and 2000a, 265-266). Sadler and Agich (along 
with Fulford, 1999) also argue that Wakefield’s account of dysfunction has a teleological 
element – functions were selected for a purpose and therefore, have an end. As 
functions are goal-directed and goals are valued, functions must be valued and 
dysfunctions must be disvalued. Wakefield responds that while his account speaks of 
goals, purposes and designs, this is “strictly a convenient language for de-scribing [sic] 
these nonintentional causal features of biological mechanisms that happen to be shared 
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with genuine goals, purposes, and designs” (Wakefield, 1995, 237). Wakefield claims 
that a dysfunction occurs when “symptoms are not caused … by a normal, proportionate 
reaction to an unusual environmental stressor” (Wakefield, 1997, 646). However, 
Murphy and Woolfolk argue that values are required to determine what is ‘normal’, 
‘proportionate’ and ‘unusual’ (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000, 246). Murphy and 
Woolfolk’s position differs from that of Sadler and Agich, as Murphy and Woolfolk do 
not claim that dysfunction in itself is value-laden, but that determining whether 
something is a dysfunction will inevitably invite value judgments. That is, by claiming 
that dysfunctions are failures of mechanisms that have been naturally selected, 
Wakefield faces an epistemological problem – it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine whether something has been naturally selected for (see also McNally, 2001, 
312). Murphy and Woolfolk claim that due to this epistemological problem, the 
application of dysfunction will invoke values. That is, a condition might be disvalued, 
which biases scientists to find that it is caused by a dysfunction (Murphy and Woolfolk, 
2000, 246). Wakefield acknowledges that to discover whether a condition is caused by a 
dysfunction is “extraordinarily difficult” (Wakefield, 1992, 383), but points out that the 
epistemological problem has no direct relationship to determining the extension of a 
concept. He says, “ease of inquiry is not a good indicator of truth” and that to take an 
ahistorical account of dysfunction would be akin to “the proverbial drunk looking for his 
keys under the streetlight because that is where the light is best” (Wakefield, 2001, 
349). Moreover, he argues that while function might have initially picked out valued 
functions, function is a purely factual concept that has nothing to do with the values that 
motivated the initial interest in function (Wakefield, 2001, 355). He gives an analogy 
with water – water is generally valued, but water is a purely factual concept.  
In addition to Sadler and Agich and Murphy and Woolfolk’s arguments that dysfunction 
is evaluative, Megone (2000) argues that facts and values cannot be separated, and so 
dysfunction is both descriptive and evaluative. Thornton (2000) argues that even if the 
meaning of mental disorder could be captured using only factual criteria, this is because 
we agree on the underlying values. Finally, DeVito argues that Wakefield’s account of 
dysfunction is evaluative because he has chosen to use an evolutionary account of 
dysfunction, rather than say a biochemical, anatomical or social account of dysfunction 
(DeVito, 2000, 553-554).  
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This is not an exhaustive list of everyone who has argued that Wakefield’s dysfunction is 
value-laden.157 Nor do I make a claim about whether the objections to the value-
freedom of dysfunction are justified. My point is simply that it is not unanimously 
accepted that Wakefield’s account of dysfunction is value-free. If dysfunction is not value-
free, then it cannot pick out a natural kind. Rather than entering a debate about whether 
Wakefield’s dysfunction is value-free, the next chapter considers the implications of 
dysfunction picking out a natural kind. That is, if dysfunction picks out a natural kind 
(either essentialist or family resemblance), then it is arguable that it will provide an 
extension of dysfunction that is static between societies. In turn, part of the extension of 
mental disorder will be static between societies. However, to safeguard against the 
medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality, it must also be shown that these 
conditions do not fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) i.e. that 
the natural kind dysfunction is co-extensive with the way dysfunction is ordinarily used 
by health professionals and informed lay-people in the developed world. The following 
chapter considers whether the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) can fulfil 
both these criteria, and concludes that it cannot.  
7. Conclusion 
The previous chapter showed that, for my purposes, a major problem with basing the 
meaning of mental disorder on the way in which it is ordinarily used by health 
professionals and informed lay-people is that the extension of mental disorder might 
change between societies. This means that homosexuality, for example, may be classed 
as a mental disorder in some societies, and medically treated on the basis of this 
classification. In contrast, if mental disorder picked out a natural kind (either essentialist 
or family resemblance), then the extension of mental disorder might be static across all 
societies. However, section one of this chapter showed that the way mental disorder is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people is not a natural kind 
because a) disvalue is a necessary component of this sense of mental disorder and b) 
natural kinds (both essentialist and family resemblance natural kinds) cannot have a 
necessary evaluative component.  
                                                          
157 See, for example, Reznek, 1987. 
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That mental disorder does not pick out a natural kind does not necessarily mean that 
natural kinds are irrelevant to the extension of mental disorder, as a component of 
mental disorder might pick out a natural kind. This aligns with Wakefield’s (1992) claim 
that all mental disorders are caused by harmful mental dysfunctions and that 
dysfunction (which includes mental dysfunctions) picks out a natural kind. Wakefield 
uses Kripke and Putnam’s essentialist account of natural kinds. Kripke and Putnam 
argue that natural kinds have a real essence—a property or set of properties shared by 
all members of the kind. The real essence is not made up of superficial (i.e.  ordinary 
language) properties, but reflects the internal structure (i.e. the microstructure) of the 
natural kind. The real essence of a natural kind concept (i.e. a concept that picks out a 
natural kind) does not change between societies – it applies in all possible worlds 
(Kripke, 1980, 48). Hence, if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, then both the real 
essence and extension thereof will be stable between societies. In turn, the extension of 
mental disorder will be, in part, static between societies. 
Cooper, and others including Dupré, disagree with Kripke and Putnam’s claim that 
natural kinds must be demarcated essentially. Even if dysfunction does not pick out an 
essentialist natural kind, it might still pick out a non-essentialist natural kind, such as a 
family resemblance natural kind. This is because non-essentialist accounts of natural 
kinds are more inclusive (i.e. relaxed – more kinds are natural kinds) than essentialist 
natural kinds. Family resemblance accounts of natural kinds are promiscuously real – a 
single concept might pick out multiple natural kinds depending on our interests. Cooper 
argues that her account will not class accidental kinds as natural kinds. This is because 
only determining properties can form clusters that represent a family resemblance 
natural kind. Determining properties are those properties that are linked together via 
natural laws such that inductive inferences can be made (Cooper, 2005, 49-51).  
Rather than concluding whether dysfunction picks out a natural kind (either an 
essentialist natural kind or a family resemblance natural kind), the following chapter 
considers the implications of dysfunction picking out a natural kind. More specifically, it 
considers whether, if dysfunction picks out a natural kind (either an essentialist or 
family resemblance), this will provide an extension of dysfunction that is both static 
between societies (criterion 2.1) and excludes conditions such as homosexuality 
(criterion 2.2).  
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Chapter Seven – Wakefield, Dysfunction and 
Conservative Naturalism 
1. Introduction 
Chapter five showed that a problem with basing the meaning of mental disorder on the 
way the concept is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people is 
that the extension of mental disorder might change over time and culture. This means, 
for example, that homosexuality might be a mental disorder in one society but not in 
another. In turn, in societies in which homosexuality is considered to be a mental 
disorder, it may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. In 
contrast, as the real essence of an essentialist natural kind applies in all possible worlds, 
if mental disorder picks out a natural kind, then the extension of mental disorder be 
static over time and culture. If so, it could be determined, for once and for all, whether a 
condition, such as homosexuality, is a mental disorder.  
The previous chapter showed that the way mental disorder is used by health 
professionals and informed lay-people is not a natural kind because disvalue is a 
necessary component of this sense of mental disorder. Despite this, the previous chapter 
showed that a component of mental disorder, namely dysfunction might pick out a 
natural kind (either an essentialist natural kind or a family resemblance natural kind). If 
being caused by a dysfunction is a necessary component of the way mental disorder is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people, and if dysfunction 
picks out a natural kind, then it is possible that whether a condition falls within that 
natural kind will not change over time and culture. If so, part of the extension of mental 
disorder would be static – it would not change over time or culture. For example, if 
homosexuality does not fall in the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists), then it 
cannot be a mental disorder in any time or culture.158  However, this chapter shows that 
even if dysfunction picks out a natural kind and thereby fixes the extension of 
dysfunction, this may  not safeguard against the medical treatment of conditions such as 
homosexuality (by it allegedly being a mental disorder). This is because conditions such 
                                                          
158 This line of argument relies on societies recognising that homosexuality does not fall in the natural 
kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). However, if homosexuality does not fall within the natural kind 
dysfunction, then societies ought to recognise that homosexuality does not fall in the natural kind thereof. 
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as homosexuality might fall within the natural kind dysfunction. That is, the natural 
kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) cannot both provide a static extension of 
dysfunction and ensure that conditions such as homosexuality do not fall within the 
natural kind dysfunction. The natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) can meet 
either criterion 2.1 or criterion 2.2 but not both.  
This is the overall conclusion of this chapter, but a nuance in the claim needs to be 
considered, namely that there are two kinds of naturalism – conservative naturalism 
and revisionist naturalism. Conservative naturalists argue that natural kinds are 
constrained (or captured) by ordinary language, whereas revisionist naturalist rejects 
this claim. The hope that one of these two types of naturalism can meet both criteria 2.1 
and 2.2 is misplaced. The natural kind dysfunction (presuming it is a natural kind) will 
only fix the extension of mental disorder if revisionist naturalism is accepted. However, 
revisionist naturalism cannot guarantee that homosexuality will be excluded from the 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). In turn, homosexuality may be a mental 
disorder and medically treated on this basis. While conservative naturalism means that 
homosexuality will be excluded from the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) 
in the developed world, it does not fix the extension of natural kinds between societies – 
homosexuality might fall within the natural kind dysfunction in other societies (and in 
turn, may be a mental disorder and medically treated on this basis).  
This chapter is structured in the following way. Section two considers a problem for 
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis, namely, that it might not be co-extensive with 
ordinary language – there might be examples of conditions that are caused by 
dysfunctions, but that health professionals and informed lay-people do not ordinarily 
call mental disorders and vice versa.159 This problem leads to discussion of the 
relationship between natural kinds and ordinary language.  
Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) argue that Wakefield avoids this problem (that the 
harmful dysfunction analysis is not co-extensive with ordinary language) using black 
box essentialism and conservative naturalism. I am not convinced that Wakefield is a 
conservative naturalist. Whether Wakefield is a conservative naturalist is not pivotal to 
                                                          
159 The problem that dysfunction may have a necessary evaluative component (and if so, it cannot pick out 
a natural kind) was discussed in section five of the previous section.  
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my argument.  I am primarily interested in whether conservative or revisionist 
naturalism can show, for once and for all, that conditions such as homosexuality do not 
fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists).  (If so, then conditions 
such as homosexuality cannot be mental disorders, and so cannot be medically treated 
on this basis.) Hence, the remainder of this chapter considers the implications of 
dysfunction picking out a natural kind. More specifically, it considers the advantages and 
disadvantages of both conservative and revisionist naturalism, as they apply to my aim 
i.e. safeguarding against the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality.  
Section three shows that the main advantage of conservative naturalism is that the 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) must be co-extensive with the way 
dysfunction is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people. As 
homosexuality is not ordinarily considered to be caused by a dysfunction in the 
developed world, then homosexuality cannot fall within the natural kind dysfunction. 
This means that a conservative account of the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it 
exists) meets criterion 2.2. In turn, homosexuality cannot be a mental disorder and so 
homosexuality may not be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. 
Section four discusses the main disadvantages of revisionist naturalism (regarding 
safeguarding against the medical treatment of homosexuality), namely, that it cannot 
pick what is included in a natural kind and so homosexuality might fall within the 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). That is, a revisionist account of the 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) does not meet criterion 2.2. Section five 
considers the disadvantages of conservative naturalism and the advantages of 
revisionist naturalism (as they relate to safeguarding against the medical treatment of 
homosexuality) These have not been separated into separate sections because they are 
interrelated and need to be considered alongside each other. The main disadvantages of 
conservative naturalism are that because natural kinds are constrained by ordinary 
language, and ordinary language might change between cultures, conservative 
naturalism might not provide extensions of natural kinds that are fixed between 
societies i.e. it does not meet criterion 2.1. Revisionist naturalism avoids this problem, 
but cannot ensure that homosexuality will be excluded from the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it exists).  
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The addendum (section eight) considers whether a family resemblance account of 
natural kinds will achieve my aim of safeguarding against the medical treatment of 
conditions such as homosexuality. It concludes that even if dysfunction picks out a 
family resemblance natural kind, this may not safeguard against the medical treatment 
of conditions such as homosexuality. Family resemblance accounts of natural kinds 
might fit with ordinary language (criterion 2.2), but if so, then they will not fix the 
extension of dysfunction between societies (criterion 2.1).  
Overall, this chapter discusses the relationship between natural kinds (both essentialist 
and family resemblance) and ordinary language, and shows that neither conservative 
naturalism nor revisionist naturalism necessarily allows me to have my cake and eat it. 
Neither approach can guarantee that conditions such as homosexuality are excluded 
from the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) and that this applies in all 
societies. Hence, neither conservative nor revisionist naturalism (regarding 
dysfunction) will safeguard against conditions such as homosexuality from being 
considered to be mental disorders. Nor will it safeguard against these conditions being 
medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders.  
2.  The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis is not a Good Fit with the way Mental 
Disorder is Ordinarily Used 
There are multiple problems with Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis. As 
explained in section six of the previous chapter, many people have argued that 
dysfunction cannot pick out a natural kind because it has a necessary evaluative 
component. This section focuses on the argument that the harmful dysfunction analysis 
might not be co-extensive with ordinary language. However, for the sake of 
thoroughness, I shall first briefly turn my attention to two other potential problems for 
Wakefield.  
Firstly, Wakefield’s ‘harm’ requirement might be critiqued. This could occur in three 
ways. Firstly, it could be argued that the way mental disorder is ordinarily used by 
health professionals and informed lay-people does not have an evaluative component. 
However, as argued in section 4.1 of chapter five, the theory that mental disorder (as 
used by health professionals and informed lay-people) has no evaluative component has 
“few adherents” (Murphy, 2015, 19; see also Murphy, 2005, 116). Secondly, it could be 
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argued that while mental disorder does have an evaluative component, the evaluative 
component is not harm but say, incapacity (Sadler and Agich, 1995, 224). Thirdly, 
Wakefield says that whether a condition is harmful is not determined by the individual 
or some objective account of harm (i.e. whether a condition is harmful is not relative to 
the individual or society in question) but is instead determined by society (Wakefield, 
2005, 88).160 This is problematic because some societies may deem homosexuality to be 
harmful, and so it may be a mental disorder. Indeed, in a very homophobic society, 
being gay is likely to be harmful. Hence, homosexuality might be a mental disorder (if it 
is also caused by a dysfunction), and so may be medically treated on this basis.  It could 
be argued that homosexuality is only harmful due to the prejudices and discrimination 
of certain cultures. That is, it could be argued that homosexuality is only harmful in 
homophobic societies due to sociocultural factors rather than biological factors. 
However, the problem with this approach is that there is no easy way to draw a clear 
line between the two (Kendell, 1975, 455). Bingham and Banner take the similar but 
stronger view that to distinguish between social and biological environments amounts 
to an “artificial polarisation”, and that in any case, it would not be desirable for medicine 
to use such a narrow account of harm (Bingham and Banner, 2014, 540). In this way, 
Wakefield’s account of harm is problematic, and a robust investigation of ‘how the 
value-statuses of mental conditions are determined’ is required. 
These three problems concerning Wakefield’s harm requirement are not discussed 
further. This is because in comparison to the large amount of debate generated by 
Wakefield’s account of dysfunction, his ‘harm’ requirement has received relatively little 
attention.161 Moreover, I am interested in the relationship between natural kinds and 
ordinary language which is not directly relevant to the ‘harm’ component. 
Secondly, Aucouturier and Demazeux critique Wakefield for assuming dysfunction picks 
out a natural kind i.e. assuming dysfunction picks out a unified object of inquiry. They 
point out that just because we have the concept mental disorder in ordinary language 
does not mean that mental disorder is out in the world waiting to be discovered 
(Aucouturier & Demazeux, 2014, 80-81). As explained above, Wakefield thinks 
dysfunction, not mental disorder, picks out a natural kind. Aucouturier and Demazeux’s 
                                                          
160 See also section 4.1 of chapter five.  
161 An exception is Bengt Brülde, 2010.   
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idea is right; they just apply it to the wrong concepts. That is, just because we have the 
concept of dysfunction in ordinary language does not mean that dysfunction picks out a 
natural kind. While it might be beneficial to my project if dysfunction referred to a 
natural kind (because the extension of dysfunction would arguably be static over 
societies), this does not have any bearing on whether dysfunction does pick out a natural 
kind. What I want to be the case is not necessarily the case. Rather than presuming that 
dysfunction picks out a natural kind, Wakefield needs to show that it picks out a natural 
kind.  
Let’s now consider the claim that Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis is not co-
extensive with the way in which mental disorder and dysfunction are ordinarily used by 
health professionals and informed lay-people. Wakefield thinks that his analysis of 
mental disorder corresponds with the ordinary, clinical sense of mental disorder. That is, 
Wakefield thinks that all conditions that fall within the clinical sense of mental disorder 
are mental disorders according to the harmful dysfunction analysis. He also thinks that 
all conditions that do not fall within the clinical sense of mental disorder will not be 
mental disorders according to the harmful dysfunction analysis. Not everyone agrees 
that Wakefield’s harmful analysis is co-extensive with the ordinary clinical sense of 
mental disorder. Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) argue that there are three situations in 
which Wakefield’s account might not fit with ordinary language. That is, there are three 
situations in which a condition that is ordinarily called a mental disorder might not be 
caused by a dysfunction.  
Firstly, Wakefield presumes that all beneficial mechanisms are functions—that all 
beneficial mechanisms have been naturally selected. Murphy and Woolfolk point out 
that this might not be the case as some beneficial mechanisms might be spandrels 
(Murphy & Woolfolk, 2000a, 276). Spandrels are advantageous by-products of other 
traits, but they do not have any adaptive functions in themselves (Gould & Lewontin, 
1979). For example, the ability to read might be a spandrel i.e. a by-product of some 
mechanism that has been selected for (Murphy & Woolfolk, 2000a, 276). Murphy and 
Woolfolk reason that since a spandrel does not have an adaptive function, a spandrel 
cannot be a dysfunction in the sense that Wakefield uses that term. Hence, if the ability 
to read is a spandrel, the inability to read cannot be caused by a dysfunction (Murphy 
138 
 
and Woolfolk, 2000, 242-243).162 While we consider the inability to read to be caused 
by a dysfunction, if the ability to read is a spandrel, then dyslexia is not caused by a 
dysfunction according to Wakefield’s analysis. In turn, dyslexia could not be a mental 
disorder. Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis would conflict with the ordinary 
clinical sense of mental disorder.  
Secondly, Murphy and Woolfolk claim that some mental disorders are caused by 
problems in the environment rather than a dysfunction within the individual (Murphy 
and Woolfolk, 2000, 243-244). If a smoke detector is placed too close to the oven, then 
the alarm will go off in the absence of fire. In this case, the smoke detector is not 
dysfunctional – smoke detectors were not designed to be placed near ovens. Instead, the 
problem is in the environment i.e. that the smoke detector is placed near the oven. By 
analogy, the mainstream view is that Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is 
both caused by a dysfunction and a mental disorder. However, if children were not 
designed to be in the formal classroom environment (Timimi and Taylor, 2004; Conrad 
and Potter, 2000), then hyperactivity in the classroom cannot be caused by a mental 
dysfunction, according to Wakefield’s account. In short, it is arguable that ADHD is not 
caused by a dysfunction even though it is ordinarily called a mental disorder. Hence, 
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis conflicts with the ordinary clinical sense of 
mental disorder.163  
Thirdly, Murphy and Woolfolk claim that some mental disorders are not caused by 
dysfunctions but by ‘bad input’ (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000, 244-245). For example, 
Anti-Social Personality Disorder might be caused by ‘bad input’. If a child is consistently 
told that they are bad or stupid (if they are given bad inputs), then he or she might 
develop an anti-social personality. Arguably, those people who develop an anti-social 
                                                          
162 Similarly, the female orgasm may be a spandrel, which means that a woman’s inability to orgasm 
cannot be caused by a dysfunction (Murphy & Woolfolk, 2000, 249). 
163 By analogy, in an obesogenic environment, a person may become severely overweight. This does not 
necessarily mean obesity is caused by a dysfunction i.e. that something has gone wrong in the obese 
person. This is because it is plausible that humans were designed to have an affinity for sweet and fatty 
food because this would be beneficial in hunter-gatherer environments in which food is scarce (Breslin, 
2013). Rather than obesity being caused by a dysfunction, it is possible that the problem is in the 
obesogenic environment. If correct, then we should consider not speaking of obesity as a ‘disease’ or 
using phrases such as the ‘obesity epidemic’.  
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personality for these reasons are not dysfunctional, but are responding in an expectable 
way to an abusive childhood. 164 
In addition to Murphy and Woolfolk’s three scenarios, there are also situations in which 
a condition might be a caused by a harmful dysfunction but does not fall within the 
ordinary clinical sense of mental disorder. For example, it might be that homosexuality is 
caused by a dysfunction. If reproduction is functional and gay people are less likely to 
reproduce, then homosexuality might be caused by a dysfunction (Cooper, 2005, 18; 
2002, 269).165 If so, and if homosexuality is also considered harmful, then 
homosexuality would be a mental disorder according to the harmful dysfunction 
analysis. Since homosexuality is not ordinarily called a mental disorder in the developed 
world, this would be an example in which the harmful dysfunction analysis conflicts 
with the current ordinary clinical sense of mental disorder.166  
In short, Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis might conflict with the way mental 
disorder is used in ordinary language i.e. the clinical sense of mental disorder. There are 
two main ways in which one could respond to this conflict. Firstly, we could reject the 
harmful dysfunction analysis. That is, we could maintain that the extension of mental 
disorder must match ordinary language, and because the harmful dysfunction analysis 
does not match ordinary language, it must be rejected. Secondly, we could accept the 
harmful dysfunction analysis. If the harmful dysfunction analysis is accepted, then one 
of four options could to be taken. Firstly, we could adapt the harmful dysfunction 
analysis, so that rather than claiming that all mental disorders must be caused by a 
dysfunction, all mental disorders must have the right antecedent cause (Murphy, 2005; 
2015). The phrase ‘right antecedent cause’ signifies that disvalue is insufficient to 
demarcate (mental) disorders, without making a commitment as to what the right 
antecedent cause is.167 This would mean that the conceptual analysis of mental disorder 
                                                          
164 Wakefield claims that only those reactions that are unexpected (or abnormal or disproportionate) are 
dysfunctional (Wakefield, 1997, 646).  See also Horwitz and Wakefield on post-bereavement grief 
(Wakefield, 2013a; Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007) and Horwitz and Wakefield on normal anxiety 
(Wakefield, 2000a, 258; Horwitz and Wakefield, 2012) c.f. Murphy and Woolfolk (2000; 2000a).  
165 C.f. Wilson’s (1978; 1975) kin theory of homosexuality in which gay people pass on their genes not via 
direct reproduction but by playing a role in raising their nieces and nephews. 
166 See also the gourmand lesion and male aggression examples in section three of chapter six.  
167 If this approach is accepted, then the way in which mental disorder is used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people will be essentialist, albeit a vague essentialist account. As Varga points out, the 
necessary and sufficient elements of a concept may be vague, but this does not mean that the concept 
cannot be essentialist (Varga, 2011, 8; see also Cooper, 2014, 41).  
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would fit with ordinary language.168 However, to say that all mental disorders must 
have the right antecedent cause without specifying what that cause consists of is rather 
vague. All it says is that according to the way health professionals and informed lay-
people ordinarily use mental disorder, all mental disorders must be χ, and what χ 
amounts to is an open question. To say that all mental disorders must have the right 
antecedent cause is just as banal as saying that we have a folk theory of human nature in 
which a mental disorder occurs when something has gone wrong in that person’s mind 
(see Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 281 on ‘view three’). In addition, as χ has not been 
specified, this approach cannot determine whether a condition is a mental disorder. For 
these reasons, this option is not discussed any further.  
Secondly, it could be argued that the ordinary clinical sense of mental disorder is co-
extensive with the harmful dysfunction analysis because all those conditions that fall 
within the ordinary clinical sense of mental disorder must be caused by a dysfunction. In 
other words, it could be argued that it is an empirical fact that the condition in question 
is caused by a dysfunction. For example, it would be said that dyslexia, ADHD or anti-
social personality disorder must be caused by a dysfunction, and we need to keep 
looking for the dysfunction until we find one. (If it cannot be shown that the condition in 
question is caused by a dysfunction, then at some point, one of the other options would 
need to be adopted.) 
Thirdly, it could be argued that the ordinary clinical sense of mental disorder is co-
extensive with the harmful dysfunction analysis because dysfunction picks out a natural 
kind and natural kinds are constrained by ordinary language. This is different from the 
previous approach in which it is an empirical fact that the condition in question is 
caused by a dysfunction. In contrast, on this (third) approach, the condition in question 
is not caused by a dysfunction for conceptual reasons (c.f. empirical reasons). That is, 
the condition in question is not caused by a dysfunction due to the constraint of 
ordinary language. 
                                                          
168 If the ‘dysfunction’ requirement is replaced with the ‘right antecedent cause’, then the extension of 
mental disorder may change based on how the ‘right antecedent cause’ is specified. For example, if the 
right antecedent cause is, at Wakefield suggests, being caused by a dysfunction, then the stress caused by 
the death of a loved one might not fall within the extension of mental disorder. On the other hand, if the 
right antecedent cause includes environmental stressors such as bereavement, then post-bereavement 
grief may fall within the extension of mental disorder. 
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Finally, we could accept the harmful dysfunction analysis, including the claim that all 
mental disorders must be caused by a dysfunction, and that dysfunction picks out a 
natural kind. We could then claim that dysfunction-status is not constrained by ordinary 
language. In this case, either a) the natural kind dysfunction would not be co-extensive 
with ordinary language or b) ordinary language could be revised to be co-extensive with 
the natural kind dysfunction. On the former approach, the extension of the natural kind 
dysfunction might not map exactly on to the way it is used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people. For example, dyslexia, ADHD and anti-social personality disorder 
might not be caused by a dysfunction (and so cannot be mental disorders), and 
homosexuality might be caused by a dysfunction (and so might be a mental disorder). 
On the latter approach, ordinary language would need to be updated or revised so that 
dyslexia, ADHD and anti-social personality disorders are no longer considered to be 
caused by a dysfunction (and so cannot be mental disorders). Equally, ordinary 
language would be revised so that homosexuality is caused by a dysfunction (and so 
might be a mental disorder). As explained in section one of chapter five, science might 
influence ordinary language such that the applicable science has become part of 
ordinary language. For example, that water is H2O is a scientific discovery, but it is a 
scientific discovery that has been incorporated into ordinary language. 
These options are summarised below: 169 
1. Reject the harmful dysfunction analysis. The condition (e.g. dyslexia) remains 
within the clinical sense of mental disorder. 
2. Accept the harmful dysfunction analysis. 
a. Rather than being caused by a dysfunction, all mental disorders must 
have the right antecedent cause. The revised version of the harmful 
dysfunction analysis would be co-extensive with ordinary language. 
b. It is an empirical fact that the condition in question is caused by a 
dysfunction. The harmful dysfunction analysis is co-extensive with 
ordinary language. 
                                                          




c. The natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) is constrained by the 
way dysfunction is used in ordinary language. The harmful dysfunction 
analysis is co-extensive with ordinary language. 
d. The natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) is not constrained by 
the way dysfunction is used in ordinary language. In this case, the 
ordinary sense of dysfunction either a) might not be co-extensive with the 
natural kind dysfunction or b) is revised to be co-extensive with the 
natural kind dysfunction. 
The following section shows that Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) argue that Wakefield 
takes approach 2c i.e. that Wakefield thinks that natural kinds are constrained by 
ordinary language. Option 2c is, according to Murphy and Woolfolk, an aspect of 
Wakefield’s black box essentialism. As will emerge, I think Murphy and Woolfolk have 
misinterpreted Wakefield. However, it is still important to consider black box 
essentialism (and conservative naturalism) as such a position might be able to show 
that conditions such as homosexuality do not fall within the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) (criterion 2.2), and that this applies across all societies (criterion 
2.1).  
 
3. Black Box Essentialism and Conservative Naturalism 
As discussed in section six of the previous chapter, a consequence of Wakefield’s use of 
an evolutionary account of function and dysfunction is that it makes it difficult to 
determine whether a condition is caused by a dysfunction because there is no blueprint 
of evolutionary processes. This is a methodological or epistemological problem 
(Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000, 247, 250). According to Murphy and Woolfolk, Wakefield 
seeks to avoid this problem using black box essentialism (Wakefield, 2000; 1999a). 
As a black box essentialist, Wakefield thinks that we can know that a kind is a natural 
kind without knowing what the real essence of the kind is—the real essence might be 
locked in a black box. For example, Wakefield says that we knew that water was a 
natural kind before it was found that water is H2O. Prior to Lavoisier’s discovery that 
water is H2O, the real essence of water was locked in a black box—it was unknown. 
Lavoisier unlocked the black box of water when he found that the essence of water is 
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H2O. Just as Lavoisier unlocked the black box by finding the formula for water, 
Wakefield claims that Darwin and other evolutionary theorists have unlocked the black 
boxes of function and dysfunction to show that the essence of function is aetiological—
the function of an organ or system is the effect for which it was naturally selected 
(Wakefield, 1992a, 243-244; 1999a, 471-472; 2000, 36). In other words, functions are 
effects that explain their causes (Wakefield, 1992, 381-383). By extension, a 
dysfunction is a failure of a mechanism within an organism to perform the function for 
which it was designed (Wakefield, 2007, 152; see also section five of the previous 
chapter). For my purposes, Wakefield’s claim that aetiology is the real essence of 
function and dysfunction is not particularly important. Instead, the important point is 
that Wakefield claims that we can know that dysfunction picks out a natural kind, even 
if the real essence of dysfunction had not been determined. This is important because it 
leads to the discussion of the relationship between natural kinds and ordinary 
language. 
As mentioned earlier, Aucouturier and Demazeux critique Wakefield for assuming 
dysfunction (or mental disorder) picks out a natural kind i.e. saying that we intuitively 
know that dysfunction picks out a natural kind. Although Aucouturier and Demazeux do 
not refer to Wakefield’s black box essentialism, their argument can be read as a critique 
of black box essentialism – just because we have dysfunction in ordinary language does 
not mean that the real essence of dysfunction is locked in a box, and is out there waiting 
to be unlocked. It might be that dysfunction does not pick out a natural kind. 
Murphy and Woolfolk (2000a) interpret black box essentialism as the claim that we can 
know the extension of a natural kind even though the real essence is locked in a black 
box. They claim that Wakefield is saying that we have intuitive knowledge of whether a 
condition falls within the natural kind dysfunction. For example, we can intuitively 
know that schizophrenia falls within the natural kind dysfunction and that being able to 
see is not a dysfunction. In other words, Murphy and Woolfolk say that Wakefield thinks 
that natural kinds are constrained by ordinary language. (This is presumably because 
ordinary language reflects the intuition that schizophrenia is caused by a dysfunction, 
but being able to see is not.)  We do ordinarily think of schizophrenia as being caused by 
a dysfunction, so schizophrenia must fall within the natural kind dysfunction. Equally, 
we do not ordinarily think of seeing as being caused by a dysfunction, so vision cannot 
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fall within the natural kind dysfunction. Murphy and Woolfolk do not think that 
Wakefield merely claims that natural kinds must reflect ordinary language. Instead, the 
pair make the stronger claim that Wakefield says that natural kinds are constrained by 
ordinary language (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 284). The position that natural kinds 
are constrained by ordinary language is known as conservative naturalism (Murphy, 
2015, 10). Conservative naturalism is a form of naturalism because it concerns natural 
kinds. It is conservative because it remains faithful to ordinary language i.e. to our folk 
theory about the natural kind in question. That is, it conserves the ordinary language 
meaning of the kind being considered. The opposing position – that natural kinds 
should not be constrained by ordinary language – is known as revisionist naturalism. 
Conservative naturalists might object to the idea that ordinary language ‘constrains’ 
natural kinds. They might prefer the idea that ordinary language ‘captures’ natural 
kinds i.e. that we can intuitively know whether a kind is a natural kind, and what is 
included or excluded from the kind. However, as will be shown in section six of this 
chapter, ordinary language does not always reflect natural kinds. Hence, I continue to 
refer to ordinary language ‘constraining’ natural kinds, rather than ‘capturing’ them.  
Revisionist naturalism is naturalist because it concerns natural kinds. It is revisionist 
insofar as it claims that what counts as a natural kind and the extension of a natural 
kind might be revised based on new scientific findings. For example, imagine that a) 
dysfunction were found to pick out a natural kind and b) the natural kind dysfunction 
excluded dyslexia. A revisionist naturalist would claim that we need to revise the 
ordinary language idea that dyslexia is caused by a dysfunction. We would need to 
accept that dyslexia is not caused by a dysfunction. (Revisionist naturalists take option 
2(d)(b) listed at the end of the previous section.) In contrast, the conservative naturalist 
would claim that dyslexia must be caused by a dysfunction because the natural kind 
dysfunction is constrained by the way dysfunction is used in ordinary language. 
(Conservative naturalists take option 2(c).)  
I endorse Murphy and Woolfolk’s account of conservative naturalism i.e. that 
conservative naturalists think that natural kinds not only reflect ordinary language, but 
are constrained by ordinary language. However, as will be shown in the remainder of 
this section, I am not convinced that Wakefield is a conservative naturalist. However, 
considering whether Wakefield is a conservative naturalist brings out a number of 
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features of conservative naturalism that require further inspection. Hence, sections 
three, four and five of this chapter consider the advantages and disadvantages of both 
conservative and revisionist naturalism (as they relate to safeguarding against the 
medical treatment of homosexuality) with a specific focus on whether either can show, 
for once and for all, that conditions such as homosexuality are not mental disorders. 
3.1 Is Wakefield a conservative naturalist?  
Murphy and Woolfolk’s interpretation of Wakefield’s black box essentialism is based on 
Wakefield’s claim that some disvalued behaviours are not ordinarily considered to be 
symptoms of mental disorders because “we believe we were designed to react in that 
way” (Wakefield, 1999a, 64; see also Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000, 247). For example, 
we do not ordinarily consider the grief experienced after the death of a loved one to be 
caused by a dysfunction, because we believe that post-bereavement grief was designed 
for. Wakefield also says that calling post-bereavement grief a mental disorder “[flies] in 
the face of common sense about human nature” (Wakefield and Schmitz, 2014, 38). 
Murphy and Woolfolk say that Wakefield goes from our belief that post-bereavement 
grief is part of our design to the claim that post-bereavement grief cannot fall within the 
natural kind dysfunction. In turn, the pair conclude that Wakefield thinks the natural 
kind dysfunction is constrained by the way dysfunction is used in ordinary language i.e. 
that Wakefield is a conservative naturalist with regard to dysfunction. That is, Murphy 
and Woolfolk claim Wakefield says that, ordinarily, post-bereavement grief is not 
considered to be caused by a dysfunction (because we think it was designed for), and so 
post-bereavement grief cannot fall within the natural kind dysfunction. If Murphy and 
Woolfolk are correct about Wakefield’s position, then while Wakefield’s account of 
dysfunction might appear to be scientific, it is actually based in ordinary language. 
Wakefield would still be a naturalist insofar as he would claim that people intuitively 
know when a natural kind is represented. (The same applies to any other conservative 
naturalist.)  
The example of post-bereavement grief suggests that Wakefield thinks that we can 
show that a condition must be excluded from the natural kind dysfunction based on 
ordinary language. In addition, Murphy and Woolfolk claim that Wakefield thinks we 
can show that a condition must fall within the natural kind dysfunction based on 
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ordinary language (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 288-289). This is based on 
Wakefield’s claim that  
[We] do not have to know the details of evolution or of internal 
mechanisms to know, for example, that typical cases of thought 
disorder, drug dependence, mood disorders, sexual dysfunction, 
insomnia, anxiety disorders, learning disorders, and so on, are failures 
of some mechanisms to perform their designed functions; it is obvious 
from surface features (Wakefield, 1997c, 256, my emphasis).  
To paraphrase, Wakefield thinks we can infer that some evolved mechanism is 
dysfunctional solely on the basis of abnormal behavior. This means Wakefield thinks 
that if we ordinarily consider some condition or behavior to be caused by a dysfunction, 
then that condition or behavior must fall within the natural kind dysfunction. For 
example, if I am very depressed for no good reason,170 it makes sense (i.e. it is intuitive) 
to think that there must be some dysfunction occurring in my mind. Likewise, if I hear 
voices that are not there (if I am psychotic), then it seems to be obvious that my brain is 
not working as it should. Even though our understanding of psychosis is limited, 
Wakefield would think it is reasonable to presume that in the future, we will find a 
dysfunction that causes psychosis. In turn, it is reasonable to presume that psychosis 
constitutes a mental disorder. Hence, when looking for the real essence of dysfunction, 
we must look for something that includes psychosis and depression. 
As psychiatry is in its infancy, there is very little reliable evidence concerning whether 
mental conditions such as depression and psychosis are caused by a dysfunction. Given 
this lack of evidence, it appears that in many cases, intuition about whether something 
has gone wrong drives dysfunction-status rather than dysfunction-status influencing 
our beliefs about whether something has gone wrong.171 
                                                          
170 A good reason, for example, might be being recently bereaved.  
171 Whether intuition drives function-status (or the other way around) might depend on why the 
condition is considered to be caused by a dysfunction. For example, if ADHD is caused by being in a 
mismatched environment rather than a dysfunction, then we might change our intuition that ADHD is a 
mental disorder. Equally, if Anti-Social Personality Disorder is not caused by a dysfunction but by bad 
input, then we might change our intuition that Anti-Social Personality Disorder is a mental disorder (c.f. 
Kirmayer and Young (1999) who critique Wakefield for using an evolutionary account of dysfunction 
which shifts attention from social learning and interactional problems.)  In both these cases, function-
status might drive our beliefs about whether something has gone wrong. In contrast, if dyslexia is not 
caused by a dysfunction (because the ability to read is a spandrel), we might be less likely to change our 
belief that dyslexia involves something going wrong. In this case, beliefs would drive function-status. 
Admittedly, my justifications for this are hazy – it is based on a hunch that most people would continue to 
call dyslexia a disorder (even if reading is a spandrel), but would be prepared to accept that ADHD is not a 
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Murphy and Woolfolk say Wakefield thinks people have a  
Capacity to identify real divisions in nature correctly and that science 
will subsequently provide the causal explanation of why the 
distinctions we make correspond to natural kinds. In the case of mental 
disorder, Wakefield would have it that common-sense distinguishes 
pathological and nonpathological behaviour and that evolutionary 
psychology vindicates our distinctions by showing how they are based 
on our design plan (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000, 247).  
In other words, Murphy and Woolfolk explain Wakefield’s position by saying  
 The scientific concept that Wakefield is interested in is the scientific 
application of a lay concept rooted in our everyday theory of human 
nature (Murphy & Woolfolk, 2000a, 286; see also Murphy, 2015, 26).  
In short, Murphy and Woolfolk think Wakefield’s black box essentialism has two 
components: 
1. We can know that a kind is a natural kind without knowing what the real essence 
of the kind is. 
2. We can know whether something falls within the natural kind without knowing 
what the real essence of the kind is. This is because natural kinds are constrained 
by ordinary language.  
I am not convinced that Wakefield’s black box essentialism includes the second 
component.172 I think that Wakefield might be a black box essentialist without claiming 
that the natural kind is constrained by ordinary language. That is, I am not convinced 
that Wakefield is a conservative naturalist. For example, one could claim a) we can 
know that water is a natural kind without knowing the real essence of water, without 
claiming b) that all the stuff we ordinarily call water must fall within the natural kind 
water. I am not convinced that Wakefield is a conservative naturalist because, at 
multiple points in his response to Murphy and Woolfolk, Wakefield hints that while our 
intuitions provide a starting point for investigating natural kinds, intuitions are not 
hegemonic i.e. they can be overturned by empirical evidence. If correct, this would make 
                                                          
mental disorder (if it is caused by a mismatched environment) and that Anti-Social Personality Disorder 
is not a mental disorder (if it is caused by bad input). For more on this see Pickering, 2003.  
(Thank you to the overseas examiner for pointing out that there is a debate concerning whether intuition 
drives function-status or vice versa.) 
172 This includes both sentences of the second component i.e. that we cannot know whether something 
falls within a natural kind without knowing the real essence thereof, because natural kinds are 
constrained by ordinary language.  
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Wakefield a revisionist naturalist, as opposed to a conservative naturalist. 173 For 
example, Wakefield says,  
Local values sometimes reflect the most accessible evidence we have 
so we use it as a first approximation. We often go wrong as a result 
(Wakefield, 2000a, 265, my emphasis).  
He also says that his sadness-generator example (which theorises that some sadness 
might be designed for) is not a polished theory, and,  
It does make some assumptions (based on evidence from the 
psychology of emotions) about sadness as a designed response that 
could turn out to be incorrect. … Local values about what is appropriate 
must enter into the consideration of what is proportional … but the use 
of local proportions is merely part of a provisional (fallible) theory of 
local indicators of function and dysfunction (Wakefield, 2000a, 266, my 
emphasis). 
Likewise, Wakefield says of dyslexia that,  
The failure to learn to read under the right circumstances leads one to 
believe that the most plausible (but still of course possibly incorrect) 
hypothesis is one of dysfunction (Wakefield, 2000a, 267, my 
emphasis). 
These three quotes suggest that Wakefield does not think that natural kinds are 
constrained by ordinary language. Our intuitions are a ‘first approximation’ and 
‘fallible’. Murphy and Woolfolk claim that Wakefield is not carrying out traditional 
conceptual analysis, but that he is carrying out a new sort of conceptual analysis in 
which folk theories (i.e. ordinary language) is incorporated into scientific theories 
(Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 287). Traditionally, ordinary language theorists thought 
that science (i.e. empirical research) was not directly relevant to conceptual analysis. 
For example, as bachelor means unmarried, adult male, science could not find that there 
was a married bachelor. As Murphy and Woolfolk say, “empirical research could not 
discover anything germane to the question whether bachelors were married” (Murphy 
and Woolfolk, 2000a, 286). As explained in section one of chapter five, ordinary 
language theorists do not consider this to be an attack on science, but say that 
                                                          
173 Put another way, methodological black box essentialism (which is aligned with revisionist naturalism) 
claims that intuitions provide a starting point for whether something is included within a natural kind.  In 
contrast, metaphysical black box essentialism (which is aligned with conservative naturalism) claims that 
intuitions fix the extension of a natural kind. Murphy and Woolfolk claim that Wakefield is both a 
methodological and metaphysical black box essentialist. I say that Wakefield might only be a 
methodological black box essentialist.  
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philosophy is concerned with conceptual analysis whereas science is concerned with 
discovering the facts.  
Ordinary language theorists claim that science is not directly relevant to concepts such 
as bachelor (which is not a natural kind). Conservative naturalists who are doing 
traditional conceptual analysis take this position in a slightly different direction and 
claim that science is not directly relevant to natural kinds i.e. that empirical evidence 
cannot tell us about the extension of a natural kind. Murphy and Woolfolk say that 
Wakefield is not doing this traditional conceptual analysis, which allows Wakefield to 
appeal to science to determine the extension of a natural kind. Instead, Murphy and 
Woolfolk claim that Wakefield is carrying out a new conceptual analysis in which,  
our commonsense theories of the world functionally define their 
theoretical concepts by specifying roles that they must satisfy. Science 
then discovers whatever it is in the world that satisfies the functional 
role specified by the folk theory. Science thus solves what Jackson 
(1998) calls “the location problem”: fitting our commonsense beliefs 
into the scientific fabric of the world (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 
288). 
Murphy and Woolfolk explain Wakefield’s erratic appeal to empirical findings (as 
evidenced in the quotations above) by claiming that Wakefield is carrying out this new 
type of conceptual analysis. On this new conceptual analysis, ordinary language 
constrains natural kinds. People doing this sort of conceptual analysis claim that this is 
not anti-scientific because, according to them, reality is not hidden by our everyday 
categories i.e. that science does not represent reality more accurately than everyday 
categories. The opposing view, as discussed in section six of this chapter, is that 
ordinary language does not necessarily map on to natural kinds and so ordinarily 
language obstructs a clear view on reality. On this new conceptual analysis, ordinary 
language is not just a heuristic device but is hegemonic i.e. ordinary language constrains 
natural kinds. The three quotations from Wakefield above suggest that he does not 
think that ordinary language is hegemonic. In turn, this suggests that Wakefield is not 
carrying out this new method of conceptual analysis i.e. that Wakefield is not a 
conservative naturalist doing this new type of conceptual analysis. On the other hand, 
Wakefield does say that the dysfunction-status (dysfunction being a natural kind) of a 
condition is obvious from surface features (Wakefield, 1997c, 256). Wakefield cannot 
both claim that we can know the dysfunction-status of a condition and that this 
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‘knowledge’ is fallible. Wakefield either has to claim that we can a) know the 
dysfunction-status of a condition based on surface features (conservative naturalism) or 
b) make the strong hypothesis that a condition is caused by a dysfunction, but admit 
that this hypothesis is fallible (revisionist naturalism). Murphy and Woolfolk think that 
Wakefield takes the first approach (in which ordinary language is hegemonic i.e. 
constrains science). However, I maintain that it is not clear which of these options 
Wakefield takes.   
An additional argument which supports the view that Wakefield might not be a 
conservative naturalist is that Kripke and Putnam are not conservative naturalists but 
revisionist naturalists. As Wakefield uses Kripke and Putnam’s account of natural kinds, 
if he wants to remain true to their account, then nor would Wakefield be a conservative 
naturalist. That Kripke and Putnam are revisionist naturalists is evidenced by their 
argument that if there were some stuff that had all the superficial or ordinary properties 
of water (i.e. stuff that was a clear, potable liquid found in lakes and rivers and so on), 
but this stuff was not H2O, then that stuff would not fall within the natural kind water 
(Putnam, 1973; 1975; see also section four of chapter six). That is, if such stuff were 
found then the way water is used in ordinary language would need to be revised to 
exclude this stuff.  
Whether Wakefield is a conservative naturalist is not pivotal to my argument. That is, 
whether Wakefield is a conservative naturalist does not determine whether 
conservative or revisionist naturalism will show that conditions such as homosexuality 
do not fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) (criterion 2.2), and 
that this applies across all societies (criterion 2.1). This question – whether 
conservative naturalism might meet both criteria – is considered in the next section.  
4. Advantages of Conservative Naturalism  
In the developed world, homosexuality is not ordinarily called a mental disorder by 
health professionals and informed lay-people. Hence, a potential way of ensuring that 
homosexuality does not fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) is 
to claim that the extension of the natural kind dysfunction is constrained by the way 
dysfunction is used in ordinary language i.e. to adopt conservative naturalism. That is 
conservative naturalism might meet criterion 2.2. By adopting conservative naturalism, 
the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) would necessarily be co-extensive 
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with the way dysfunction is used in ordinary language. All conditions that are included 
within the way dysfunction is used in ordinary language will be included in the natural 
kind dysfunction. Equally, all conditions that are excluded from the way dysfunction is 
used in ordinary language will be excluded from the natural kind dysfunction.  
That conservative naturalism means that natural kinds are co-extensive with ordinary 
language leads to two further advantages. The first is that a natural kind and its 
ordinary language counterpart refer to the same thing (or set of things). In other words, 
the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) cannot stray so far from the way in 
which it is ordinarily used that the talk is no longer of dysfunction (as it is ordinarily 
used) but of something else i.e. something with a new intension and/or extension. In 
contrast, as explained in the following section, on revisionist naturalism, it is possible 
that the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) will no longer refer to the same 
thing or set of things as the ordinary extension of dysfunction.  
The second advantage is that conservative naturalism means that the pragmatic link 
between mental disorder and medical treatment will be retained. Chapter four showed 
that there is a pragmatic link between medical treatment and the way mental disorder is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay people i.e. that only mental 
disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders. Conservative 
naturalism means that the natural kind dysfunction is co-extensive with the way 
dysfunction is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay people. For 
example, if dyslexia is ordinarily thought of as being caused by a dysfunction, then it 
must fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). In turn, dyslexia 
might be a mental disorder, and may be medically treated on this basis. Likewise, 
conservative naturalism means that if homosexuality is not ordinarily thought of as 
being caused by a dysfunction, then it cannot fall within the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) and so cannot fall within the ordinary clinical sense of mental 
disorder. In turn, homosexuality may not be medically treated on the basis of being a 
mental disorder. More generally, as, a) the natural kind dysfunction is a necessary 
component of mental disorder, and b) conservative naturalism means that only those 
things that are ordinarily considered to be caused by a dysfunction can be included in 
the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists), then it follows that mental disorder 
(as ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people) includes only 
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those conditions that are ordinarily considered to be caused by dysfunctions.174 While 
the pragmatic link is between the ordinary clinical sense of mental disorder and medical 
treatment, conservative naturalism means that the natural kind dysfunction (presuming 
it exists) will only include those conditions that would ordinarily be called mental 
disorders. Hence, the pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical treatment 
would remain. (While this is an advantage of conservative naturalism, the next section 
shows that revisionist naturalism does not forsake the pragmatic link.)  
In short, the advantage of conservative naturalism is that the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) is co-extensive with the way dysfunction is ordinarily used – the 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) and the ordinary use of dysfunction refer 
to the same set of things. This means, for example, since homosexuality is not ordinarily 
considered to be caused by a dysfunction in the developed world, homosexuality cannot 
fall with the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists), and in turn, homosexuality 
can neither be a mental disorder nor be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder. In this way, the pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical 
treatment is retained (only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of 
being mental disorders), and so conservative naturalism might safeguard against the 
medical treatment of homosexuality.  
To safeguard against the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality on the 
basis that these conditions are not disorders, it must be shown that these conditions are 
not mental disorders in any society. That is, it must be shown that the extension of 
mental disorder is static between societies and excludes these conditions i.e. both 
criteria 2.1 and 2.2 must be met. This section has shown that conservative naturalism 
means that the extension of mental disorder will exclude these conditions. (Section six of 
this chapter will show that conservative naturalism cannot provide an extension of 
mental disorder that is static between societies.) The following section considers 
whether revisionist naturalism will show that these conditions are not mental 
disorders.  
                                                          
174 To be a mental disorder, a condition must be both harmful and be caused by a dysfunction. Hence, not 
all conditions that we ordinarily think of as being caused by dysfunctions are disorders, for example, 
Regard and Landis’ (1997) gourmand lesion.  
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5. Disadvantages of Revisionist Naturalism 
For the most part, the advantages of conservative naturalism concerning the natural 
kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) are the disadvantages of revisionist naturalism 
concerning the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists), and vice versa. As will be 
shown, an exception is the pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical 
treatment – both conservative and revisionist naturalism might retain the pragmatic 
link. This section shows that revisionist naturalism is disadvantageous (regarding 
safeguarding against the medical treatment of homosexuality), insofar as the natural 
kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) might not be co-extensive with the way 
dysfunction is ordinarily used. In other worlds, the two might not refer to the same set of 
things. This means that revisionist naturalism might not meet criterion 2.2. The section 
then shows that revisionist naturalism can retain the pragmatic link between mental 
disorder and medical treatment (so long as mental disorder does not fall out of common 
parlance).  
According to revisionist naturalism, a natural kind is not constrained by the way a 
concept is used in ordinary language. Hence, the natural kind dysfunction (presuming 
dysfunction is a natural kind) might not be co-extensive with the way dysfunction is 
used in ordinary language. Homosexuality, for example, might fall within the natural 
kind dysfunction even though it is not ordinarily considered to be caused by a 
dysfunction in the developed world. In turn, homosexuality might be a mental disorder 
and medically treated on this basis. In this way, revisionist naturalism would not 
safeguard against the medical treatment of homosexuality (on the basis that it is not a 
mental disorder). Revisionist naturalism does not allow us to pick and choose what is 
included or excluded from the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). It does not 
meet criterion 2.2. In contrast, conservative naturalism does meet criterion 2.2, as that 
the extension of a natural kind is constrained by ordinary language, and in this sense, 
we can choose what is included within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it 
exists). Hence, conservative naturalism might safeguard against homosexuality being a 
mental disorder, and being medically treated on this basis.  
As explained in the previous section, conservative naturalism means that the extension 
of dysfunction cannot stray so far from its ordinary use that the two no longer refer to 
the same thing i.e. that the talk is no longer of dysfunction (as it is ordinarily used) but of 
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something else. This is not necessarily the case for revisionist naturalism – the natural 
kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) might stray so far from the way dysfunction is 
ordinarily used, that the talk might no longer be of dysfunction (as it is ordinarily used), 
but something else (Murphy, 2015, 7). For example, imagine the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it is a natural kind) excludes depression and cancer. According 
to revisionist naturalism, depression and cancer would not be caused by a dysfunction 
even though they are ordinarily considered to be caused by a dysfunction. Equally, if the 
natural kind dysfunction includes happiness and intelligence, then according to 
revisionist naturalism, happiness and intelligence are caused by a dysfunction even 
though they are not ordinarily considered to be caused by a dysfunction. If this 
discrepancy happens multiple times, then the natural kind dysfunction might not mean 
the same thing as the way dysfunction is ordinarily used.  
Murphy does not specify how far the ordinary meaning of a concept might stray before 
it becomes ‘too far’. That is, he does not isolate the point at which the talk is no longer 
about dysfunction175 (as it is ordinarily used) but something else. In Murphy’s defence, it 
would be incredibly difficult to isolate such a point. Saying that the natural kind has 
strayed too far from ordinary language, if mental disorder falls out of the common 
vernacular (see section two of chapter five) does not help as there is no single point at 
which a concept will fall out of the common vernacular. It could be said that the talk is 
no longer about dysfunction (i.e. the ordinary language concept) in cases in which a 
natural kind no longer refers to substantially the same set of things as the ordinary use. 
But what does ‘substantially’ mean? That is, how much overlap does there need to be 
between the extension of the way dysfunction is ordinarily used (by health professionals 
and informed lay-people) and the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists)? Has 
the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) strayed too far if only ninety percent 
of the types of conditions that fall within the ordinary extension of dysfunction fall 
within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) or vice versa? Or is eighty 
percent more acceptable? I do not solve this problem on behalf of Murphy, but merely 
wish to point out that his claim ought, at some point, to be refined.  
                                                          
175 Murphy discusses the point at which the talk is no longer about mental disorder (rather than 
dysfunction). However, Murphy’s point can be applied to any concept/natural kind pair.  
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To return to my initial point, the revisionist natural kind dysfunction (presuming it 
exists) might stray so far from the way dysfunction is ordinarily used, that the two no 
longer refer to the same thing. If this occurs, then the pragmatic link between mental 
disorder and medical treatment might dissolve. For example, dyslexia, ADHD and anti-
social personality disorder are all ordinarily called mental disorders, and so must fall 
within the ordinary clinical sense of dysfunction i.e. these conditions must be caused by 
a dysfunction. If these three conditions do not fall within the natural kind dysfunction 
(which, according to the revisionist naturalist, is not constrained by ordinary language), 
then these conditions cannot fall within the extension of dysfunction. (In turn, these 
conditions cannot be mental disorders.) The extension of the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) will stray so far from the way dysfunction is ordinarily used, that 
we might stop using dysfunction altogether. In turn, we might stop using mental disorder 
altogether. In other words, if the extension of mental disorder excluded many things that 
we take to be paradigm examples of mental disorders and include many thinks that we 
would not ordinarily call mental disorders, then mental disorder might fall out of the 
common vernacular. If so, the pragmatic link between it and medical treatment cannot 
survive – we could not claim that only mental disorders may be medically treated on the 
basis of being mental disorders. In contrast, as conservative naturalism means that 
natural kinds are constrained by ordinary language, dysfunction (and in turn, mental 
disorder) is unlikely to fall out of the common vernacular. Hence, the pragmatic link 
might be retained. 
It could also be argued that even if we keep using mental disorder, the pragmatic link 
might dissolve if the meaning has strayed too far from its ordinary use. However, this is 
not the case. The pragmatic link will not dissolve if conditions that are not ordinarily 
considered to be caused by dysfunctions (e.g. homosexuality) are included within the 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). Even if homosexuality falls within the 
natural kind dysfunction, it is not a mental disorder unless it is disvalued (and is mental 
as opposed to physical). In the developed world (in which homosexuality is not 
disvalued), it would remain the case that homosexuality is not a mental disorder and so 
may not be medically treated on this basis. Hence, the pragmatic link would remain. Of 
course, in societies in which homosexuality is disvalued (and if homosexuality is mental 
as opposed to physical), then it would be a mental disorder. The pragmatic link would 
not dissolve in societies that disvalue homosexuality. Queer-friendly people like myself 
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might want the pragmatic link to dissolve (because they do not disvalue 
homosexuality), but the pragmatic link would not dissolve. While revisionist naturalism 
might not safeguard against the medical treatment of homosexuality, this is not because 
the pragmatic link has dissolved. Instead, it is because, in these societies, homosexuality 
is a mental disorder, and so may be medically treated on this basis. 
Nor will the pragmatic link dissolve if conditions that are ordinarily thought of as being 
caused by dysfunctions (e.g. dyslexia) are not included in the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists). This is because the pragmatic link, as I have outlined it, is that 
‘only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders’. 
It does not say ‘only mental disorders may be medically treated’. Hence, even if dyslexia 
is not a mental disorder, it may still be medically treated – it just cannot be medically 
treated on the basis that it is a mental disorder.176 The pragmatic link between mental 
disorder and medical treatment would remain even if many conditions that we 
ordinarily called mental disorders were found not to be caused by a dysfunction. That is, 
it would still be the case that mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of 
being mental disorders.177 Even though the pragmatic link would not dissolve if 
conditions that are ordinarily thought to be caused by a dysfunction do not fall within 
the natural kind dysfunction, the pragmatic link might become less useful. If all mental 
disorders may be medically treated and many non-disorders may be medically treated, 
then it could be argued that there is little point in determining the disorder-status of a 
condition. Instead, what is important is whether the medical treatment fulfills the 
standard bioethical criteria (see section five of chapter three) or whether the treatment 
passes muster according to values-based medicine.  
To summarise, revisionist naturalism means that the extension of a natural kind might 
differ from the way a concept is ordinarily used. The natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) might stray so far from the ordinary use thereof, that the talk is no 
longer of dysfunction (as ordinarily used) but something else. (Revisionist naturalism 
means that criterion 2.2 might not be met.) In turn, the meaning of mental disorder 
might stray so far from the ordinary use thereof, that the talk is no longer of mental 
                                                          
176 Alternately, we might accept that dyslexia is not a mental disorder and so may not be medically treated 
on this basis. In this case, the pragmatic link would remain. 
177 See section 4.3 of chapter four in which it is shown that a condition’s being a disorder is sufficient but 
not necessary to establish a pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment.  
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disorder (as ordinarily used) but something else. In contrast, conservative naturalism 
does not face these problems – it meets criterion 2.2. Conservative naturalism also 
retains the pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical treatment. However, I 
have shown that unless mental disorder falls out of the common vernacular, revisionist 
naturalism will also maintain the pragmatic link. 
To safeguard against the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality on the 
basis that these conditions are not disorders, it must be shown that these conditions are 
not mental disorders in any society (criterion 2.1). Revisionist naturalism cannot ensure 
that the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) will be co-extensive with 
ordinary language. In turn, revisionist naturalism cannot ensure the second condition is 
met i.e. that conditions such as homosexuality do not fall within the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it exists). Hence, these conditions might be mental disorders, 
and if so, they may be medically treated on this basis. Given the desire to exclude 
homosexuality from the medical sphere, this is a major problem for my application of  
revisionist naturalism.  
6. Disadvantages of Conservative Naturalism and Advantages of Revisionist 
Naturalism 
 The main disadvantage of conservative naturalism is that the extension of natural kinds 
might not be static between societies i.e. it might not meet criterion 2.1. This is because, 
as will be shown in this section, conservative naturalism cannot account for scientific 
findings, at least, until the science is incorporated into ordinary language. As a) the 
ordinary extension of a concept might change between societies, and b) conservative 
naturalism means that natural kinds are constrained by ordinary language, it follows 
that the extension of conservative natural kinds might change between societies. For 
example, in a society that does not ordinarily consider homosexuality to be caused by a 
dysfunction, then in that society, homosexuality cannot fall within the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it exists). In contrast, if homosexuality is ordinarily considered 
to be caused by a dysfunction in society χ, then in society χ, homosexuality must fall 
within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). In society χ, homosexuality 
might be a mental disorder and medically treated on this basis. Section four explained 
that the main advantage of conservative naturalism is that it can ensure that conditions 
such as homosexuality will not fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it 
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exists) in societies in which these conditions are not ordinarily called MENTAL 
DISORDERS or considered to be caused by dysfunctions i.e. it will meet criterion 2.2. 
Nonetheless, as conservative naturalism will not fix the extension of the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it exists), it does not fulfil the second criterion – it cannot 
safeguard against the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality on the 
basis that they are not mental disorders. In other words, this section shows that even if 
dysfunction picks out a conservative natural kind, this cannot ensure that conditions 
such as homosexuality are not mental disorders in any society.  
As mentioned earlier, for the most part, the disadvantages of conservative naturalism 
are the advantages of revisionist naturalism (as they relate to safeguarding against the 
medical treatment of homosexuality) and vice versa. Hence, an advantage of revisionist 
naturalism (for my purposes) is that it ensures that the extension of natural kinds is 
static between societies. This means that the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it 
exists) will be static between societies (criterion 2.1). In turn, it can be determined for 
once and for all whether homosexuality falls within the natural kind dysfunction, and 
whether it might be a mental disorder. However, revisionist naturalism cannot ensure 
that homosexuality is excluded from the natural kind dysfunction because we cannot 
pick and choose what is included or excluded from a natural kind (criterion 2.2). Even if 
dysfunction picks out a revisionist natural kind, this cannot ensure that conditions such 
as homosexuality are not mental disorders in any society. 
Let us look at the claim that revisionist naturalism means that the extensions of natural 
kinds are static. According to revisionist naturalism, whether something falls within a 
natural kind is not constrained by ordinary language, but is based on scientific evidence. 
For example, let’s say that fish is a natural kind and that all fish are ‘gill-bearing aquatic 
craniate animals that lack limbs with digits’ i.e. this is the real essence of the natural 
kind fish. This means that for a creature to be a fish it must, amongst other things, have 
gills. At one point, whales were thought to have gills and so whales were ordinarily 
considered to be fish. Scientists then found that whales do not have gills but lungs. A 
revisionist naturalist would say that fish is still a natural kind and it still has the same 
essence, but that the extension of the natural kind fish must exclude whales. That is, a 
revisionist would revise the extension of the natural kind fish to exclude whales. A 
revisionist would also revise the extension of the natural kind mammal (presuming it 
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exists) to include whales.178 In other words, a revisionist naturalist would use the 
scientific evidence to show that the extension of fish (as it was ordinarily used in the 
past) is not co-extensive with the natural kind fish. As explained in section four of 
chapter five, according to Kripke and Putnam’s account of natural kinds, natural kinds 
are demarcated using their real essence, and the real essence of a natural kind is the 
same across all possible worlds (Kripke, 1980, 48). This shows that Kripke and Putnam 
are revisionists regarding natural kinds. For example, if fish is a natural kind, and the 
real essence thereof is along the lines of ‘gill-bearing aquatic craniate animals that lack 
limbs with digits’, then this is the case in all possible worlds. Hence, the extension of the 
revisionist natural kind fish is static across all societies. By analogy, the extension of the 
revisionist natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) would also be static across 
societies.  
According to revisionist naturalists, science determines the real essence of a natural 
kind. Science also determines whether something possesses the real essence i.e. science 
determines membership of the natural kind.179 While revisionist naturalists claim that 
natural kinds are not constrained by ordinary language, this does not mean that 
ordinary language is irrelevant to the extension of natural kinds. Ordinary language 
provides a starting point to determine whether a kind is a natural kind. As Murphy says, 
scientific and ordinary language uses of a concept are not  
“fully independent, since the development of science influences everyday 
thought, and many scientific concepts begin in prescientific contexts and carry 
the marks of those origins deep into their careers” (Murphy, 2015, 7).  
However, revisionist naturalists say ordinary language is only a heuristic device. 
Ordinary language might reflect an intuition about whether a kind is a natural kind and 
what the extension of the natural kind is, but it cannot prove or disprove either of these 
things. That is, for revisionist naturalists, ordinary language is not hegemonic – ordinary 
                                                          
178 ‘Mammal’ is not italicised because I am not considering the concept mammal, but the set ‘mammals’ 
itself.  
179 Revisionist naturalists do not necessarily claim that the way a concept is used in ordinary language 
should be changed to be co-extensive with a natural kind. For example, if there were some stuff that we 
would ordinarily call water, but this stuff is not H2O, then that stuff would not fall within the natural kind 
water. However, we might still call this stuff water in ordinary language.  
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language is trumped by scientific evidence (Murphy, 2015, 25; see also Murphy and 
Woolfolk, 2000a, 289).  
As explained in section one of chapter five, ordinary language theorists claim that 
science is not directly relevant to concepts that are not natural kinds such as bachelor 
(see also section 3.1 of this chapter). Ordinary language theorists argue that philosophy 
is concerned with conceptual analysis; whereas science is concerned with discovering 
the facts. I agree with the ordinary language theorists that empirical evidence is 
irrelevant to the extension of non-natural kinds such as bachelor. The extension of 
bachelor must be based on the way it is ordinarily used. To say there is a married 
bachelor would be to misunderstand the meaning of bachelor. Conservative naturalists 
take this position further, and claim that science is not directly relevant to natural kinds 
i.e. that empirical evidence cannot tell us about the extension of a natural kind. A 
conservative naturalist would maintain that during the time in which whales were 
considered to be fish, whales were fish i.e. that the natural kind fish (presuming it is a 
natural kind) must include whales. The conservative naturalist would also say that the 
natural kind mammal (presuming it is a natural kind) cannot include whales. For the 
conservative naturalist, whales would remain in the natural kind fish in spite of the 
scientific evidence that whales do not have gills. The conservative naturalist would not 
revise the extension of the natural kind fish (presuming it is a natural kind) based on 
the scientific finding that whales do not have gills. A conservative naturalist would 
either change the real essence of the natural kind fish so that it included whales, or say 
that fish cannot pick out a natural kind.180 Conservative naturalists ignore the scientific 
evidence about the natural kind fish (presuming it is a natural kind) for purely 
conceptual reasons – it is decided ‘from the armchair’ that whales must be fish. The 
conservative naturalist would maintain that this is not anti-scientific because, according 
to them, our ordinary use of fish does not hide reality i.e. that science does not reflect 
the real world more precisely than ordinary language.  
While conservative naturalists claim that science is not directly relevant to the 
extension of natural kinds, scientific findings might be indirectly relevant if they lead us 
to change the use of the word. For example, that ‘whales do not have gills, but lungs’ has 
                                                          
180 Finding that whales (and other creatures such as lungfish (Zachar, 2000, 176)) do not have gills is 
unlikely to be sufficient to show that fish is not a natural kind. 
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led us to exclude whales from the ordinary language extension of fish. In turn, the 
extension of the natural kind fish (presuming it is a natural kind) now excludes whales. 
Equally, that ‘whales do not have gills, but lungs’ has led us to ordinarily call whales 
mammals. Hence, the extension of the natural kind mammal (presuming it is a natural 
kind) now includes whales.  But why should we wait until science becomes part of 
ordinary language to revise the extension of the natural kind? If whales do not have 
gills, then whales should be excluded from the natural kind fish straight away. We 
should not have to wait until ordinary language evolves in such a way that whales are 
not ordinarily called fish before we can say that the natural kind fish excludes whales. In 
contrast, a revisionist naturalist does not have to wait for ordinary language to change 
to account for the scientific findings. 
So far, it has been shown that conservative naturalism cannot account for scientific 
evidence (at least, until that evidence has been incorporated into ordinary language). 
Conservative naturalists claim that this is not anti-scientific because ordinary language 
does not hide reality i.e. that ordinary language maps on to the real world. I shall now 
show this to be false, or, at least, highly questionable. In some cases, our common-sense 
categories will be co-extensive with natural kinds. For example, everything that we 
ordinarily call water falls within the natural kind water. However, in many cases, 
common sense categories will not be co-extensive with natural kinds. For example, the 
way we use jade in ordinary language is two different natural kinds, namely jadeite and 
nephrite. While jadeite and nephrite produce minerals that appear very similar, jadeite 
is a combination of sodium and magnesium and nephrite is constituted of calcium, 
magnesium and iron (Putnam, 1975, 241). For a further example, water is a natural 
kind, but it is not intuitively clear that steam, ice and a single molecule of H2O fall within 
the natural kind water. 
 
A conservative naturalist might respond that jade is a single natural kind that includes 
both jadeite and nephrite. In turn, the conservative naturalist would maintain that 
ordinary language does map on to natural kinds. Conservative naturalists would say 
that this is acceptable because ordinary language tells us how nature is really organised 
i.e. that ordinary language does not obstruct a clear view on reality. I disagree. Instead, 
like Murphy and Woolfolk, I claim there is little reason to suppose that our ordinary 
language categories always conform to natural kinds (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000, 
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247).181 Sometimes ordinary language will conform to natural kinds (e.g. water), but to 
claim that an ordinary language category is co-extensive with a natural kind would be to 
make a substantial empirical bet. Conservative naturalists claim that their position is 
that natural kinds exist in the world, and ordinary language reflects these natural kinds. 
In contrast, what conservative naturalists really do, is to start with the way a concept is 
used in ordinary language, and claim that natural kinds reflect ordinary language. 
Moreover, that conservative naturalism cannot account for scientific findings at the time 
at which they are made puts conservative naturalism on shaky grounds. Ordinary 
language should not constrain the extension of natural kinds because to do so would not 
give science its deserved credence. Conservative naturalism merely pays lip-service to 
science. As Murphy and Woolfolk point out, conservative naturalism means that in cases 
in which “science agrees with folk-theory, it is to be commended, and where it does not, 
it is to be criticized” (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 291). I agree with Murphy and 
Woolfolk that this puts unnecessary and unfavourable restrictions on the scientific 
enterprise. 
 
Let us now consider how conservative and revisionist naturalism would be applied to 
dysfunction. A conservative naturalist would say the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it is a natural kind) must include all and only those conditions we ordinarily 
think of as caused by a dysfunction. Conservative naturalists acknowledge that 
empirical evidence might be indirectly relevant to the extension of the natural kind 
dysfunction (and in turn the extension of mental disorder) if the empirical evidence led 
to changes in ordinary language. Revisionist naturalists would say that a condition can 
fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it is a natural kind) regardless of 
whether it is ordinarily considered to be caused by a dysfunction. Revisionist 
naturalism can account for science immediately – without having to wait for the science 
to be incorporated into ordinary language. 
 
Conservative naturalism might have unpalatable consequences for the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it is a natural kind). In nineteenth century Russia, epilepsy was 
                                                          
181 Unless conservative naturalism is accepted, then we cannot know that a kind is a natural kind without 
knowing the real essence. That is, if conservative naturalism is rejected, then black box essentialism is 




not ordinarily considered to be caused by a dysfunction, but was seen as a sign of 
holiness (Ruse, 1981, 149). Advances in medical science means that we now know that 
epilepsy is caused by a dysfunction. Conservative naturalists in societies that do not 
ordinarily consider epilepsy to be caused by a dysfunction would have to maintain that 
epilepsy does not fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it is a natural 
kind) in spite of the scientific evidence.182 They would have to ignore the scientific 
evidence purely for conceptual reasons. I agree with Murphy that whether a condition is 
caused by a dysfunction is not to be decided ‘from the armchair’ (Murphy, 2015, 26, see 
also Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000a, 286). Instead, to determine whether a condition is 
functional or not, we need to do science and scientific findings might result in common 
sense (i.e. ordinary language) being contradicted.183Equally, some societies ordinarily 
think of (or thought of) homosexuality as being caused by a dysfunction. Even if 
scientists find that homosexuality is not caused by a dysfunction, conservative 
naturalists in these societies must maintain that homosexuality falls within the natural 
kind dysfunction (presuming it is a natural kind) in spite of the scientific evidence. Once 
again, the scientific evidence would be ignored for conceptual, not empirical, reasons.184  
A further problem for conservative naturalism is that it leaves the natural kind 
dysfunction (presuming it exists) open to be used for the purpose of social control. It is 
likely that the fact that we disvalue some condition influences the fact that the condition 
is ordinarily thought of as being caused by a dysfunction. That is, the logical positivists 
claim that ‘sciences and values are independent’ might be wrong – science might be 
influenced by values.185 186 If so, conservative naturalism means that the natural kind 
                                                          
182 The conservative naturalist could not account for the scientific evidence until that epilepsy is caused 
by a dysfunction has become part of ordinary language.  
183 Murphy claims that the way health-concepts, such as mental disorder, are used in ordinary language 
are too muddled to constrain science (Murphy, 2015, 13; see also Murphy 2006). (Note the similarity here 
with Aucouturier and Demazeux’s (2014) claim that mental disorder is not unified in either ordinary 
language or in in scientific settings.) Yet, even if the way mental disorder were used in ordinary language 
were well-defined, Murphy says the ordinary language definition of mental disorder should not constrain 
the real essence of the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) (Murphy, 2015; 2006; see also 
Murphy & Woolfolk, 2000a).  
184 It could be found that homosexuality falls within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). 
This is not problematic for the revisionist naturalist (i.e. my application of revisionist naturalism) because 
even though homosexuality would fall within the natural kind dysfunction, unless it is disvalued, then 
homosexuality cannot be a mental disorder.   
185 Quine, 1951. See section five of chapter six, and Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000, 246 c.f. Wakefield, 2001, 
35. See also Nordby, 2006; Goldenberg, 2006, 2624; Zita, 1988, 79; Longino, 1983; Franklin and Perovic, 
2015 and Cooper, 2005, 88. See  
186 The value-status of a condition could also be influenced in the other direction – values might be 
influenced by science. We might find (in a value-free way) that some condition is caused by a dysfunction, 
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dysfunction will be evaluative and culturally relative i.e. it will not really be a natural 
kind. In contrast, revisionist naturalism means that scientific evidence can override our 
ordinary categories, and so even if values do influence dysfunction-status, these values 
are not hegemonic i.e. they do not determine the function-status of a condition. 
(Whether a revisionist naturalist can completely purge the values is debatable. See, for 
example, section six of chapter five.) Wakefield critiques Sedgwick’s purely normative 
(value-laden) definition of mental illness as it means that mental illness is 
A completely value and culture-relative notion with no scientific 
content whatsoever, thereby leaving the concept open to 
unconstrained use for purposes of social control (Wakefield, 1992, 
376).  
Wakefield implies that while Sedgwick’s account of mental illness has “no scientific 
content whatsoever”, his account of disorder does have scientific content (Wakefield, 
1992, 376). However, if Wakefield is a conservative naturalist, then nor is his account of 
dysfunction scientific. His approach would also leave the concept of mental 
disorder open to social control.  In societies that ordinarily consider homosexuality to be 
caused by a dysfunction, homosexuality would fall within the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists). In turn, homosexuality might be a mental disorder and may be 
medically treated on this basis. 
On the other hand, as explained in the previous section, a major problem for revisionist 
naturalism, at least for my purposes, is that it cannot ensure that conditions such as 
homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political dissident will 
not be mental disorders (criterion 2.2). While revisionist naturalism will provide a static 
extension of the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists)187, we cannot pick and 
choose which conditions we want to be included in or excluded from the natural kind. In 
addition, if science has no obligation to respect ordinary language, then the natural kind 
might stray so far from the way in which it is ordinarily used that the two do not refer to 
                                                          
which biases people towards disvaluing that condition. For example, it might be that homosexuality is 
caused by a dysfunction (see, for example, Cooper, 2005, 18; 2002, 269 c.f. Wilson, 1978; 1975). If so, we 
may begin to disvalue homosexuality i.e. to consider homosexuality to be harmful. It might be rebutted 
that this is a non-sequitur due to the divide between ‘is’ statements and ‘ought’ statements. However, in 
practice, it is possible that once a condition is known to be caused by a dysfunction, it will slowly become 
disvalued.  
187 If dysfunction picks out a natural kind, then it can be shown whether a condition (such as 




the same thing (Murphy, 2015, 7). If this were to occur, then dysfunction and mental 
disorder could drop out of the common vernacular which would mean that the 
pragmatic link between mental disorder and medical treatment would be forsaken.188 
There are a few options at this point. Firstly, revisionist naturalists could maintain that 
this does not matter – the natural kind should not be constrained by ordinary language 
in any respect. 189 This approach does not avoid the problem that natural kinds and 
ordinary language might not refer to the same thing. Hence, this approach might risk 
dysfunction falling out of ordinary language altogether, which would result in the 
pragmatic link being forsaken.  Secondly, revisionist naturalism could avoid this 
problem (that natural kinds and ordinary language might not refer to the same thing) 
by allowing natural kinds to be constrained by ordinary language to the extent that the 
two refer to the same thing. The problem with this approach, as mentioned in the 
previous section, is that it would be difficult to specify this point. Moreover, it is not 
clear why revisionist naturalism should bow to ordinary language i.e. why it should be 
constrained by ordinary language in this respect. This point leads to the third option for 
revisionist naturalists, namely, to maintain that natural kinds should not be constrained 
by ordinary language even in this very minimal sense, but to acknowledge the difficulty 
by choosing a different word (i.e. rigid designator) to refer to the natural kind. For 
example, if scientists were to find that only half of the conditions we ordinarily think of 
as being caused by a dysfunction fall within the natural kind dysfunction (and that half 
of the conditions we do not ordinarily think of as being caused by a dysfunction fall 
within the natural kind), they could consider giving it a different name (i.e. rigid 
designator), such as ‘zysfunction’. The problem with this approach is that, in ordinary 
language, all mental disorders are disvalued mental dysfunctions. It is not the case that 
all mental disorders are disvalued mental zysfunctions. Hence, whether a condition is 
caused by a zysfunction is irrelevant to whether that condition is a mental disorder. For 
example, even if the natural kind zysfunction excludes homosexuality, then this is 
irrelevant to whether homosexuality is a mental disorder.  None of these options solve 
                                                          
188 As explained in the previous section, the pragmatic link will not dissolve if conditions that are not 
ordinarily considered to be caused by dysfunctions are included within the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists).  
189 At times, Murphy and Woolfolk claim that ordinary language should not constrain natural kinds at all. 
For example, they say, “science is under no obligation to respect our pre-theoretic beliefs” (Murphy and 
Woolfolk, 2000a, 272). However, this is not representative of the overall tone of their papers.  
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the problem potentially faced by revisionist naturalists i.e. that homosexuality might be 
a mental disorder. Instead, my aim here was only to point out the seemingly intractable 
problems posed by the tensions between revisionist naturalism and ordinary language.  
To summarise this section, the main disadvantage of conservative naturalism is that the 
extension of natural kinds might not be static between societies – it might not meet 
criterion 2.1. This is because the extension of ordinary language concepts such as 
dysfunction changes between societies and conservative naturalists claim that the 
extension of natural kinds are constrained by ordinary language i.e. conservative 
naturalists cannot account for scientific evidence until that evidence is incorporated 
into ordinary language. In contrast, revisionist naturalism means that the extension of a 
natural kind is static between societies. It can meet criterion 2.1. This is because 
revisionist naturalism claims that natural kinds are not constrained by ordinary 
language, and so it can account for scientific evidence without having to wait for 
ordinary language to catch up. Conservative naturalists say their position is not anti-
scientific because ordinary language does not hide reality i.e. ordinary language maps 
on to the real world. However, it is not the case that ordinary language always maps on 
to the world and the extension of a natural kind should not be determined ‘from the 
armchair’. Hence, in addition to not providing a static extension of natural kinds, 
conservative naturalism is anti-scientific.   
Revisionist naturalism is also problematic, for my purposes, as it might mean that 
conditions such as homosexuality fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it 
exists). It might not meet criterion 2.2. In turn, these conditions may be mental 
disorders, and medically treated on this basis. In addition, if the natural kind 
dysfunction strays too far from the way dysfunction is used in ordinary language, then 
dysfunction might fall out of use in ordinary language. If so, the pragmatic link between 
mental disorder and medical treatment might be lost.190  
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the implications of dysfunction being a natural kind i.e. 
whether it will help to show, for once and for all, that conditions such as homosexuality 
                                                          
190 The pragmatic link will not be lost if a) conditions that are not ordinarily considered to be caused by  
dysfunctions are included within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) or b) conditions that 
are ordinarily thought of as being caused by dysfunctions are not included in the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists).  
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are not mental disorders and so may not be medically treated on this basis. This led to 
the discussion between conservative naturalists (who claim that ordinary language 
constrains natural kinds) and revisionist naturalists (who deny conservative 
naturalism).  
The chapter first questioned Murphy and Woolfolk’s (2000; 2000a) claim that 
Wakefield is a conservative naturalist regarding dysfunction. They claim that 
Wakefield’s black box essentialism means that he is a conservative naturalist. I am not 
convinced that Wakefield is a conservative naturalist. He might be a revisionist 
naturalist. I presented a different interpretation of Wakefield’s black box essentialism in 
which he might not be a conservative naturalist. According to this interpretation 
Wakefield claims that ‘we can know that a kind is a natural kind without knowing what 
the real essence of the kind is’, without making the additional claim that ‘we can know 
whether something falls within the natural kind without knowing what the real essence 
of the kind is’.  
This chapter has considered whether conditions such as homosexuality are not mental 
disorders in any society. To be true, it must be shown that the extension of mental 
disorder  
2.1 Is static between societies, and 
2.2 Excludes conditions such as homosexuality.  
Neither conservative nor revisionist naturalism can meet both criteria 2.1 and 2.2. 
Conservative naturalism can maintain that conditions such as homosexuality cannot fall 
within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) in the developed world, and so 
cannot be a mental disorder in the developed world. That is, conservative naturalism 
meets criterion 2.2, at least in the developed world. However, conservative naturalism 
does not fulfil criterion 2.1. Conservative naturalism means that in a homophobic 
society, the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) might include homosexuality. 
Conservative naturalism does not show, for once and for all, that homosexuality does 
not fall within the natural kind dysfunction (and so cannot be a mental disorder). In 
contrast, if dysfunction picks out a revisionist natural kind, this might include conditions 
such as homosexuality. This because revisionist naturalism cannot pick what is included 
in a natural kind. Science tells us how nature is really organised, and that we want a 
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condition such as homosexuality to be excluded from the natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) is irrelevant to how nature is really organised. 191  Hence, even if 
dysfunction picks out a revisionist natural kind, then this may not fulfil criterion 2.2. 
However, if dysfunction picks out a revisionist natural kind, then this will provide an 
extension of dysfunction that is static between societies (criterion 2.1). In turn, the 
extension of mental disorder will be partly static between societies.  
Even if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, neither conservative naturalism nor 
revisionist naturalism allows us to have our cake and eat it. Conservative naturalism 
meets criterion 2.2 but not criterion 2.1. Revisionist naturalism meets criterion 2.1 but 
not criterion 2.2. Neither conservative nor revisionist naturalism can show that 
societies that consider conditions such as homosexuality to be mental disorders are 
mistaken. In turn, this approach cannot show that those societies that medically treat 
conditions such as homosexuality on the basis of being mental disorders have 
incorrectly applied the rhetoric of mental disorder (i.e. that the wrong extension of 
mental disorder is used but correctly applied).  
8. Addendum: Family Resemblance Natural Kinds and Conservative Naturalism 
 
So far, this chapter has considered essentialist natural kinds and has shown that even if 
dysfunction picks out an essentialist natural kind, it cannot meet both criteria 2.1 and 
2.2. Section 5.1 explained that Cooper’s family resemblance account of natural kinds is a 
more relaxed account of natural kinds i.e. more kinds might be natural kinds than on the 
essentialist approach. Cooper argues that while her account relaxes the notion of 
natural kinds, it is still a realist account i.e. it provides the true extension of a natural 
kind. Artificial or accidental kinds will not be labelled family resemblance natural kinds 
because the network of criss-crossing and overlapping properties of a natural kind must 
be determining properties.192 (‘Determining properties’ are those properties of family 
resemblance natural kinds that are linked together via natural laws such that inductive 
inferences can be made (Cooper, 2005, 49-51).) As a family resemblance natural kind is 
more relaxed, the hope is that if dysfunction is a family resemblance natural kind, then it 
                                                          
191 This could be rejected by showing that ordinary language represents the word just as accurately as 
science does i.e. that ordinary language maps on (or is co-extensive with) natural kinds. However, 
ordinary language tells us how we intuitively organise nature, not how nature is really organised. 
192 See Cooper on Dupré (Cooper, 2005, 49-51) and section 5.1 of the previous chapter.  
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might meet both criteria 2.1 and 2.2. That is, the properties of the family resemblance 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) are picked out by health professionals 
and informed lay-people. This means that this family resemblance natural kind is 
amenable to conservative naturalism i.e. it is constrained by the way dysfunction is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people. In this way, the hope is 
that criterion 2.2 will be met – conditions such as homosexuality will not fall within the 
extension of dysfunction. Moreover, as the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) is a real category, the hope is that there will be a truth about the 
extension thereof. That is, it might provide an extension of dysfunction that is static 
between societies, and so meets criterion 2.1. This section shows that this is not the case 
– even if dysfunction picks out a family resemblance natural kind, it cannot meet both 
criteria 2.1 and 2.2. This is because, while family resemblance natural kinds are 
amenable to conservative naturalism, one can still be a revisionist family resemblance 
natural kind theorist. If dysfunction picks out a conservative family resemblance natural 
kind, it might meet criterion 2.2 but not 2.1. If dysfunction picks out a revisionist family 
resemblance natural kind, it might meet criterion 2.1 but not 2.2. 
Two points need to be clarified. Firstly, not all family resemblance concepts are family 
resemblance natural kinds (see Aucouturier & Demazeux, 2014, 80-81 and section one 
of this chapter). A family resemblance concept is only a family resemblance natural kind 
if it has sufficient determining properties to form a property cluster. Henceforth, I work 
on the presumption that the way health professionals and informed lay-people use 
dysfunction picks out a family resemblance natural kind, and consider the implications 
of this i.e. whether it will fulfil both criteria listed above.193 Secondly, section 5.1 of the 
previous chapter also explained that family resemblance natural kinds might be 
promiscuous i.e. a single concept might pick out multiple natural kinds depending on 
that in which we are interested (Cooper, 2005, 49; Duprè, 1981, 74). I am not interested 
in whether dysfunction picks out multiple family resemblance natural kinds depending 
on that in which we are interested. This section solely concerns the family resemblance 
natural kind dysfunction as used by health professionals and informed lay-people 
(presuming it exists). (Henceforth, referred to as the family resemblance natural kind 
                                                          
193 See section 5.1 for how dysfunction (as used by health professionals and informed lay-people) may 
pick out a family resemblance concept.  
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dysfunction.) It does not concern other family resemblance natural kinds, such as that 
that might be used by pathologists.194  
Now that these points have been clarified, I will show that the family resemblance 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people cannot meet both criteria 2.1 and 2.2 – it cannot both show that 
conditions such as homosexuality are not mental disorders, and that this applies in all 
societies. As with essentialist natural kinds, which of the criteria are fulfilled depends on 
whether revisionist or conservative naturalism is accepted. As shown in section three of 
this chapter, the advantage of a conservative account of essentialist natural kinds is that 
it matches with ordinary language. The same applies to a conservative account of a 
family resemblance natural kind. According to a conservative account of family 
resemblance natural kinds, the extension of the family resemblance kind dysfunction is 
constrained by the way health professionals and informed lay-people ordinarily use 
dysfunction. If health professionals and informed lay-people (in the developed world) do 
not ordinarily consider homosexuality to be caused by a dysfunction, then it cannot fall 
within the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction, and so cannot be a mental 
disorder. In this way, family resemblance natural kinds are amenable to conservative 
naturalism, and so criterion 2.2 would be fulfilled.195 
The disadvantages of a conservative account of essentialist natural kinds are twofold. 
Firstly, it cannot account for scientific findings until the science has been incorporated 
into ordinary language. Secondly, it cannot provide a static extension of the natural kind 
dysfunction. It cannot meet criterion 2.1. This is because it is constrained by ordinary 
language, and ordinary language changes between societies and within societies over 
time, and so the extension of the natural kind dysfunction would also change. These two 
disadvantages also apply to a conservative account of the family resemblance natural 
kind dysfunction. That is, a conservative family resemblance natural kind cannot 
account for science (until it has become part of ordinary language). Take, for example, a 
society in which health professionals and informed lay-people ordinarily consider 
                                                          
194 As explained in section 5.1 of the previous chapter, on a family resemblance account of natural kind, 
the network of properties is between the properties of a concept, such as dysfunction, as used by a single 
group, such as health professionals and informed lay-people. The network is not between the natural kind 
dysfunction as used by multiple groups.  
195 While family resemblance natural kinds are amenable to conservative naturalism, this does not mean 
that all family resemblance natural kind theorists are conservative – they may be revisionists. 
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homosexuality to be caused by a dysfunction (such as China196, Serbia or Indonesia). In 
these societies, homosexuality will be included in the conservative family resemblance 
natural kind dysfunction. Now imagine that scientists find that homosexuality is not 
caused by a dysfunction. According to this conservative account of the family 
resemblance natural kind dysfunction, homosexuality would remain in this family 
resemblance natural kind despite the presence of scientific evidence that refutes this 
categorisation. Despite the scientific evidence, homosexuality would remain in the 
family resemblance natural kind dysfunction until the relevant science has been 
incorporated into the ordinary language of health professionals and informed lay-
people in these societies. This inability to account for science means that a conservative 
account of the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction might not provide a static 
extension of dysfunction. Homosexuality will not be included in the family resemblance 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) that is used by health professionals and 
informed lay-people in the West. However, in societies in which health professionals 
and informed lay-people do ordinarily consider homosexuality to be caused by a 
dysfunction (for example, modern China, Serbia and Indonesia), homosexuality will be 
included in the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) that is 
used by health professionals and informed lay-people in these societies. Hence, the 
extension of the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction will not be static between 
societies. Moreover, in societies in which homosexuality is included within the family 
resemblance natural kind dysfunction, homosexuality might be a mental disorder, and 
so may be medically treated on this basis.  
In short, as conservative family resemblance natural kinds are constrained by ordinary 
language, and ordinary language changes between societies, the extension of the natural 
kind dysfunction will also change. This means that criteria 2.1 is not met – the extension 
of dysfunction is not static. In turn, it cannot be shown, for once and for all, that 
homosexuality is not a mental disorder. A conservative account of the family 
resemblance natural kind used by health professionals and informed lay-people 
(presuming it exists) will not safeguard against the medical treatment of homosexuality 
on the basis that homosexuality is not a mental disorder. 
                                                          
196 While homosexuality is not a mental disorder according to the Chinese Society of Psychiatrist, in 
practice, it is considered to be a mental disorder (Human Rights Watch, 2017).  
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Let us now consider revisionist naturalism. The advantages of the revisionist account of 
essentialist natural kinds, for my purposes, are that it can account for science (it does 
not have to wait for the science to be incorporated into ordinary language) and so it will 
provide a static extension of dysfunction (see section six). The same applies to a 
revisionist family resemblance account of the natural kind dysfunction. There would be 
a truth concerning the extension of the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction, 
and this truth is not dependent on the ordinary language of the society in question. 
Criterion 2.1 would be met.197 However, as shown in section five, for my purposes, the 
disadvantage of a revisionist account of the essentialist natural kind dysfunction 
(presuming it exists) is that it might not be co-extensive with ordinary language. This 
means that homosexuality might still fall within the revisionist essentialist natural kind 
dysfunction, even though we (i.e. health professionals and informed lay-people from the 
developed world) do not ordinarily think of homosexuality as being caused by a 
dysfunction. Criterion 2.2 would not be met. That we do not want homosexuality to fall 
in the natural kind dysfunction does not mean that homosexuality is excluded from the 
natural kind dysfunction. In slogan form, what we want to be the case is not necessarily 
the case. Hence, a revisionist account of the family resemblance natural kind 
dysfunction will not ensure that conditions such as homosexuality are not caused by a 
dysfunction. In short, a revisionist account of the family resemblance natural kind 
dysfunction as used by health professionals and informed lay people (presuming it 
exists) would provide a static extension of dysfunction (criterion 2.1). However, it might 
be that conditions such as homosexuality fall within the natural kind thereof (criterion 
2.2). This would apply to all societies. In societies in which being gay is also disvalued, it 
may be a mental disorder and medically treated on this basis.  
                                                          
197 A single concept may pick out multiple family resemblance natural kinds. As I am interested in the 
clinical sense of dysfunction, I have only discussed the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction used 
by health professionals and informed lay-people (presuming it exists). I have not discussed, for example, 
the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction used by pathologists (presuming it exists). The way 
dysfunction is used by health professionals and informed lay people may pick out a revisionist family 
resemblance natural kind, and the way dysfunction is used by pathologists may also pick out a revisionist 
family resemblance natural kind. If so, a condition could be caused by a dysfunction according to the 
family resemblance natural kind as used by health professionals and informed lay-people, but not caused 
by a dysfunction according to the family resemblance natural kind dysfunction as used by pathologists. If 
dysfunction picks out multiple family resemblance natural kinds, then a revisionist account of family 
resemblance natural kinds will not provide a static extension of dysfunction. That is, to provide a static 
extension thereof, the sense of dysfunction in which one is interested would need to be specified.  
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To conclude, neither a revisionist nor a conservative account of the family resemblance 
natural kind dysfunction as used by health professionals and informed lay-people 
(presuming it exists) meets both criteria 2.1 and 2.2. The conservative approach does 
not provide a static extension, but might exclude conditions such as homosexuality. A 
revisionist approach provides a static extension but might include conditions such as 
homosexuality. Neither approach allows us to both have our cake and eat it.  
174 
 
Chapter Eight – Are there fixed values concerning 
mental disorders? 
1. Introduction 
Chapter five showed that disvalue is a necessary component of the way mental disorder 
is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people – if a condition is not 
disvalued, then it cannot be a mental disorder. If whether a condition is disvalued 
changes over time or culture, then the extension of mental disorder will change between 
these societies. For example, in societies in which homosexuality is not disvalued, then 
homosexuality cannot be a mental disorder and so cannot be medically treated on that 
basis. In contrast, if homosexuality is disvalued by a society, then it might be a mental 
disorder in that society. In turn, it may be medically treated on the basis of being a 
mental disorder in that society. That is, it would be appropriate for it to be medically 
treated on that basis. Chapter five also explained that the variable extension of mental 
disorder might be resolved if mental disorder referred to a real category. This chapter 
considers whether mental disorder picks out a morally real category i.e. whether there 
are truths concerning the value-status of a condition. Rather than asking whether a 
condition, in itself, is to be disvalued, it is asked whether a condition leads to things that 
are to be disvalued. For example, if the ability to distinguish reality from that which is 
not real is to be disvalued, and schizophrenia impedes this ability, then schizophrenia is 
to be disvalued. In turn, schizophrenia might be a mental disorder and if it is a mental 
disorder, schizophrenia may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder. 
What does it mean to say that mental disorder refers to or picks out a morally real 
category? Moral realists argue that for a claim to be morally true it must exist ‘in the 
world’ independent of human’s beliefs and experiences. Moral realism faces multiple 
problems. For my purposes, the most important are that there might not be any such 
things as moral truths, and that it is unclear how we could have knowledge of a moral 
truth i.e. a morally real category. That is, moral realism faces metaphysical problems, as 
well as the problem of epistemological access. However, my goal is not to show that 
mental disorder is a morally real category, but to consider ways in which the extension 
of mental disorder might be fixed. This chapter avoids the epistemological problem by 
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grounding or justifying values in another way i.e. without appealing to moral realism. 
The chapter considers whether there are Rawlsian primary goods – goods that are of 
value no matter what plan of life one selects – concerning mental states. For example, if 
the ability to distinguish reality from that which is not real is a primary good, and 
schizophrenia impedes this ability, then schizophrenia is to be disvalued, and so might 
be a mental disorder. Equally, if being able to communicate with others is a primary 
good, and if severe anxiety impairs this primary good, then severe anxiety is to be 
disvalued. In turn, severe anxiety might be a mental disorder. More importantly, for my 
purposes, if some individual or society claimed that severe anxiety was not to be 
disvalued, then that person or society is wrong.198 Equally, if being gay impairs a 
primary good, then homosexuality is to be disvalued and so might be a mental order. On 
the other hand, if homosexuality does not impair any primary good, then homosexuality 
is not to be disvalued, and so cannot be a mental disorder. Those people or societies that 
claim that homosexuality is to be disvalued (and so might be a mental disorder) are 
wrong. In the absence of primary goods concerning mental states, and if the extension 
of mental disorder cannot be fixed in some other way, then we cannot say that those 
who consider homosexuality to be a mental disorder are wrong. The most that we can 
say is that their extension of mental disorder is different to that used in the developed 
world. 
This chapter considers whether there are primary goods related to mental states, what 
these are, and whether homosexuality impairs any of these primary goods. It also 
considers whether the existence of primary goods can fix the extension of mental 
disorder. Section two gives a brief overview of moral realism, and the opposing position, 
namely, moral anti-realism. It explains the problems faced by both camps and that these 
problems might be avoided by utilising Rawlsian primary goods.  Section three begins 
by exploring Fulford’s (1993; 1995) claim that the values associated with mental 
conditions are diverse, which suggests that there might not be primary goods 
concerning mental states, and so the extension of mental disorder might not be able to 
be fixed using this method. Section 3.1 considers Graham’s argument that the basic 
psychological capacities are primary goods and any condition that impairs one or more 
of these capacities is to be disvalued. Varga (2015) argues that Graham’s basic 
                                                          
198 Presuming the ability to communicate is a primary good and that anxiety impairs this primary good. 
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psychological capacities are both too narrow (i.e. are not neutral between differing 
competing conceptions of the good life and too vague to be primary goods). I show both 
of Varga’s claims to be misguided. While the basic psychological capacities are not too 
vague to be primary goods, the vagueness does mean that the capacities might be 
interpreted in different ways in different societies. Moreover, a condition might impair a 
capacity in some environments but not others. If either of these occurred, then a 
condition would be disvalued in some societies but not others. In turn, this means that 
the extension of mental disorder would not be static between societies. The basic 
psychological capacities will not help to determine, for once and for all, whether a 
condition is a mental disorder i.e. they do not help to meet criteria 2.1. 
2. Moral realism and moral anti-realism 
Moral realists claim that there are such things as moral truths.199 Moral realists point 
out that some things are valued in almost all societies, such as friendship and bravery; 
and some things are disvalued in almost all societies such as murder and incest. In 
contrast, moral anti-realists claim that there are no such things as moral truths. Moral 
anti-realists generally adopt one of three positions: non-cognitivism, error theory or 
non-objectivism. Moral non-cognitivists claim that moral claims are the sorts of things 
that cannot be true or false i.e. moral claims are not truth-apt. They claim that moral 
statements such as ‘murder is bad’ or ‘bravery is good’ are either expressions of feelings 
(emotivism) or orders (prescriptivism). Error theorists, such as Mackie, claim that 
moral statements aim at the truth but fail to secure it because there is nothing that 
instantiates the moral property or there is no such property. Mackie (1977) says if 
moral truths existed, then they would do so in a very different way from anything else in 
the universe and so moral truths would be ontologically queer. The final type of moral 
anti-realists, namely moral non-objectivists, claim that moral facts exist but are 
constituted by mental activity.  
                                                          
199 These moral truths might or might not be relative to the society in question. However, if they are 
relative to the society in question, then this will not do for my purposes. If ‘homosexuality is to be 
disvalued’ is a moral truth in one society, but ‘homosexuality is not to be disvalued’ is a moral truth in 
another society, then moral truths will not fix the extension of mental disorder and so might not safeguard 
against the medical treatment of homosexuality. 
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Moral anti-realists point out that moral realists face the epistemological problem of how 
we determine whether something is a moral truth (presuming moral truths exist).200  
When determining the truth of empirical matters, we use our sense-experience, for 
example, when we examine the natural world. If Mackie is right that moral truths are 
ontologically queer, then sense experience cannot determine the truth of a moral 
claim.201 In addition, the divide between ‘is’ statements and ‘ought’ statements means 
that we cannot base moral truths on the way things are. In other words, that there are 
such things as moral truths cannot be deduced from the claim that there are moral 
claims that are universally held. Universal moral claims do, however, make the 
existence of moral truths more plausible.202 Anti-realists also claim that it is difficult to 
get widespread agreement on moral truths in many areas – there is much cultural 
diversity on what is moral or immoral. For example, in some cultures, infanticide would 
be acceptable whereas in others, it would not.203 Nor can we claim that our current 
ideological standards necessarily reflect the moral truth. For example, just because 
infanticide is currently seen as immoral, this does not mean that it is immoral. Unless 
moral claims progress over time (which is debatable), we cannot say that current 
ideological standards are any better than past ideological standards. 
There are, of course, problems for anti-realism. One of the most important is that moral 
anti-realism might slide into an ‘anything goes’ situation. 204  This would mean, for 
example, that infanticide is acceptable in societies which consider it to be acceptable, 
that slavery is acceptable according to the norms of a slave society, and the medical 
treatment of homosexuality is acceptable in a homophobic society. Without a moral 
truth to appeal to, moral realists need a different way in which to ground their claim 
                                                          
200 Varga argues that the ontological status of values is irrelevant and that what matters is the 
epistemological problem of how we pick out the right values (Varga, 2015, 205). 
201 Here, I presume that something cannot be ontologically queer and sensible i.e. that ontological 
queerness means that the truth cannot be captured by the usual five senses. 
202 Equally, even if it is difficult to get widespread agreement on many moral truths does not mean there 
are no moral truths. However, it does mean that the existence of moral truths is less plausible.  
203 Realists respond that anti-realists exaggerate diversity since there are often underlying shared 
agreements. For example, both societies might think that the suffering of a baby should be minimised. 
Societies that think that infanticide is acceptable take this stance because they want to reduce the 
suffering of babies. 
204 Many moral anti-realists, such as Rorty (1989) reject that their position means anything goes. They 
claim that the beliefs and practices of a society can be judged by the norms of that society and by the 
norms of external societies. Hence, moral anti-realists can still judge the beliefs and practices of other 




that one position is right or wrong or that one position is better than another. One way a 
moral realist could avoid this problem is to adopt a more relaxed account of moral 
realism, such as Thornton’s (2007) ‘relaxed naturalism’.205 Thornton argues that values 
are real in the same way that secondary properties such as colour are real. According to 
Locke (and McDowell, upon whose work Thornton bases his argument), secondary 
qualities are not in the object itself, but are caused in us by powers in the object. The 
powers are the secondary qualities and the powers are in the world. Hence, secondary 
qualities are real. Thornton argues that values are real in the same way. Relaxed 
naturalism means that if naturalism is concerned with getting to the structure of the 
world, and values form part of the structure of the world, then values can be natural 
(Thornton, 2007, 234-236).206 As Varga says, relaxed naturalism allows Thornton to 
“have it both ways” (Varga, 2015). That is, Thornton can admit that mental disorder is 
value-laden but real. For my purposes, the important part of Thornton’s argument is 
that if mental disorder picks out a relaxed natural category, then the claim that a 
condition is a mental disorder can be right or wrong. When we disagree about the 
boundaries of mental disorder, it is possible that one side is wrong.207   
Relaxed naturalism is not discussed further for two reasons. Firstly, as secondary 
qualities exist (as powers) in the real world, it still faces the epistemological problem of 
determining what the secondary qualities are. Secondly, Thornton is a particularist 
                                                          
205 As naturalism is a type of moral realism, Thornton is a (relaxed) moral realist. 
The debate concerning conservative and revisionist naturalism (see sections four to six of chapter seven) 
can also be applied to strict moral realism. If there are such things as moral truths concerning the 
extension of mental disorder, then these form a real kind. Should real moral kinds (presuming they exist) 
be constrained by people’s values? Conservative naturalists regarding real moral kinds claim that the 
kinds should be constrained by people’s values. Hence, conservative naturalists regarding real moral 
kinds are likely to be relaxed moral realists. (Relaxed moral kinds are dependent on the values of people, 
and so relaxed moral realists necessarily claim that moral truths are constrained by the values of people.) 
In contrast, as revisionist naturalists regarding real moral kinds maintain that the kind should not be 
constrained by the values held by people, revisionist naturalists are likely to be strict moral realists.  
206 Varga argues that values are different from secondary properties in two ways (Varga, 2015, 200-204). 
Firstly, secondary properties are stable. For example, green things are always seen as green. In contrast, 
values are unstable - an individual can change their mind regarding an evaluative state. Secondly, while 
secondary properties are largely agreed upon, values are divergent i.e. they change over time and culture. 
These differences mean that while secondary properties may be relaxed naturalistic categories, values 
might not be.  
207 In contrast, Wakefield does not claim there are moral truths regarding the value-status of mental 
conditions i.e. he claims that what is considered harmful may change between societies (Wakefield, 2005, 
89 c.f. Boorse, 2014, 690; 2012, 7, see also Varga, 2015, 196, 204). Hence, while Wakefield’s harmful 
dysfunction analysis (1992) has both descriptive and evaluative components, Wakefield’s approach does 
not have it both ways i.e. Wakefield does not claim that mental disorder has an evaluative component, and 
refers to a real category. Instead, Wakefield says that dysfunction is a real category i.e. a natural kind.  
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rather than a principlist (Thornton, 2008, 125; 2007, 233). That is, Thornton thinks that 
values cannot be codified into principles, but instead depend on the particulars of the 
context in question. (Thornton argues that this does not mean that values are subjective 
– he says they are real but uncodifiable.) Thornton’s claim that values cannot be codified 
is problematic for my purposes because it will not be able to help determine whether a 
type of condition is a mental disorder. For example, if whether homosexuality is 
disvalued depends on the context in question, then it cannot be said that homosexuality 
is always to be valued or disvalued. In turn, it cannot be determined, for once and for all, 
whether homosexuality might be a mental disorder. If Thornton’s particularism is 
correct, then moral realism will be unable to achieve what I hope that it might – to 
provide a static extension of mental disorder. Hence, I do not discount Thornton’s 
account because I think it is wrong, but because it cannot help my project.  
A second potential way of a) avoiding the problems of moral realism and anti-realism 
and b) showing that the extension of mental disorder is fixed is to show that the value-
status of mental states are fixed between people and societies. This approach is agnostic 
in the moral realism/anti-realism debate. That is, it does not require the values to be 
real (or say that real values do not exist), but aims to show that the value-status of 
mental states is fixed. That approach is considered in the following section. 
3. Is the value-status of mental states fixed?  
This section considers whether the value-status of mental states is fixed. 208 If the value-
status of all mental states is fixed, then the extension of mental disorder will be, at least 
partly, fixed.209 For example, if it is the case that being able to be responsible and care 
for oneself is to be valued by everyone, and dementia impedes this ability, then 
dementia is to be disvalued. If dementia is also caused by a dysfunction, and mental (as 
opposed to physical), then dementia would be a mental disorder. This would apply to all 
societies. Someone who says that dementia is not to be disvalued, and so cannot be a 
mental disorder, would be wrong. The same line of reasoning can be applied to physical 
                                                          
208 Wakefield would ask whether the condition leads to harm. I take harm to be a type of disvalue, but do 
not use the term ‘harm’ because Wakefield hints that there are not moral truths regarding mental 
disorder (Wakefield, 2005, 89), whereas I am agnostic on the existence of moral truths concerning mental 
states.  
209 For the extension of mental disorder to be entirely fixed, it must also be the case that there is a truth 
about whether the condition is caused by a dysfunction, and whether it is a mental condition (as opposed 
to a physical condition).  
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disorders. If being free of pain is to be valued by everyone, since having a broken arm is 
painful, then having a broken arm is to be disvalued. If having a broken arm is caused by 
a dysfunction and physical, then having a broken arm must be a physical disorder in all 
societies. (I presume that the intension of physical disorder is ‘disvalued physical 
dysfunctions’.) 
The values involved in physical disorders are widely agreed upon (Fulford, 1993). For 
example, nearly everyone thinks having cancer or a broken arm is a bad thing, and 
nearly everyone thinks that the ability to see is a good thing.210 In contrast, Fulford 
claims that there is much diversity in those mental conditions that are valued and 
disvalued. There is, of course, some agreement on the value-status of mental disorders. 
Most people would agree that the mood disturbances involved in depression and 
inability to care for oneself caused by dementia should be disvalued. However, Fulford’s 
point is that the values concerning mental states are much more diverse than the value-
status of physical disorders. Fulford points out, for example, that while extreme 
sportspeople love the rush of adrenalin that comes from anxiety, others hate it (Fulford, 
1993, 159; 1995, 155).211 This means that the value-status of anxiety is not fixed. 
Anxiety might be a mental disorder for some people but not others, which means that 
the extension of mental disorder will not be fixed.  
How does this relate to whether it can be shown, for once and for all, that 
homosexuality is or is not a mental disorder? If ‘the ability to be in a romantic 
relationship with the person you love’ is to be valued by everyone and if homosexuality 
does not impede this, then homosexuality is not to be disvalued (on this basis), and so 
homosexuality could not be a mental disorder (on this basis). Equally, if ‘being able to 
have a biological child with your partner’ is to be valued by everyone, and 
                                                          
210 This widespread agreement means that the values become less visible (and hence the values can be 
translated into descriptive terminology). However, this does not mean that the concept physical disorder 
is value-free (see Fulford et. al., 2005, 80). Following Hare, Fulford says that where values are shared, 
they will be less obvious and hence the thing will appear fact-heavy. In contrast, where values are diverse 
(as mental states are), they will be obvious, and hence the thing in question will appear value-heavy.  
211 It could be argued that whether something is to be valued depends on whether it leads to happiness. 
For my purposes, the problem with this approach is that something may lead to happiness for one person 
but not another. Hence, this approach will not fix the extension of mental disorder between individuals, let 
alone between societies. For example, the anxiety I experience prior to public speaking does not make me 
happy – I disvalue it and so it may be a mental disorder. However, other more extroverted people, may 
still feel anxiety before public speaking, but thrive on it. For such people, the very same type of anxiety 
leads to happiness and so is valuable. Hence, it cannot be a mental disorder for these people, but it may be 
a mental disorder for me. 
181 
 
homosexuality prevents a gay person from having a biological child with his or her 
same-sex partner, then homosexuality is to be disvalued, and so a) might be a mental 
disorder and b) medically treated on this basis. 
There are two problems with this line of reasoning. Firstly, it is unlikely that ‘being in a 
romantic relationship with the person you love’ is to be valued by everyone. Some 
hermits and people with autism might maintain that loving is not always good. 
Moreover, there are situations in which we think being in such a relationship might not 
be a good thing, such as when a person loves a violent partner, or is in an incestuous 
relationship with a parent. In addition, a homophobic person would say that it is not 
good for a person to be in a romantic, loving relationship with someone of the same sex. 
Likewise, the ability to have a biological child with your partner is unlikely to be valued 
by everyone, as evidenced by the growing number of couples who choose not to have 
children or their biological children (OECD, 2015). Some people would also say that the 
ability to have children is not a good if the parents are incapable of raising a child, for 
example, if the parents are too young, too old, too poor, too busy and so on.  
Secondly, even if ‘being in a romantic relationship with the person you love’ is to be 
valued by everyone, whether being gay impedes this depends on the environment in 
which one is in. It would not be impeded in a queer-friendly environment, and so 
homosexuality is not to be disvalued (on this basis). In a homophobic environment, 
being gay might impede this good, and so in homophobic environments, homosexuality 
is to be disvalued. This problem is returned to in section 3.1.3 of this chapter.  
The values relating to mental states that have been considered so far (anxiety, being in 
romantic relationships, and the ability to have biological children) are not fixed i.e. these 
things are not to be valued by everyone. The following section considers whether the 
values of mental states might be fixed using Graham’s (2013) basic psychological 
capacities.  
3.1 Graham’s basic psychological capacities 
Graham uses Rawls’ ‘original position’ methodology to determine the goods concerning 
mental states. Rawls (1999) says that to take the ‘original position’, we are placed 
behind a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, we do not know what type of cultural, 
economic or any other relevant circumstances we are in. Rawls thinks that behind this 
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veil of ignorance, rational agents would ensure that society is organised so they can 
realise the goods that are required for any life to go well. That is, the veil of ignorance is 
said to provide neutrality between the different conceptions of the good life no matter 
what plan of life one selects i.e. things that are primarily good (Graham, 2013, 150-
152).212 Having sufficient food, water and shelter are examples of primary goods.  
Graham uses Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ methodology to pick out those mental capacities 
that are primary good i.e. those mental capacities that all rational agents would pick 
regardless of their plan of life. Graham begins by pointing out that capacities for both 
reason (including reason-responsiveness) and consciousness are basic psychological 
goods, and then list seven further basic psychological goods (Graham, 2013, 157-159): 
1. Bodily and spatial self-location – to be able to identify the physical position of 
our bodies in the world so that we can use their motor capacities to achieve 
goals. 
2. Historical and temporal self-location – to be able to identify our present position 
in time and as individuals with a past and a future. 
3. General self-comprehension and world-comprehension – the ability to 
comprehend both ourselves and the world to the extent that enables us to live in 
a moderately well-informed and knowledgeable fashion.  
4. Communication – the ability to communicate about ourselves and the world with 
other people, and to be both competent speakers and listeners. 
5. Care, commitment and emotional attachment and engagement – the ability to 
care about and be committed to people and things other than ourselves.  
6. Responsibility for self – the ability to care and be responsible for ourselves, to 
guide and control our behaviour in a reason-responsive way. 
7. Recognising and acting on opportunities. 
Graham claims that these basic psychological capacities are primary goods. This means 
that if a condition impedes one of these capacities, then that condition is to be disvalued. 
For example, if schizophrenia hinders general self-comprehension and world-
comprehension, then schizophrenia is to be disvalued. Anyone who claims that 
schizophrenia is not a mental disorder (because it is not the case that schizophrenia is 
                                                          
212 Rawls says that the primary goods identified behind the veil of ignorance presumes that one is in a 
democratic nation state that has a level of wealth. 
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to be disvalued) would be wrong. Graham also distinguishes between a decent life and a 
flourishing life. If an impairment of the basic psychological capacities impacts negatively 
on a decent life, then the condition might be a mental disorder. In contrast, if the 
impairment impacts negatively on a flourishing life, then the condition is not a mental 
disorder (Graham, 2013, 159-160).  
Graham develops a prototypical – non-essentialist – account of mental disorder. On his 
account, even if the condition does not impair a basic psychological capacity, so long as 
enough of the other requirements, such as having harmful consequences, are fulfilled, 
then the condition is a mental disorder (Graham, 2013, 148, 165). Hence, a prototypical 
account such as Graham’s will not determine, for once and for all, whether a condition is 
a mental disorder. I make a slight change to Graham’s position and apply Graham’s basic 
psychological capacities to an essentialist account of mental disorder – a condition might 
be a mental disorder if and only if it impairs a basic psychological capacity (in such a 
way that it impacts negatively on a decent life). For example, if schizophrenia hinders 
general self-comprehension and world-comprehension, then schizophrenia is to be 
disvalued and so might be a mental disorder. If schizophrenia is also caused by a 
dysfunction and mental (as opposed to physical), then it is a mental disorder. By taking 
this essentialist approach to the basic psychological capacities, it might be determined, 
for once and for all, whether a condition is a mental disorder. 
Now that Graham’s position has been outlined, it can now be considered whether the 
basic psychological capacities are primary goods. Graham’s basic psychological 
capacities are much more fundamental and expansive than the potential fixed values 
mentioned above. For example, I asked whether ‘the ability to have a biological child 
with one’s partner’ and ‘being in a romantic relationship with the person you love’ are 
to be valued by everyone. In contrast, Graham says that the ability ‘to care about and be 
committed to people and things other than ourselves’ is a primary good. This 
expansiveness is advantageous as it makes it much more likely that Graham’s basic 
psychological capacities will be primary goods i.e. it allows neutrality between the 
various conceptions of the good life. Regardless of whether someone wants to have 
children, it is likely that having emotional commitments to others is a primary good.  
Three questions arise from Graham’s list. Firstly, are the basic psychological capacities 
primary goods? Secondly, will they help to determine whether a condition is a mental 
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disorder?  Thirdly, will the basic psychological capacities provide an extension of mental 
disorder that is fixed between cultures? 
3.1.1 Are the basic psychological capacities primary goods? 
 
Regarding the first question (whether Graham’s basic psychological capacities are 
primary goods), Varga argues that the basic psychological capacities are both too vague 
and too narrow to be primary goods i.e. that they would not be universally picked out 
based on their importance in realising a good life.213 Regarding narrowness, Varga says, 
there are examples in which the basic psychological capacities might not be chosen by 
all rational agents behind the veil of ignorance. For example, Varga points out that 
monks and warriors might have a conception of the good life in which it would be better 
for them not to have a capacity for emotional commitments to other people, which 
suggests that the capacity for emotional commitment is not a basic psychological good 
(Varga, 2015, 192). He also claims that some people in the Deaf community would not 
say that normal auditory perception is a basic psychological good and so not everyone 
would agree that the capacity to communicate is a basic psychological good (Varga, 
2017, 6; 2015, 193). 
Let us first deal with the Deafness example, as that is the easiest to reject. Varga says 
that those people in the Deaf community who do not value normal auditory perception 
shows that the ability to communicate is not a basic psychological good (Varga, 2017, 6; 
2015, 193). However, Graham does not say that normal auditory perception is a basic 
psychological good. Instead, Graham says that the ability to communicate is a basic 
psychological good. Presumably, Deaf people still value the ability to communicate, just 
not the ability to communicate via auditory perception. Hence, Deaf people would likely 
agree that communication is a basic psychological good. Contrary to Varga’s claim, this 
is not an example in which the basic psychological goods are too narrow i.e. are not 
universally accepted.  
                                                          
213 Varga’s argument is based on Sandel, Taylor and Forst’s claims that Rawls’ thought experiment strips 
the person of a historically, culturally and communally ‘situatedness’ and only utilises a ‘thin’ concept of 
the self which reflects the values of political liberalism found in individualistic cultures over 
communitarian cultures (Varga, 2015, 191-193). While Varga does not argue that Graham’s basic 
psychological capacities favour individualistic cultures over communitarian ones, he borrows the method 
to argue that the basic psychological capacities are not primary goods (see also Varga, 2017, 6).  
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What of Varga’s claim that monks and warriors might not value having a capacity for 
emotional commitments to other people? Firstly, I doubt that all warriors do not value 
emotional commitments to others – surely some warriors fight to protect their family 
and tribe. Varga’s point that monks might not value emotional commitments to others is 
slightly more plausible. While some monks value emotional commitment insofar as 
many monks are in the service of good of others and/or have an emotional commitment 
to a higher power such as God, there are some monks who do not value emotional 
commitment (see Wong, 2006, 208). Despite this, there are two possible ways of 
defeating Varga’s counter example. Firstly, it might be that monks might still value the 
ability to emotionally commit, but choose not to exercise it. If so, then this would remain 
a basic psychological capacity. Secondly, it is arguable that it would be unwise to reject 
emotional commitment as a basic psychological good based on the relatively small 
population of monks. This is problematic because we would need to determine the point 
at which a minority view means that some capacity is not a basic psychological good. 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to claim that even if some monks do not value the capacity 
for emotional commitment, it is still a basic psychological good.214  
Another example that Varga might use to support his position that ‘emotional 
commitment is not a primary good’ concerns utilitarianism. Utilitarians, particularly 
Bentham, claim that the morally right thing to do is that which provides the greatest 
good for the greatest number. Having emotional commitments to one’s family and 
friends might impede the utilitarian from carrying out those acts that would furnish the 
greatest good to the greatest number.215 For example, emotional commitment might 
mean that a utilitarian instinctively rescues his or her own drowning child, rather than 
rescuing two children that he does not know (all other things being equal). On this basis, 
utilitarians might not agree that the capacity for emotional commitment is not a basic 
psychological good. However, even the staunchest of utilitarians is unlikely to hold that 
the capacity for emotional commitment is not a good. While utilitarians might think that 
the capacity for emotional commitment is not valuable in the drowning example, it is 
                                                          
214 Even if the capacity for emotional commitment is not a basic psychological good, this does not render 
Graham’s list useless. If the other basic psychological capacities are universally valued, then these may be 
able to determine whether a condition is a mental disorder. 
215 Here, I presume that emotional commitment is to individuals, rather than society in general. If 
emotional commitment were to society in general, then this example would be of no use to the idea that 
emotional commitment is not a primary good.  
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likely that even a committed utilitarian would admit that the capacity is important in 
other areas of life.  
In a nutshell, it is difficult to come up with plausible examples in which the basic 
psychological capacities would not be picked by all rational agents behind the veil of 
ignorance. While there are possible exceptions, these are few and far between, and 
should not prevent the basic psychological capacities from being primary goods.  
Let us now turn to Varga’s claim that the basic psychological capacities are too vague. It 
is unclear what Varga means by ‘vagueness’. Does he mean that the capacities have 
fuzzy boundaries, or does he mean that the capacities are too expansive? Varga says the 
basic psychological capacities  
are unable to specify the type of comprehensive, communicative and 
decision-making capacities that individuals need in order to lead a 
good life. For instance, it is not clear whether, and at what point, 
intense feelings of care and love that alter comprehension of self and 
the world and decision making that should count as impairment 
(Varga, 2015, 192, my emphasis).  
The quote suggests that Varga thinks the basic psychological capacities are both too 
expansive and that the boundaries are too fuzzy. His claim that the point at which 
intense feelings that alter comprehension should count as an impairment suggests that 
he thinks that the problem is one of fuzzy boundaries. Varga is right that the boundaries 
of the basic psychological capacities are fuzzy. However, it might be that the primary 
goods just do have fuzzy boundaries. That is, there is no reason to presume that primary 
goods are discrete. Hence, the basic psychological capacities should not be rejected as 
primary goods just because they have fuzzy boundaries. (As Sorenson (2001) argues, 
many concepts are vague but are perfectly usable i.e. meaningful. Nordenfelt also points 
out that we can use the concept bald without defining precisely when a person is bald 
(Nordenfelt, 1997, 17-18; see section two of chapter five.) Varga’s claim that the basic 
psychological capacities are unable to specify the type of capacities (see the above 
quote) suggests that he thinks the expansiveness of the basic psychological capacities is 
also problematic. This interpretation is backed up by Varga’s point that “less vague 
descriptions and further specifications of the relevant psychological capacities would 
most probably make these too narrow, thus excluding particular ideas of the good life” 
(Varga, 2015, 192). For example, if the capacity for communication is narrowed to the 
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capacity for normal auditory perception, this will rule out some Deaf people’s 
conception of the good life. Varga’s point is that while the problem of expansiveness can 
be resolved by making the basic psychological capacities narrower, this will mean that 
the basic psychological capacities do not provide a neutral conception of the good life.  
I agree with Varga’s point that the basic psychological capacities cannot simply be 
narrowed, as this would likely rule out some conceptions of the good life. However, I 
disagree with Varga’s claim that the capacities are too expansive to be primary goods. 
Primary goods might be expansive. In fact, given the diversity of values, if primary 
goods are to be neutral between conceptions of the good life, then they must be 
expansive. Hence, I disagree with Varga that Graham’s basic psychological capacities are 
too narrow and too vague to be primary goods. They are not too narrow because they 
appear to include all conceptions of the good life. Even if some monks do not value the 
capacity for emotional commitment, it would be excessive to reject the capacity as a 
basic psychological good solely for this reason. Nor are the basic psychological 
capacities too vague – neither too fuzzy nor too expansive. While the basic psychological 
capacities have fuzzy boundaries, it might be the case that primary goods just do have 
fuzzy boundaries. In addition, the basic psychological capacities might well need to be 
expansive to be primary goods. In short, objections to Graham’s basic psychological 
capacities being primary goods are not all that persuasive.  
3.1.2 Do the basic psychological capacities help to determine whether a condition is a 
mental disorder? 
 
We can now consider the second question – whether the list of basic psychological 
capacities will help determine whether a condition is a mental disorder. An essentialist 
version216 of Graham’s list of basic psychological capacities will help to determine 
whether a condition is a mental disorder insofar as if a condition impairs one or more of 
the basic psychological capacities (in a way that negatively impacts on a decent life c.f. 
flourishing life), then that condition might be a mental disorder. It is a little more 
difficult to use an essentialist version of Graham’s list of basic psychological capacities 
to show that a condition is not a mental disorder. To do so, we need to make two 
                                                          
216 As mentioned above, Graham develops a non-essentialist, prototypical account of mental disorder 
(Graham, 2010, 148, 165). I consider whether Graham’s basic psychological capacities can be applied to 
an essentialist account of mental disorder.  
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presumptions. The first is that all mental disorders are disvalued because they impair a 
basic psychological capacity i.e. mental disorders are not disvalued for some other 
reason. 217 The second is that Graham’s list is exhaustive of the basic psychological 
capacities. This can be summarised in the following syllogism: 
1. All mental disorders are disvalued because they impair one or more of the basic 
psychological capacities (in such a way that impacts on a decent life c.f. a 
flourishing life).  
2. Graham’s list is exhaustive of the basic psychological capacities. 
3. Impairments of basic psychological capacities are to be disvalued. 
4. Condition ᵡ does not impair any of the basic psychological capacities. 
5. Therefore, condition ᵡ is not to be disvalued.  
6. Therefore, condition ᵡ cannot be a mental disorder. 
For example, if being intelligent does not impair any of the basic psychological 
capacities, then intelligence is not to be disvalued. In turn, intelligence cannot be a 
mental disorder. Likewise, if being gay does not impair any of the basic psychological 
capacities, then homosexuality is not to be disvalued, and so cannot be a mental 
disorder. In short, an essentialist version of Graham’s basic psychological capacities can 
show whether a condition is to be disvalued. In turn, the basic psychological capacities 
can help to determine whether a condition is a mental disorder.  
Section 3.1.1 showed that the vagueness (fuzzy boundaries and expansiveness) of the 
basic psychological capacities does not prevent them from being primary goods. Nor 
does the vagueness (fuzzy boundaries and expansiveness) of the basic psychological 
capacities prevent the capacities from helping to determine whether a condition might 
be a mental disorder. Firstly, the expansiveness of a category does not make it difficult 
to determine membership. Mammal is an expansive category, but it is clear whether an 
animal is a mammal. Do the fuzzy boundaries of the basic psychological capacities make 
it difficult to determine whether a condition is a mental disorder? As mentioned above, 
Graham develops a non-essentialist, prototypical account of mental disorder (Graham, 
2010, 148, 165). Prototypical accounts of mental disorder have fuzzy boundaries, which 
                                                          
217 This presumption is reasonable given that there do not seem to be any examples in which a mental 
disorder is disvalued for reasons other than the impairment of the basic psychological capacities, and 




means that it might be difficult to determine whether a condition is a mental disorder. 
Essentialist accounts of mental disorder might also have fuzzy boundaries. That is, even 
if an impairment of a basic psychological capacity is necessary for a condition to be a 
mental disorder, the basic psychological capacity might still have fuzzy boundaries 
which means it might not be clear whether a mental condition (i.e. an instance or a type 
of mental condition) is a mental disorder. For example, it might be unclear whether a 
person with a slightly below-average IQ has an impaired basic psychological capacity 
for comprehension. Equally, it might be unclear whether shyness is an impairment of 
the capacity for communication. It could be argued that the fuzzy boundaries of the 
basic psychological capacities mean that the capacities cannot help to determine 
whether something is a mental disorder.218 Such an argument would be too harsh. The 
basic psychological capacities can still help to determine whether a condition is a 
mental disorder, but a condition might be a mental disorder in one society but not 
another.  
To summarise this section, an essentialist version of Graham’s basic psychological 
capacities can help to determine whether a condition is a mental disorder. This is not 
negated by the expansiveness of the basic psychological capacities. The fuzzy 
boundaries of the basic psychological capacities can determine the disorder-status of a 
condition, but as will be discussed in the following section, a condition might be a 
mental disorder in one society but not another.  
3.1.3 Do the basic psychological capacities fix the extension of mental disorder? 
 
The third question can now be considered – whether Graham’s list of basic 
psychological capacities mean that the extension of mental disorder will be static over 
time and culture? If the basic psychological capacities are primary goods and if the 
extension of mental disorder is based on these basic psychological capacities, then in 
theory, the extension of mental disorder might be static. (Once again, I am applying the 
basic psychological capacities to an essentialist account of mental disorder.) However, 
Graham’s approach faces two main problems. Firstly, whether a basic psychological 
capacity is contingent upon context. Secondly, the vagueness of the basic psychological 
                                                          
218 Specifying the boundaries of mental disorder is a problem for everyone who considers the meaning of 
mental disorder, and it has led to the claim that mental disorder does not have clear boundaries (Rogers 
and Walker, 2017, 410; Keil and Stoeker, 2016).  
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capacities means that the extension of mental disorder might change depending on how 
the capacities are interpreted. 
Concerning the first issue, a problem with some of the potential primary goods 
suggested earlier (e.g. ‘being in a romantic relationship with the person you love’) is 
that whether homosexuality impedes these goods is contingent on context. For example, 
whether being gay impedes being in a romantic relationship with the person you love 
depends on whether the gay person is in a homophobic or queer-friendly society. In a 
homophobic environment, being gay might impede this good, and so in homophobic 
environments, homosexuality is to be disvalued. Hence, the value-status of 
homosexuality might not be static between societies. In turn, whether homosexuality is 
a mental disorder might not be static between societies. Moreover, in those societies in 
which homosexuality is a mental disorder, it may be medically treated on this basis.  
Does the same apply to the basic psychological capacities i.e. is it the case that whether a 
basic psychological capacity is impaired depend on the environment in which one 
happens to be? Take the basic psychological capacity of communication, for example. 
Whether a Deaf person has the ability to communicate depends on whether that person 
lives in a society in which sign language is widely known. In a society in which sign 
language is widely used (i.e. a Deaf-friendly society), then being Deaf does not impair a 
basic psychological capacity, and so cannot be a mental disorder (using an essentialist 
account). In contrast, in a society in which sign language is not widely use, being Deaf 
might well impair the basic psychological capacity of communication, and so might be a 
mental disorder. Deafness might be a mental disorder in some societies but not others. 
Equally, whether a person with dyslexia is able to comprehend the world (i.e. the basic 
psychological good of self and general comprehension) might depend on whether he or 
she is in a literate society. Hence, Graham’s basic psychological capacities might not 
ensure that the extension of mental disorder is static between societies. If we restrict the 
environment to which impairment of basic psychological capacities is determined to 
biological environments, rather than social environments, then whether a condition 
impairs a basic psychological capacity is much more likely to remain static.219 However, 
                                                          
219 However, environments will change environmentally over evolutionary time periods (see, for example, 
Kovacs, 1998, 32-34). Hence, the basic psychological capacities will not be entirely static even if restricted 
to biological environments.  
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as Kendell points out, it is difficult to distinguish biological environments from social 
environments because “man is necessarily a social creature” (Kendell, 1975, 455).220  
The second problem for claiming that the basic psychological capacities will fix the 
extension of mental disorder over time and culture is that the vagueness (both the 
expansiveness and the fuzzy boundaries) of the basic psychological capacities means 
that the extension of mental disorder might change depending on how the capacities are 
interpreted. That is, in practise, the extension of mental disorder might change. For 
example, Graham says to have the basic psychological capacity ‘general self-
comprehension and world-comprehension’ an individual must have the ability to 
comprehend both ourselves and the world to the extent that enables us to live in a 
moderately well-informed and knowledgeable fashion. Graham does not specify what 
counts as a moderately well-informed and knowledgeable fashion. This is not only a 
problem for the fuzzy boundaries of the basic psychological capacities (the point at 
which a capacity is impaired). It is also a problem for the expansiveness of the 
capacities. The expansiveness of the capacities means that whether a society considers a 
person to be able to live in a moderately well-informed and knowledgeable manner 
might depend upon the values of the society in question. For example, in a society in 
which being well-educated and having a professional career are highly valued, a person 
with a below average IQ might be less likely to be said to be moderately well-informed 
and knowledgeable. In contrast, in a society in which education and professional 
success is not so highly valued, then a below average IQ might be more likely to be said 
to be moderately well-informed and knowledgeable. Hence, a person with an IQ of 80 
might be said to be mentally disordered in one society but not another. While the 
expansiveness of the basic psychological capacities does not prevent them from helping 
to determine whether a condition might be a mental disorder, the expansiveness does 
mean that the extension of mental disorder is unlikely to be fixed between societies. 
One of Graham’s (non-essential) criteria for mental disorder is that the condition causes 
harmful or potentially harmful symptoms or consequences for the affected individual 
                                                          
220 Sociobiology also complicates the distinction between biological and social environments. 
Sociobiology is the theory that some human behaviour can be explained in terms of genetics, instead of in 
terms of cultural and environmental factors. Sociobiological phenomena are biological phenomena as 
they are social phenomena that are grounded in biology. If we mistakenly take a sociobiological 
phenomenon to be purely social (or vice versa), then we may be mistaken about whether a condition 
impairs a basic psychological capacity in a biological environment.  
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(or perhaps others) (Graham, 2010, 165). Graham does not tell us at what point a 
condition is harmful. The most he says is that a harmful condition will be clinically 
significant (Graham, 2010, 148, 176). However, this does not help determine what is 
harmful, as the two are likely to inform each other. That is, I will go to a health 
professional when I consider a condition to be harmful, and when a condition is harmful 
it will be clinically significant. Once again, the lack of specificity is problematic as it 
might mean that a condition is a mental disorder in one society but not another. In 
addition, the basic psychological capacities might be inconsistent with each other and 
Graham does not tell us how to weigh these capacities against each other. For example, 
when a person has intense feelings of romantic love for another person, that person 
might not make reasonable decisions. In this situation, the capacity for ‘care, 
commitment and emotional attachment and engagement’ conflicts with the capacity to 
take responsibility for oneself (see also Thornton, 2008, 125 and Varga, 2015, 192).221 
In this way, a condition might be a mental disorder in one society but not another.  
In short, Graham’s list of basic psychological capacities does not fix the extension of 
mental disorder over time and culture. This is because a) whether a capacity is impaired 
might be dependent on the society in which one happens to be, and b) the vagueness 
(both the expansiveness and the fuzzy boundaries) might mean that capacities can be 
interpreted in different ways.222 That is, even if Graham’s basic psychological capacities 
are primary goods, the extension of mental disorder might not be static. There is a 
tension between the goals of a) ensuring that primary goods concerning mental states 
are neutral between conceptions of the good life and b) specific enough to determine 
whether a mental condition is to be disvalued. This tension means that it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to use primary goods to provide a static extension of mental 
disorder.  
Does this apply to homosexuality? That is, is it the case that homosexuality could a) 
impair a basic psychological capacity in a homophobic environment and/or b) does the 
vagueness of the basic psychological capacities means that homosexuality might be 
                                                          
221 Graham notes that the weighting of the capacities may be “contextually variable” but it is the capacities 
themselves that interest him (Graham, 2010, 157).  
222 This may also be true for physical disorders. However, if Fulford (1993) is right that the values 
concerning physical states are widely agreed upon, then while the basic physical capacities (whatever 
they may be) may be interpreted in different ways in theory, it is unlikely that this will occur in practice.  
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interpreted as impairing one of these? It is, at least arguable, that in a homophobic 
environment, being gay impairs the basic psychological capacity of being responsible 
for oneself. That is, homophobic people would claim that people that are unable or 
unwilling to resist the urge to act on their homosexual impulses cannot control their 
behaviour in a reason-responsive way. The counter-argument is that gay people can 
control their behaviour in a reason-responsive way i.e. that being gay is within the 
bounds of reason-responsiveness rational in a society that is not homophobic. That it 
can be debated whether being gay impairs a basic psychological capacity highlights my 
point that Graham’s basic psychological capacities are vague and open to interpretation, 
and in turn, that they might not fix the extension of mental disorder between societies. 
However, as argued in section 3.1.1, the basic psychological capacities cannot simply be 
made more specific as this would likely rule out some conceptions of the good life (see 
also Varga, 2015, 192). Nor can it be said that social influences, such as being in a 
homophobic society, should not influence whether a basic psychological capacity is 
impaired because, as pointed out earlier, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish 
biological environments from social environments.  
There is one further problem with Graham’s analysis. He claims that lacking the 
capacity to be moral might be indicative of a mental disorder – that the ‘incapacity to 
grasp and understand moral features of social situations and to react reason-
responsively to them’ might show that the basic psychological capacities of ‘general self-
comprehension and world-comprehension’ and ‘care, commitment and emotional 
attachment and engagement’ are impaired (Graham, 2010, 174-175; see also Varga, 
2017, 7). Graham thinks that those who contravene the moral code of a society might 
have an incapacity to understand these moral features and therefore, might be mentally 
disordered. He gives Ted Bundy as an example of someone whose moral behaviour 
could count as a mental disorder. (Ted Bundy was an American serial killer, rapist, 
burglar and necrophile of the 1970s.) 
There are three main problems with Graham’s claim that an incapacity to grasp 
morality might be indicative of a mental disorder. Firstly, Graham presumes, rather than 
shows that there is a function or capacity to grasp the moral code, and so says that an 
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inability to grasp the moral code is evidence of a mental disorder. 223  Secondly, it might 
be difficult to distinguish whether a person is incapable of grasping the moral code or 
disagrees with it. Thirdly, and most importantly for my purposes, in a homophobic 
society, a gay person might be deemed incapable of grasping morality (or, at least, 
incapable of grasping parts of morality) and so might be considered to be mentally 
disordered. More precisely, being gay could be said to be an inability to grasp the moral 
features (either in part or in full) of that society. In turn, homosexuality would be an 
impairment of a basic psychological capacity, and so might be a mental disorder.224 In 
queer-friendly society, being gay would not indicate immorality, and so would not 
impair a basic psychological capacity and, in turn, could not be a mental disorder. 
Graham’s claim that an incapacity to grasp morality might be indicative of a mental 
disorder means that the basic psychological capacities might not fix the extension of 
mental disorder.  
The same applies to the other case studies considered in chapter two. In racist societies, 
black runaway slaves might be deemed incapable of grasping morality; in sexually 
conservative societies, those who masturbate might be deemed incapable of grasping 
morality; and in politically repressive societies, being a political dissident might be 
deemed incapable of grasping morality (either in part or in full). In these societies, all 
these people might be mentally disordered. In contrast, in societies that are not racist, 
sexually conservative or politically repressive, these conditions cannot be mental 
disorders. Hence, the basic psychological capacities do not fix the extension of mental 
disorder.  
Graham does not specify which contraventions of a moral code might indicate mental 
disorder. He says that the concept of mental disorder should not be devoid of “some 
moral assessments of some persons and some behaviours” (Graham, 2010, 175, 
Graham’s emphasis). Graham, following Churchland, seems to have in mind those acts 
that are universally seen as immoral, such as murder and unfairly sharing 
resources (Graham, 2010, 172-173). Homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway 
                                                          
223 In a similar vein, Murphy and Woolfolk say that we cannot simply claim that the capacity to learn to 
read is functional. Rather, we need to show that it is functional (Murphy and Woolfolk, 2000, 242-243). 
224 It could be countered that most gay people have the capacity to grasp the moral code of a society, but 
disagree with it. This would mean that being gay is not indicative of a mental disorder. However, as 
already discussed it may be difficult to determine whether a person is incapable of grasping the moral 
code or whether they disagree with the code.  
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slave or political dissident are not universally considered to be breaches of the moral 
code. Hence, it is unlikely that Graham would consider any of these conditions to be 
impairments of the basic psychological capacities. Nonetheless, unless Graham 
specifies which incapacities to meet the moral code might be indicative of a mental 
disorder, then these conditions might be deemed mental disorders in certain societies.  
Graham’s analysis of the basic psychological capacities is convincing insofar as it helps 
to determine whether a condition is a mental disorder. (It does not provide an extension 
of mental disorder that is static between societies, but this is not what Graham set out to 
do.) However, Graham seems to add on the idea that an incapacity to grasp morality 
might be indicative of a mental disorder. While Graham’s claim is not novel225, he does 
not give this important issue the attention it deserves. In particular, he does not 
consider the negative implications that it might have, such as homosexuality being 
indicative of a mental illness in homophobic societies. A more plausible position – the 
position that I take – is to be agnostic regarding whether an incapacity to grasp morality 
is an indicative of mental disorder. That is, Graham might be right that immorality might 
be indicative of a mental disorder, but a lot more work needs to be done to justify his 
position. Due to the abusive treatment that occurred in the name of medicine in the past 
(e.g. the labelling of homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a 
political dissident as mental disorders, and medically treating these conditions on this 
basis), we ought to tread very carefully before declaring that an incapacity to grasp 
morality impairs some of the basic psychological capacities, and so might be a mental 
disorder. Gay people, masturbators, runaway slaves, and political dissidents could all be 
considered to be mentally disordered even though they might simply have different 
views of morality and different conceptions of the good life. If Graham or anyone else 
persists with this line of argument, then he or she must tread extremely carefully. 
4. Conclusion 
Chapter five established that disvalue is a necessary component of the way mental 
disorder is ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people. If a 
condition is not disvalued, then it cannot be a mental disorder. Chapter five also 
established that if the value-status of mental conditions changes over time or culture, 
                                                          
225 See Schirmann, 2013, 35-36.  
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then the extension of mental disorder will also change. This chapter has considered 
whether the extension of mental disorder might be fixed by establishing if there are 
primary goods concerning mental states.  
The chapter began with a brief explanation of the debate between moral realists and 
moral anti-realists. Moral realism faces the problem of epistemological access. This 
chapter took an agnostic stance on whether there are such things as moral truths, and 
instead asked whether there are any primary goods (i.e. goods that all rational agents 
behind the veil of ignorance would choose, regardless of their conception of the good 
life) concerning mental states.  
Section 3.1.1 showed that Graham’s (2013) list of basic psychological capacities might 
well be primary goods. Graham’s basic psychological capacities are very basic or 
fundamental, and therefore are likely to be chosen by all those behind the veil of 
ignorance. Varga’s (2015) claim that the basic psychological capacities are both too 
narrow and too vague to be primary goods was rejected. The capacities are not too 
narrow – the overwhelming majority of those behind the veil of ignorance think that 
one’s life would be worse off without these capacities. While the capacities are vague 
(i.e. they are expansive and have fuzzy boundaries), this does not prevent them from 
being primary goods. Indeed, narrow capacities, such as the ability to learn to read, are 
less likely to be primary goods.  
Section 3.1.2 showed that Graham’s list of basic psychological capacities also helps to 
determine whether a condition is a mental disorder: if a condition impairs one or more 
of the basic psychological capacities, then that condition might be a mental disorder. 
Moreover, if the list of basic psychological goods is exhaustive, and a condition does not 
impair a basic psychological capacity, then that condition cannot be a mental disorder. 
The expansiveness of the basic psychological capacities does not prevent the capacities 
from helping to determine whether a condition might be a mental disorder. While the 
fuzzy boundaries of the capacities mean that there might be disagreement about 
whether a condition is a mental disorder, the capacities still help to determine whether 
a condition is a mental disorder.  
However, section 3.1.3 showed that the basic psychological capacities might not provide 
an extension of mental disorder that is static over time and culture. Firstly, the 
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expansiveness (and fuzzy boundaries) of the capacities means that the capacities might 
be interpreted differently between cultures. Secondly, whether a condition impairs a 
basic psychological capacity might depend on environmental features of the society in 
question. Thirdly, Graham claims that an incapacity for morality might be indicative of 
an impairment to a basic psychological capacity. This means that homosexuality might 
be a mental disorder in homophobic societies. For these three reasons, the basic 
psychological capacities might not be able to determine, for once and for all, whether a 
condition is a mental disorder and whether it may be medically treated on this basis.  
Basing the extension of mental disorder on primary goods regarding mental states will 
be a good fit with ordinary language. For example, let’s say that happiness (being a 
mental state) is a primary good, and that having Major Depressive Disorder negatively 
impacts on happiness. This would mean that Major Depressive Disorder is a mental 
disorder, and this fits with the way mental disorder is ordinarily used by health 
professionals and informed lay-people. Moreover, as explained earlier, for a primary 
good to be neutral between different conceptions of the good life, it will almost always 
need to be very broad. This breadth means that the primary good (i.e. as Graham argues, 
the basic psychological capacity) might be interpreted differently in different societies. 
In a society that considers dyslexia to be a mental disorder (such as our literate society), 
the basic psychological capacity of ‘self and general comprehension’ (i.e. the ability to 
comprehend the world) might be interpreted in such a way to include dyslexia. It will fit 
with the ordinary language of this society. In a society that does not consider dyslexia to 
be a mental disorder (for example, a preliterate society), the basic psychological 
capacity ‘self and general comprehension’ might be interpreted in such a way to exclude 
dyslexia. This fits with the ordinary language of that society. In this way, primary goods 
are a good fit with ordinary language.  
However, the breadth of the basic psychological capacities means that they might not 
provide a static extension of mental disorder. In turn, this approach might not exclude 
conditions such as homosexuality from being considered to be mental disorders. For 
example, if the inability to grasp morality indicates an impairment of the capacity for 
self and world comprehension, and homosexuality is considered immoral, then 
homosexuality would impair this capacity, and so would be a mental disorder in this 
society. In contrast, if the capacity for self and world comprehension did not include the 
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morality component, or homosexuality was not considered to be immoral, then 
homosexuality would not impair this capacity and so could not be a mental disorder. In 
such a society, defining mental disorder using primary goods might fulfil criteria 2.2 – it 
can show that conditions such as homosexuality are not mental disorders. However, this 
approach cannot fulfil criteria 2.1 – it does not provide a static extension of mental 
disorder. Graham’s approach does not allow us to both have our cake and eat it. It does 
not fulfil both criteria 2.1 and 2.2, and in turn, it does not show that conditions such as 





Chapter Nine – Conclusion 
1. Overall Findings 
In the past, and in some parts of the current world, homosexuality was (or is) 
considered to be a mental disorder and is medically treated on this basis. As a pro-
queer, rainbow waving woman, I do not support the medical treatment of 
homosexuality. However, the aim of this thesis was not to show that homosexuality 
should never be medically treated. This is because, following Earp et. al. (2014) (and 
others such as Haldeman and Bonne, see Earp et. al. 2014), I am open to the idea that 
there might be situations in which medical treatment to change an individual’s sexual 
orientation might be acceptable. For example, if a gay person lives in a very homophobic 
society and gives fully informed consent to conversion therapy, then it is at least 
arguable that this medical treatment (i.e. conversion therapy) should be provided (see 
section four of chapter three). For this reason, the thesis does not consider ways in 
which the medical treatment of homosexuality might be prevented, but instead 
considers whether the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality can be 
safeguarded against by showing that homosexuality is not a mental disorder, and so 
may not be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder. It is not 
necessarily paradoxical to claim that ‘there may be situations in which homosexuality 
may be medically treated’ while also considering ways in which the medical treatment 
of homosexuality might be safeguarded against. If it is the case that ‘homosexuality may 
not be medically treated on the basis of being a mental disorder’, then the two positions 
are not mutually exclusive. As explained in chapter three, to claim that ‘only disorders 
may be medically treated on the basis of being disorders’ is quite different from 
claiming ‘only disorders may be medically treated’.  On the former approach, non-
disorders may be medically treated, but not using the rhetoric of disorder (i.e. the 
pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment). This means that, unlike the 
latter approach, the former approach does not rule out too much. For example, 
providing pain relief during child birth may be acceptable. 
This line of argument (that ‘only disorders may be medically treated on the basis of 
being mental disorders’) may also be applied to masturbation, being a runaway slave 
and being a political dissident. That is, if these conditions are not mental disorders, then 
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they may be medically treated, but not on the basis of being mental disorders. In this 
way, the medical treatment of these conditions can be safeguarded against. Some 
readers might balk at this position as it allows that there might be cases in which these 
conditions should be medically treated. However, as will be discussed in the next 
section (the coda), this does not mean ‘anything goes’ i.e. that homosexuality and so on 
may be medically treated without restriction. For example, it is highly unlikely that any 
runaway slave or political dissident would freely consent to such treatment. Hence, this 
position will not, in practise, allow for the medical treatment of runaway slaves or 
political dissidents. It is possible that someone would consent to some treatments to 
curb or stop him or her from masturbating or would consent to conversion therapy to 
eliminate homosexuality. However, if masturbation or homosexuality is not a mental 
disorder, and the consenting individual is aware of this, then psychiatry is not being 
used as a guise for social control, and so is not problematic in this sense. 
To support the claims that homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and 
being a political dissident may not be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder, two things must be established. Firstly, it must be shown that there is a link 
between mental disorder and medical treatment i.e. that there is such a thing as ‘the 
rhetoric of mental disorder’. I have referred to this throughout the thesis as criterion 
one. Secondly, it needs to be shown that the condition in question, such as 
homosexuality, is not a mental disorder in any society. This second criterion has two 
components. Criteria 2.1 is that the extension of mental disorder is static between 
societies. Criteria 2.2 is that the condition in question, such as homosexuality, must not 
fall within the extension of mental disorder. If both parts of the second criterion are met, 
then the condition in question, such as homosexuality, is not, never was and never will 
be a mental disorder. Those societies or individuals that consider homosexuality to be a 
mental disorder do not just use an extension of mental disorder that is different to that 
used in the developed world, but class homosexuality incorrectly. Their extension of 
mental disorder would be wrong. Moreover, if both criteria one and two are met, then 
the condition in question (for example, homosexuality) may not be medically treated on 
the basis of being a mental disorder. A society that medically treats homosexuality on 
the basis that it is a mental disorder would be incorrectly applying the rhetoric of 
mental disorder (i.e. using the incorrect extension of mental disorder but correctly 
applied the rhetoric c.f. using the correct extension but incorrectly applying it). Some 
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societies, such as China226, Serbia and Indonesia, still consider homosexuality to be a 
mental disorder, which means that in these countries, it may be medically treated on the 
basis of being a mental disorder. If it can be shown that these people are incorrectly 
applying the rhetoric of mental disorder, then we can safeguard against the medical 
treatment of homosexuality in these countries.  
A second benefit is as follows: there exist conditions for which their status as mental 
disorders is debatable such as ADHD227, schizophrenia228 (including attenuated 
psychosis syndrome229) and Dangerous Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD).230 It would 
be beneficial if criteria one and two were met, as then it could be determined, for once 
and for all, whether these conditions are mental disorders. In turn, it could be 
determined, for once and for all, whether the medical treatment of these conditions (on 
the basis that they are mental disorders) amounts to using psychiatry as a guise for 
social control.   Put another way, it could be determined, for example, whether 
medicating children with ADHD with Ritalin can be justified using the rhetoric of mental 
disorder (i.e. that ADHD may be medically treated on the basis of being a mental 
disorder) or whether medicating children so that they can succeed in the classroom 
environment is a minor form of social control. 
The thesis then considered whether the two criteria (‘only mental disorders may be 
medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders’ and ‘homosexuality, 
masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political dissident are not mental 
disorders in any society’) were true. After defining medical treatment as ‘those products 
and services, both effective and ineffective, that are provided by health professionals in 
their capacity as health professionals i.e. treatments that fall within the Asclepian 
frames’, chapter four showed that there is no exclusive prescriptive link between 
mental disorder and medical treatment. The presence of a disorder (either mental or 
                                                          
226 While homosexuality is not a mental disorder according to the Chinese Society of Psychiatrists, in 
practice, it is considered to be a mental disorder (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
227 Timimi & Taylor (2004) and Conrad & Potter (2000) argue that ADHD is not a mental disorder but the 
consequence of expecting people to succeed in the structured environment of the classroom or office.  
228 Bentall (1993) and Boyle (1990) argue that schizophrenia is not a mental disorder because it does not 
meet the standards of scientific validity (Poland, 2007, 170).  
229 A diagnosis of Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome could easily be used for the purpose of social control 
(Gosden, 1999). 
230 DSPD was seen as a political invention that used medicine as a guise to protect the public (Gunn, 2000; 
see also Szasz, 2003; Buchannan, 2001; Farnham, 2001; White, 2002). 
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physical) is neither necessary nor sufficient to show that the condition in question 
should be medically treated.  
While there is no exclusive prescriptive link between disorder and medical treatment, 
there is a pragmatic link between disorder and medical treatment.  Hence, the first 
criterion (only mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental 
disorders) is true. The pragmatic link refers to the idea that mental disorders may (c.f. 
should) be medically treated because they are mental disorders. This is because both 
disorders and medical treatments fit within the Asclepian frame. As mental disorders 
may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders, it follows that only 
mental disorders may be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders i.e. 
conditions that are not mental disorders may not be medically treated on the basis of 
being mental disorders. Hence, the first criterion is true. Some non-disorders, such as 
pregnancy, also fall within the Asclepian frame. This means that some non-disorders 
may (c.f. should) be medically treated. This does not jeopardise the existence of a 
pragmatic link between disorders and medical treatment, as the link only requires that 
disorder is sufficient (c.f. necessary) for appropriate medical treatment. 
Chapters five through eight considered the second criterion (that it needs to be shown 
that homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political dissident 
are not mental disorders in any society). Chapter five considered the way mental 
disorder is used in ordinary language. It acknowledged that in ordinary language, mental 
disorder might be used in multiple ways and specified that the sense of mental disorder 
that this thesis is interested in is the way mental disorder is used by health professionals 
in clinical settings and informed lay-people in serious situations. For a condition to be a 
mental disorder in this sense, it must be a) mental, b) disvalued and c) caused by a 
dysfunction. An advantage of basing the extension of this sense of mental disorder on 
ordinary language is that it retains the pragmatic link between mental disorder and 
medical treatment. A second advantage is that homosexuality and so on will not fall 
within the extension of mental disorder, at least in the developed world. That is, 
criterion 2.2 would be met. However, this approach does not fulfil criterion 2.1 – it does 
not fix the extension of mental disorder between societies. For example, homosexuality 
cannot be a mental disorder in a society in which it is not disvalued (i.e. valued or value-
neutral), but might be a mental disorder in a society in which it is disvalued. Hence, 
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basing the extension of mental disorder on the way it is ordinarily used does not fulfil 
criterion two (homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political 
dissident are not mental disorders in any society). In turn, it cannot safeguard against 
the medical treatment of these conditions on the basis that they are not mental 
disorders.  
Chapter six considered whether science could both fix the extension of mental disorder 
and show that homosexuality, masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political 
dissident are not mental disorders. This might be achieved if mental disorder (as used 
by health professionals and informed lay-people) picked out a scientifically real 
category (i.e. a natural kind). However, this sense of mental disorder cannot pick out a 
natural kind – neither an essentialist natural kind nor a family resemblance natural kind 
– because disvalue is a necessary component of this sense of mental disorder.  However, 
dysfunction (being a component of mental disorder) might pick out a natural kind. 
Rather than contributing to the debate concerning whether dysfunction picks out a 
natural kind, this thesis considers the implications of dysfunction picking out a natural 
kind. That is, if dysfunction did pick out a natural kind, will it meet both criteria 2.1 and 
2.2?  
Chapter seven answered this question in the negative. This applies regardless of 
whether one is an essentialist concerning natural kinds, such as Wakefield (Wakefield, 
1999a, 471-472; 2000, 36), Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975; 1973) or a non-
essentialist, such as Cooper (2005) and Dupré (1981). It also applies whether one is a 
conservative naturalist or a revisionist naturalist. Conservative naturalism is the 
position that natural kinds should be constrained by ordinary language. The benefit of 
conservative naturalism is that the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) could 
not include conditions such as homosexuality, at least not in the developed world. 
Hence, conservative naturalism would mean that homosexuality and so on would not be 
included within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists), at least in the 
developed world i.e. criterion 2.2 would be met.  In addition, if dysfunction picked out a 
conservative natural kind, then the pragmatic link would be retained. This is because 
according to conservativism, natural kinds are constrained by ordinary language. Only 
those conditions that are ordinarily thought of as being caused by a dysfunction might 
be mental disorders. However, conservative naturalism does not fix the extension of 
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mental disorders. In a society that considers homosexuality to be a mental disorder, 
homosexuality will fall within the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists). This is 
because conservative naturalism cannot account for new scientific evidence until that 
evidence has been incorporated into ordinary language. Hence, conservative naturalism 
does not meet criterion 2.1, and therefore, it cannot meet criterion two. A conservative 
approach to natural kinds does not allow us to say that a society that considers a 
condition, such as homosexuality, to be a mental disorder is wrong, and so we cannot 
say that those who medically treat these conditions have incorrectly applied the 
rhetoric of mental disorder.  
I have not shown that conservative naturalism is wrong i.e. that natural kinds should 
not be determined ‘from the armchair’. I have only shown that conservative naturalism 
is problematic for my purposes because it will not provide a static extension of the 
natural kind in question. Nonetheless, I think there is something fundamentally wrong 
with conservative naturalism and refuting conservative naturalism would be an 
interesting area for my research in the future. 
Revisionist naturalism is the position that natural kinds should not be constrained by 
ordinary language. Revisionist naturalism does provide a static extension of the natural 
kind in question – it meets criterion 2.1.231 However, revisionist naturalism concerning 
the natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) might not exclude homosexuality and 
so on. In turn, homosexuality might be a mental disorder in all societies and so may be 
medically treated in all societies. More generally, descriptive claims about the extension 
of a natural kind cannot be derived from prescriptive claims about the way we want a 
natural kind to be. Hence, revisionist naturalism cannot safeguard against the medical 
treatment of conditions such as homosexuality (on the basis that they are not mental 
disorders). An advantage of conservative naturalism is that it retains the pragmatic link 
between mental disorders and medical treatment. Revisionist naturalism does not 
necessarily forsake the pragmatic link (see section five of chapter seven). However, 
revisionist naturalism might mean that the link becomes less useful. If the revisionist 
                                                          
231 This applies to both essentialist and family resemblance natural kinds. However, family resemblance 
natural kinds may be promiscuous i.e. a single concept may pick out multiple family resemblance natural 
kinds. The extension of dysfunction might not be static between these natural kinds.  I have avoided this 
problem by specifying that I am solely interested in the way dysfunction is used by health professionals 
and informed lay-people. This sense of dysfunction will not pick out multiple family resemblance natural 
kinds, which means that promiscuity is avoided and so will provide a static extension of dysfunction. 
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natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) strays from the way dysfunction is 
ordinarily used, it might be the case that all mental disorders may be medically treated 
and many non-disorders also may be medically treated. If so, then there would be less 
reason to determine the disorder-status of a condition. It might be more fruitful to 
determine whether the medical treatment fulfills the standard bioethical criteria or the 
requirements of values-based medicine (see the coda in this chapter). 
In short, together, chapters six and seven show that even if dysfunction is a natural kind 
(either essentialist or family resemblance), neither conservative nor revisionist 
naturalism can provide an extension of mental disorder that applies to all societies and 
excludes conditions such as homosexuality. Basing the extension of dysfunction on a 
natural kind (presuming it exists) will not allow us both to have our cake and eat it – it 
will not meet both criteria 2.1 and 2.2, and so will not meet criterion two.  In turn, the 
natural kind dysfunction (presuming it exists) cannot safeguard against the medical 
treatment of conditions such as homosexuality on the basis that they are not mental 
disorders. While the thesis has not succeeded in showing that both criteria 2.1 and 2.2 
can be met, if dysfunction picks out a natural kind, then it can be shown whether a 
condition (such as homosexuality) is caused by a dysfunction. Even so, it cannot show 
that homosexuality is not caused by a dysfunction.  
Chapter eight considered whether both criteria 2.1 and 2.2 could be met by considering 
the evaluative component of mental disorder. Mackie’s (1977) argument from 
ontological queerness means that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a 
concept such as mental disorder picks out a morally real category. Hence, rather than 
considering moral realism, chapter eight focused on whether Rawlsian primary goods 
might provide an extension of mental disorder that meets criteria 2.1 and 2.2. It was 
shown that Graham’s (2013) basic psychological capacities might be primary goods (c.f. 
Varga, 2015), and that primary goods might provide an extension of mental disorder 
that is a good fit with ordinary language i.e. it meets criteria 2.2. However, this approach 
does not provide an extension of mental disorder that can be applied to all societies i.e. it 
does not meet criterion 2.1. This is because the basic psychological capacities are so 
expansive that they might be interpreted in different ways in different societies. To be 
neutral between conceptions of the good life, the basic psychological capacities must be 
broad. Hence, anyone who attempted to utilise Rawlsian primary goods to fix the 
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extension of mental disorder is likely to fail. A further problem with Graham’s analysis is 
his claim that an incapacity to grasp the moral code of a society might be indicative of a 
mental disorder (Graham, 2010, 174-175). This is problematic because in a society in 
which homosexuality is immoral, a gay person might be deemed incapable of grasping 
morality and so might be considered to be mentally disordered, and medically treated 
on this basis.  The final way in which the basic psychological capacities will not provide 
a static extension of mental disorder is that whether such a capacity is impaired depends 
on social and/or biological features of the society in question. As criterion 2.1 is not met, 
conditions such as homosexuality might be considered to be mental disorders in some 
societies i.e. criterion two has not been fulfilled.  
Overall, chapters five through eight considered three ways in which criterion two might 
be met, namely, by basing the extension of mental disorder on a) ordinary language, b) 
natural kinds (either essentialist or family resemblance, and conservative or 
revisionist), or c) values (specifically Graham’s basic psychological capacities). None of 
these approaches have been able to show that conditions such as homosexuality are not 
mental disorders in any society (criterion two). It can be shown that these conditions 
are not mental disorders, but it cannot also be shown that these conditions are not 
mental disorders in any society. Equally, while it can be shown that the extension of 
mental disorder is partly static between societies (if dysfunction picks out a natural 
kind), these conditions might be mental disorders. There is an inconsistency between 
wanting the extension of a concept such as mental disorder or dysfunction to only 
include the things we want it to include, and also wanting there to be a truth concerning 
the extension of mental disorder or dysfunction i.e. wanting the extension of these 
concepts to be static between societies. We might want conditions such as 
homosexuality to be excluded from the true extension of mental disorder or dysfunction, 
but this is not necessarily the case. Further, if it is the case, this is independent from the 
fact that we want it to be the case. We can either base the extension of mental disorder 
on what we want to be the case or base it on the truth (presuming there is a truth). As 
the two might not coincide, we cannot both have our cake and eat it.  
Looking at the big picture, this thesis has begun with the way that mental disorder is 
ordinarily used by health professionals and informed lay-people, and then considered 
whether there is a way in which the extension of mental disorder could be used to 
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safeguard against the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality. This 
cannot be done. While it has been shown that only mental disorders may be medically 
treated on the basis of being disorders, it has not been shown that conditions such as 
homosexuality are not mental disorders in any society. In other words, this thesis has 
not been able to show that those societies that consider conditions such as 
homosexuality to be mental disorders are wrong. In turn, the thesis has failed to show 
that the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality can be safeguarded 
against by showing that conditions such as homosexuality may not be medically treated 
on the basis of being mental disorders. 
2. Coda 
What implications does this have for the future of the debate regarding the extension of 
mental disorder and the medical treatment of conditions such as homosexuality? While 
this thesis has not been successful in showing that conditions such as homosexuality 
may not be medically treated on the basis of being mental disorders, this might not 
mean that the door is left open to the medical treatment of these conditions. It only 
means that the arguments claiming that conditions may not be medically treated cannot 
be based on the rhetoric of mental disorder (which necessarily includes an analysis of 
the extension of mental disorder). That is, rather than showing that the medical 
treatment of these conditions is inappropriate, the arguments need to show that such 
medical treatment is unacceptable i.e. that they should not be medically treated. Here, I 
claim that the medical treatment ‘should’ not be given, as opposed to ‘may’ not be given. 
This denotes that I am now discussing prescriptive claims concerning medical 
treatment. I am no longer discussing the pragmatic link between mental disorder and 
medical treatment. 
As explained in section two of chapter three, there are at least two ways of showing that 
a condition (either a disorder or a non-disorder) should not be medically treated. The 
first is to show that, on balance, the standard bioethical criteria relevant to clinical 
decision-making (consent, benefit to patient, and harm-minimisation) are not in favour 
of medical treatment. The second is to show that the medical treatment should not be 
given using a values-based approach, such as Fulford’s (2004a) values-based medicine 
(VBM). This approach claims that the values captured by the ‘standard bioethical 
criteria’ approach only pick out a small proportion of the values involved in medicine, 
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and to determine whether medical treatment should be given the situation that a 
particular patient is in needs to be considered (see section two of chapter three).  
Regarding the ‘standard bioethical criteria’ approach, a potential argument is that in a 
queer-friendly society, being gay does not lead to bad outcomes which makes it difficult 
to maintain that conversion therapy is beneficial. Similarly, it could be shown that 
masturbation is not harmful in a sexually liberated society, that being a runaway slave is 
not harmful in societies that are not racist, and that being a political dissident is not 
harmful in societies that are not dictatorships. The disadvantage of this approach is that 
homosexuality, for example, would be considered harmful in a homophobic society. To 
show that being gay is not harmful in a homophobic society, it could be argued that the 
harm from being gay is only due to social, as opposed to biological, factors. However, 
distinguishing between the social and the biological can be incredibly difficult (Kendell, 
1975, 455). Moreover, as Murray argues, even if harm is due to social factors, if medical 
treatment can alleviate the suffering of gay people living in a homophobic society, then 
health professionals should provide this treatment (Murray in Earp et. al, 2014, 9; see 
also Haldeman and Bonne, both in Earp et. al, 2014; and section four of chapter three). 
Another potential reason why homosexuality should not be medically treated (on the 
‘standard bioethical criteria’ approach) is that the medical treatment of homosexuality 
amounts to the homogenisation of sexuality (see Gupta, 2012) and that having a diverse 
range of sexual preferences is a good thing, or at least not a bad thing. Gupta says that 
while there are no studies that consider whether sexual diversity is a common good, 
there are many studies that show that racial, linguistic, and cultural diversity is a 
common good (Gupta, 2012, 27). That is, even if conversion therapy benefits the 
individual (as conversion therapy might be advantageous to a gay person in a very 
homophobic society), it might not be beneficial to society (or might even be harmful to 
society). The same can be applied to political dissidence. That is, it is good for there to 
be a diverse range of political persuasions and that treating people on the basis that 
they have a minority political view would, in turn, negatively impact on the common 
good. Returning to the example of homosexuality, the question becomes whether the 
individual (the gay person) should be denied conversion therapy for the sake of the 
benefit for society. In other words, should a gay person in a homophobic society be 
forced into martyrdom for the sake of the good of society? In addition, it is arguable that 
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the medical treatment of homosexuality reinforces the idea that homosexuality is a bad 
thing. Hence, even if I freely consent to conversion therapy to make me straight, it is 
arguable that conversion therapy should not be permissible because it means that other 
gay people who are considering conversion therapy will be more likely to seek out (and 
consent to) conversion therapy. As Haldeman says, “psychology cannot free people from 
stigma by continuing to promote or tacitly endorse conversion therapy” (Haldeman, 
1994, 226). Gupta (2012) makes the same argument with respect to the claim that 
allowing cosmetic surgery reinforces the beauty ideal (see also Murray & Little in Earp 
et al., 2014).232 Once again, the question becomes whether a gay person in a 
homophobic society be forced into martyrdom for the sake of other gay people.  
This coda has provided a brief analysis of some of the ethical arguments that could be 
made to safeguard against the medical treatment of homosexuality (as well as 
masturbation, being a runaway slave and being a political dissident). Even this short 
discussion has shown that these arguments are not straightforward. It seems that a 
knock-down argument that can show in which circumstances, if any, these conditions 
may be medically treated is still a long way off.  Those working in the mental health field 
must be very careful that they are treating their clients and patients for justifiable 
reasons. Perhaps then, using VBM to assist with clinical decision-making – to determine 
whether an instance of a condition in an individual should be given a particular medical 
treatment – would be the most fruitful approach.  According to VBM, while the patient’s 
values have ‘first call’, the values of the health professionals and others “who have a 
legitimate interest in outcomes” are also relevant. Legitimately interested parties can 
include family (especially if they are responsible for the care of the patient), employers, 
insurers and even the State (Fulford, 2004, 81). Fulford’s fundamental argument is that 
people’s values are legitimately different, and so health professionals need to welcome a 
“plurality of perspectives” (Fulford, 2004, 81). By making explicit the values of all 
affected parties, Fulford says a better decision will be made (Fulford, 2004, 82) and also 
reduce the scope for psychiatry to be used for the purpose of social control (Fulford 
et.al., 1993, 808).  Whereas the ‘standard bioethical criteria’ approach aims to come to 
the ‘right’ answer, VBM acknowledges that values will be diverse and thus the process 
                                                          
232 Haldeman, Murray and Little note the tension between the idea that providing conversion therapy or 
cosmetic surgery makes the health professional complicit in questionable social norms and that denying 
such treatments may cause the individual more suffering (Earp et. al., 2014, 9). 
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(e.g. good communication) is more important than obtaining the ‘right’ outcome 
(Fulford, 2004a, 67; 2004b, 81-82). Rather than coming to a consensus, Fulford 
encourages that we come to a ‘dissensus’ – he does not want to homogenise diverse 
values (Fulford, 2004, 64). If all the relevant values of all interested parties are made 
clear, and disagreement is encouraged, then the chances of psychiatry being used as a 
guise for social control might be minimised. As Mahatma Gandhi says, ‘honest 
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